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Chapter 1
Introduction
「不以規矩，不能成方圓」
“Nothing can be accomplished without norms or standards.”
–《孟子 ⋅離婁上》
Mèng Zıˇ ⋅ Lí Lóu Shàng
Normative reasoning is a general theoretical topic that studies normative concepts
involving obligation, prohibition, and permission in various systematic methods. It at-
tracted a great deal of attention from experts in various fields including philosophy, lin-
guistics, ethics, law, and artificial intelligence. A number of traditional formal methods
including deontic logic (e.g. standard deontic logic [73], minimal deontic logic [101],
dynamic deontic logic [74], and deontic action logic [20, 100]), the logic of agency
(e.g. STIT-logics [12, 50]), Input/Output logic [82], logic and games [107, 48, 113, 96],
and law and logic [56, 57, 63, 68, 54, 94, 64] have been used in researches into nor-
mative reasoning. Normative reasoning is often viewed as non-monotonic, because it
has an important common sense aspect. This is reflected in many recent approaches,
for instance deontic preference logic [42, 109], non-monotonic logic [76, 70, 95], ar-
gumentation and logic programming [14], and default theory [52].
For a long time, the dominant normative concept in normative reasoning, either in
theoretical fields or in formal tools, has been that of obligation rather than permission.
For instance, in standard deontic logic (SDL), permission is reducible to obligation. It
is the dual of obligation. For the sake of consistency in this reductive account, it has
to be that obligation implies permission. This so-called consistency principle in SDL
seems to be a sufficient prescriptive criterion for normative reasoning [3, p.283]. It
is now a widely-accepted principle in most of the normative systems in the reductive
account.
Should we take for granted that permission must be viewed as a second class citi-
zen? Indeed, from the perspective of rationality, obligation guides human actions, and
hence it should be at the center of normative reasoning. However, the reducibility of
permission to obligation is not universally accepted. Von Wright’s classic paper [116]
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is the first attempt to study permission as a primitive concept, and reduce obligation
to the dual of permission. Though “this choice was more or less an accident” [43],
it shows a branching point in normative reasoning: the reducibility of permission to
obligation should not be taken for granted 1.
For one thing, the reduction just mentioned entails several difficulties in capturing
the common sense notion of permission expressed by the free choice principle [118,
p.21-22]. “Permission here means freedom to choose between all the alternatives, if
any, covered by the permitted thing.” (See [118, p.32].) This idea approximates the
concept permission as at liberty in philosophy [84], which is also based on common
use in ordinary language. “When saying that an action is permitted we mean that one is
at liberty to perform it, that one may either perform the action or refrain from perform-
ing it.” (See [84].) If both concepts share the same logical structure as “permission as
the dual of obligation” in the reductive approach [47, 73], then either free choice per-
mission causes the famous puzzle, the so-called Ross’s Paradox 2 [47, p.61-62] [73],
or permission as at liberty fails the principle of consistency. I will come back to this in
Section 1.1.3. In conclusion, permission as freedom to act is at odds with the standard
notion of permission that is reducible to obligation.
In the face of this, one natural solution is to study normative systems where per-
mission is not reducible to obligation. A number of normative systems of that kind
have been developed [101, 21, 99, 89, 11, 10], in which the reducible tie between obli-
gation and permission is broken, while two principles are maintained. The first is the
consistency principle mentioned above. The second is the free choice principle regard-
ing permission: all performances of the alternatives are allowed. These non-reductive
approaches also seem to fit many uses of "permissions" in natural language.
A number of researches, especially in legal theory, have pointed out the many faces
of permission related to obligation. Rather than being reduced to the dual of obliga-
tion, and implied by obligation, certain types of permission can also generate obliga-
tion. Hohfeldian legal rights involve two types of permission, one is called privilege,
the dual of obligation, the other is called power, which is one’s legal ability to change
others’ normative states constructed by obligation [49]. Various formal methods have
been developed to model this classification emphasizing the dynamic aspect of permis-
sion [56, 57, 63, 68, 54, 94]. On the other hand, considering the defeasible functions
of rights in a legal context [45, p.275], there are clearly many notions of permissions.
One is the protected right proposed by Raz [85], which can defeat the others’ reasons
for interference, and so it is a claim that “the other has a duty not to interfere.” These
1Von Wright mentioned once in his later paper [120, p.17] that “the analogy between modal and
deontic ideas” is “untenable and that the identities which are extracted from it depend on a confusion
between genuine norms and norm-propositions or statements about the existence or non-existence of
norms.” In deontic logic a lot of discussions concern the question of what are genuine norms. See the
Jørgensen’s dilemma related to the prescriptive/descriptive distinction [47, p.58-59]. In this thesis I just
note this issue, however.
2Sometimes it is called free choice permissions puzzle, but this is different from the free choice per-
mission paradox introduced later, because they have different causes, and result in different conclusions.
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Raz-protections are, however, defeasible, as it frequently appears in legal texts and in
discussion among legal scholars [121, 85]. However, few formal works have touched
on this issue of defeasible permissions and rights.
The main research questions in this thesis are: How to capture the four principles
consistency, free choice, change, and defeasibility for permissions? What are the ap-
propriate non-monotonic logics for normative reasoning, in which one can characterize
various types of permission? Though several formal works for free choice permission
and for permissions as rights have been developed, few have touched the many facets
of permission in non-monotonic normative reasoning. This is the goal of this thesis.
1.1 An Overview on Permission
I start with an overview on permission in normative reasoning, which focuses on the
development of deontic logic [73, 47], a field which perhaps is the first to offer a
systematic analysis of normative concepts in a formal way.
1.1.1 The Traditional Scheme: A Reductive Approach
The theoretical foundation of Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) has two origins. One can
be dated it back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s reductive “modalities of law” (iuris
modalia), which includes three categories: obligation (debitum), prohibition (illici-
tum), and permission (licitum) [47]. SDL follows this reductive method, and is devel-
oped based on such modal analogies. Along the path of its ancestor in the 14th century,
SDL takes obligation as the primitive concept in the scheme, and thus prohibition and
permission can be defined accordingly. Prohibition is something it is obligatory not to
do, and permission is something it is not obligatory not to do. The core of the reduc-
tive approach is that: permission is the dual of obligation. This kind of permission is
called negative permission or weak permission [118]. The other key feature of SDL, its
second origin, is the so-called consistency principle, which can be traced back to von
Wright’s earliest work [116, 73, 47]. In its usual form it states that obligation implies
permission, which together with the definition of permission in terms of obligation
excludes inconsistent obligations. These two key points together constitute the basic
scheme of SDL.
SDL is a branch of modern modal logics [13], and axiomatically specified by the
system D [73]. As a member of the normal modal logics [13], the language of SDL is
constructed by a set of atomic propositions, taken together with classical negation, con-
junction, and the modality O for obligation. Disjunction and the material conditional
are defined as usual. Permission, such as negative permission and weak permission, is
defined by obligation: Pϕ ∶= ¬O¬ϕ. All well-formed formulas of SDL can be in-
terpreted in a serial Kripke model, which includes a binary accessible relation R over
a non-empty set of possible worlds, indicating an ideal relation between two possible
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worlds. The truth conditions for propositions are standard, and those for obligation and
permission are of a universal/existential character:
• Oϕ is true at w iff for all ideal-world u accessible from w, ϕ is true at u
• Pϕ is true at w iff for some ideal-world u accessible from w, ϕ is true at u
The sound and complete axiomatization for SDL is presented in Table 1.1.
(K-O) O(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Oϕ→ Oψ)
(D-O) Oϕ→ ¬O¬ϕ
(NEC-O)
ϕ
Oϕ
Table 1.1: All propositional tautologies are taken as axioms, and Modus Ponens is
taken as a rule.
As usual in normal modal logics, the logical characterization of negative permission is
the following theorem in SDL:
P (ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ Pϕ ∨ Pψ
This property for negative permission will sometime be called the weak permission
property. Similarly, the following is the standard property for obligation in SDL:
O(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ Oϕ ∧Oψ
For many purposes it is useful to extend the language of SDL with an action or
agency operator, capturing what the agent does or “sees to it that.” One recent promi-
nent logic of agency is the so-called "STIT" theory, for "Seeing To It That" [50]. The
main component in constructing the language of STIT is the non-normal modality [13]
Doi over propositions, which indicates that agent i “sees to it that.” This modality is,
however, often assumed to be a normal, S5 modality [50, p.17]. One popular formu-
lation of “seeing to it that” in legal theory is a deontic logic with the T axiom and the
E rule for “seeing to it that,” analyzed by Kanger and Kanger [57, 56], Lindahl [63],
Makinson [68] and Sergot [93]. See the details in Table 1.2.
(T -Do) Doiϕ→ ϕ (E-Do)
ϕ↔ ψ
Doiϕ↔ Doiψ
Table 1.2: One sound and complete deontic logic for STIT. All propositional tautolo-
gies, Modus Ponens and all axioms and rules for O in SDL are also taken into account.
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1.1.2 A Brief History of the Free Choice Principle
In what follows, I give a brief history about the development of the notion of free
choice permission. The basic idea is that when a permission is given for a number of
alternatives, one is at liberty to choose any of them.
The expression “free choice permission” is first noted in von Wright’s later work [118,
p.21], which addressed permission with a free distribution of one’s choices:
“On an ordinary understanding of the phrase ‘it is permitted that,’ the for-
mula ‘P (p ∨ q)’ seems to entail ‘Pp ∧ Pq.’ If I say to somebody ‘you
may work or relax’ I normally mean that the person addressed has my per-
mission to work and also my permission to relax. It is up to him to choose
between the two alternatives.”
I denote this logical principle by FCP. Free choice permission should be distinguished
from the two alternative forms of permission that have been discussed. First, in par-
allel to free choice permission von Wright also introduced the notion of strong per-
mission [117]. This appears to be stronger than free choice permission. An action is
strongly permitted in this sense if “the authority has considered its normative status
and decided to permit it.” This might be seen as requiring that P (ϕ∨ ψ) is equivalent
to Pϕ∧ Pψ. Second, the notion of bilateral permission is based on a similar intuition
but involves a different logic structure. Bilateral permission is introduced by Raz [84,
p.161], as a notion of permission under which one is at liberty to perform the permitted
action: “that one may either perform the action or refrain from performing it.” Free
choice permission is often associated with strong permission, but not with bilateral
permission.
The free choice permission is close to the later developed notion in accord with the
principle open specification [25] (or open interpretation [18]) in the logic of actions,
and to the open reading principle studied in [6] recently. The open interpretation of an
action expression is first mentioned in [25]. Roughly speaking, an action expression
is open whenever “the action denoted by that action expression occurs, possibly in
combination with other actions” [26]. Under such an “open” specification for actions,
a strong permission comes down to saying that an action is permitted if none of the
ways of performing this action leads to a violation state, which takes us back to free
choice permission in the sense of [118].
1.1.3 Problems for Free Choice Permission and Weak Permission
The so-called free choice permission paradox shows that the standard, weak reading
of permission is incompatible with free choice permission. The free choice permission
paradox was first discussed by von Wright [118, p.33], and later extensively discussed
by logicians. It is generally taken to show an incompatibility between “our intuitive
understanding of such statements of ordinary language, our usual procedure for sym-
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bolizing them, and the formal powers of the usual systems of deontic logic within
which they are symbolized” [67].
I will come back in detail to the problem with FCP in Chapter 3. For now I just
highlight one of the most acute forms of the paradox. As already pointed out by
Hilpinen [46, p.176-177], if (classically) logically equivalent formulas can be sub-
stituted in the scope of the permission operator, then the following is a direct conse-
quence of FCP: Pϕ → P (ϕ ∧ ψ) for arbitrary ψ. Hansson’s well-known vegetarian
free lunch [43, p.218] is one instance of this: if you are permitted to order a vegetarian
lunch, then you are permitted to order a vegetarian lunch and not pay for this meal.
1.2 The Many Faces of Permission
So far I have encountered three types of permissions: weak, strong and bilateral. These
have been extensively studied by philosophical logicians and computer scientists in
the tradition that started with von Wright. Permission has also been studied in natural
language semantics and in formal theories of rights. In what follows I give a short
overview of the main insights arising from these different traditions.
1.2.1 Permissions in Natural Language
Permissions in Formal Linguistics
In linguistics, utterances with “may,” “can” in a deontic context are ambiguous. An
ordinary utterance of choices (1a) taken in a deontic context would normally be un-
derstood as the conjunction of its choices (1b) and (1c), in the sense of free choice
permission:
(1a) Detectives may go by bus or boat.
(1b) Detectives may go by bus.
(1c) Detectives may go by boat.
However, some formal linguists have noticed [123] that, in ordinary language use, this
kind of inference is not always warranted.
The following is an example, which seems to imply neither (1b) nor (1c). It rather
behaves like a weak permission:
(1d) Detectives may go by bus or boat – but I forget which.
How to account for this phenomenon? Two general forms of reply are proposed in for-
mal linguistics: the pragmatic account is rooted in the Gricean view [38], which treats
the deontic utterances about permission as a conversational implicature. Nowadays,
this investigation of permission is well-analysed through pragmatic concepts including
quantity implicature [32] and scalar implicature [5, 31]. For the semantic account,
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one promising answer for the free choice phenomenon in the deontic context uses the
alternative semantics [4].
Permissions in Dynamics: Reshape the Normative States
Another important insight from the formal semantics literature is the dynamic aspect of
permission. This was explicitly mentioned by David Lewis [61] in the so-called games
between Master and Slave. In this example, “the point of the game, as regards com-
manding and permitting, is to enable the Master to control the actions of the Slave [61,
p.22],” and “his purpose is to control the Slave’s actions by changing the sphere of
permissibility [61, p.24].” In other words, the function of permission is to influence the
normative states of others, in order to guide the others’ actions.
In von Wright’s work this dynamic aspect goes hand in hand with his notion of
strong permission [117, p.86]: “An act is permitted in the strong sense if the authority
has considered its normative status and decided to permit it. [. . . ] Strong permission
only is a norm-character.” Various formal works have addressed the norm change
function of permission in modeling legal rights [63, 68, 54]. I will come back to this
in Chapter 4.
The formal theories of “changes” have been well-studied in dynamic epistemic
logics [103, 9] and dynamic deontic logics [65, 109, 110]. Semantically, the logics of
dynamics involve two kinds of model transformations. So do information dynamics.
One is the so-called update, which concerns the change in the level of the worlds. Af-
ter the announcement of new “hard information,” it generates a model only containing
the worlds that satisfy the announced information. The other, the so-called upgrade
considers the change in the level of the preference structure. After the announcement
of new “soft information,” it generates a model with the same worlds but a new pref-
erence order. Recently, van Benthem et al. [110] developed a dynamic deontic logic
for conditional obligation based on the second type of change, in which permission is
modeled as a dynamic modality, and can be viewed as free choice permission in certain
conditions.
1.2.2 Permissions and Rights in Legal Theory
Hohfeld’s influential classification of fundamental legal rights [49] distinguishes be-
tween static and dynamic rights. Static rights include claim and privilege, and their
correlatives of duty and no-claim; dynamic rights are power and immunity together
with the correlatives of liability and no-power. Given that agent i has a claim against
agent j to stay off i’s land, this claim correlates to j’s duty toward i to stay off her
land. The classical duality and correlation between the different Hohfeldian types of
right are presented in Table 1.3. Observe that the opposite relation in static rights is the
dual relation between obligation and permission in deontic logic. If i has a privilege
against j to enter her land, this is reduced to j’s absence of a claim against i not to
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Claim Duty
No-Claim Privilege
correlatives
opposites
Power Liability
No-Power Immunity
correlatives
opposites
Table 1.3: Legal Rights [94]
enter her land. A number of formal theories [56, 57, 63, 68, 54, 94] have developed
their frameworks of static rights based on this observation.
One important part of Hohfeld’s legal theory is his emphasis on the dynamic char-
acter of power and immunity. On powers, he writes:
A change in a given legal relation may result [. . . ] from some superadded
fact or group of facts which are under the volitional control of one or
more human beings. [⋯] the person (or persons) whose volitional control
is paramount may be said to have the (legal) power to effect the particular
change of legal relations that is involved in the problem.
This dynamic character can be spelled out in terms of normative positions [94]. The
dynamic rights are the legal ability to influence the normative positions, which are the
maximally consistent conjunctions consisting of the static rights.
There are two notable formal theories on Hohfeld’s “power as change” [49, p.44-
45]: reductive and non-reductive. I will argue in Chapter 4 that the first [56, 57, 63]
does not distinguish deontic from non-deontic actions. The language of the reductive
account is constructed by atomic propositions, negation, conjunction, a deontic modal-
ity O for obligation, and a Doi-modality for agent i’s “seeing to it that.” The logic for
O behaves essentially as in SDL, and the logic for Doi is the non-normal modal logic
satisfying the T axiom and the E rule [22, 50]. Then, ODoiϕ indicates a claim against
agent i to see to it that ϕ, and ¬PDoiϕ indicates an absence of agent i’s privilege to
see to it that ϕ. Power and immunity are reduced as combinations of claim, privilege,
and action performance. For instance, in [63], agent i has a power to see to it that j has
a duty to see to it that ϕ can be defined as: PDoiODojϕ. See [68, 94] for summaries
of the other formulations.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to develop the formal theories of the various permissions that I
have just introduced. The main running thread will be the non-monotonic character of
permissions, such that inferences involving permissions, and in particular free choice
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permission, can be defeated as more information comes in. So this thesis can be viewed
as a contribution to the formal theories of non-monotonic normative reasoning.
I start with an investigation of the non-reducible approach in Chapter 2, by honing
in on a special case of permissions: rational permissions in games. Setting the free
choice permission paradox aside, I argue there that such permission should satisfy free
choice permission. In particular, I argue that, in games, obligations and permissions
should be viewed, respectively, as the necessary and the sufficient conditions for ra-
tionality. This gives rise to a specific deontic logic where, for instance, O and P are
not dual notions and P becomes a free choice permission operator. This feature is em-
phasized in the logic of obligation as the weakest permission in [90, 7], and is shared
with three similar deontic logics proposed in the literature, as early as the minimal de-
ontic logic [101], and more recently the deontic action logics in [58, 20]. This chapter
studies the relationships between these deontic logics for rational agency in games.
I compare their deductive power, provide the translation results, and emphasize the
different views they take on what players ought to, or may do.
Chapter 3 is a reflection on the free choice principle imposed on actions as well
as the well-known free choice permission paradox in natural language. This chap-
ter proposes a new solution to the free choice permission paradox in three notable
aspects [11, 43, 122], combining ideas from substructural logics and non-monotonic
reasoning. The challenge for a logic of free choice permission is to exclude the counter-
intuitive consequences while not giving up too much deductive power. I suggest that
the right way to do so is using a family of substructural logics augmented with princi-
ples from non-monotonic reasoning. This follows up on a proposal made in [6].
I then turn to the dynamic aspect of permission applied to the Hohfeldian notions
of power and immunities in Chapter 4. I develop a dynamic logic to model and study
legal competences, and in particular the Hohlfeldian categories of power and immunity.
The logic improves the existing formalizations by taking explicitly into account the
genuinely dynamic character of legal competences. It does so, while keeping a tight
connection between both, with, however, the former being ultimately reducible to the
latter. The logic is shown to be completely axiomatizable, and I provide an analysis
of dynamic normative positions. And then it is applied to a concrete case in German
contract law, as well as to diverse forms of permissions in the legal context.
Chapter 5 explores various types of permission in the light of defeasibility. I sug-
gest augmenting current default theories along two dimensions: a distinction between
obligatory and permissive defaults, and a multi-agent character. In doing so, a priori-
tized default theory is developed, which encompasses permissive and obligatory norms
as prima facie norms. In this augmented default theory I can develop a rich typology
of permissions, including weak permission, explicit permission, tacit permission, and
protected right. I address two running examples as applications of analyzing legisla-
tion, one from Chinese tax law, and one from German driving regulations.

Chapter 2
Permission and Obligation for Rational
Agency in Games
This chapter studies a family of deontic logics that diverge from standard deontic logic
(SDL) [73] in that O and P are not dual, and P validates the notorious free choice
principle:
P (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ Pϕ ∧ Pψ (FCP)
In [90, 7], the authors argued that such deontic logics are well-suited to capturing
rational obligations and permissions in games, i.e. what the players ought to, and may
do according to particular solution concepts. The similarity between the logic proposed
by the authors and a number of other deontic systems has been observed in [7]. But the
precise comparison remained to be made. This is the main contribution of the present
chapter.
This contribution should be of interest to philosophical logicians working on game
theory for two reasons. It shows, first, that four independent proposals in deontic logic
are well-suited to describe the rational obligations and permissions that bear on players
in games, even though these systems might not have been originally devised for that
purpose. This is a conceptual contribution. Second, on the formal side, it provides a
systematic comparison of the deductive power of the first two systems studied here,
and shows that the third can be embedded in the first, while the fourth can be partially
embedded in the second.
Section 2.1 reviews the normative interpretation of solution concepts in game the-
ory, and the argument given in [90, 7] for the particular structure of obligations and
permissions to which they give rise. Section 2.2 provides the first comparison, between
van Benthem’s “Minimal Deontic Logic” [101] and Anglberger et al. “Obligations as
Weakest Permissions” [89]. Section 2.3 compares van Benthem’s system with Trupuz
and Kulicki’s “Deontic Boolean Action Logic” [99], and also compares Anglberger et
al.’s system with Castro and Maibaum’s “Propositional Boolean Dynamic Logic” [21].
Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.1 The Deontic Logic of Rational Recommendations
in Games
By rational recommendations in games I mean obligations and permissions stemming
from classical game-theoretic solution concepts. The goal of this section is to argue
that such recommendations give rise to a specific kind of deontic logics, one that differs
from SDL. On the way, I give a brief, informal introduction to the game-theoretic
solution concepts I have in mind (Section 2.1.1).
2.1.1 Normative Interpretation of Solution Concepts
In a game a number of self-interested players interact in what Schelling called “inter-
dependent decisions” (see [92]). The result of each player’s decision depends on what
all the other players do. In this chapter I look only at the so-called games in strategic
form. The formal definition is presented as follows:
2.1.1. DEFINITION. A game in strategic form G is a tuple ⟨I, {Si}i∈I , pi⟩ where
• I is a finite set of agents or players.
• Si is a finite set of actions or strategies for each player i.
• The payoff function pi ∶ S → RI assigns to each strategy profile a vector of
real-valued payoffs for the players, such that S is the set of all strategy profiles
σ that are combinations of strategies, one for each player.
I write σi for agent i’s strategy in σ, and σ−i for the strategies of all agents except i in
σ. I use pii to denote i’s component in that vector. Let me consider a concrete example:
the game “Guess 2/3 of the Average”, a classic in introductory game-theory courses
and experiments 1. A number n of players have to choose a natural number between 0
and 100. They do so simultaneously, without knowing what the others do. The winner
is the player whose choice is closest to 2/3 of the average number chosen. In the event
there is more than one “winner”, the players split the prize. Players prefer having more
of the prize than less. So each prefers to be the unique winner.
Consider a very simple, two-player version of this game, say between Ann and
Bob. So I = {Ann, Bob}, and SAnn = {0, 1, ..., 100}, and similarly for Bob. The
payoff function is first defined player-wise, as follows, with a pair (k, l) representing
Ann’s choice k and Bob’s choice l, and a = 2/3k + l2 .
piAnn(k, l) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 ∣k − a∣ < ∣l − a∣
1/2 ∣k − a∣ = ∣l − a∣
0 otherwise
1See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guess_2/3_of_the_average for an
overview.
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Bob’s payoff function piBob(k, l) is just defined as 1 − piAnn(k, l), while pi(k, l) as(piAnn(k, l), piBob(k, l)).
What should Ann and Bob do in this game? The standard solution concept to be
applied here is that of Nash equilibrium, which is computed using the best response
dynamics. Put yourself in Ann’s position, and consider the case in which you and Bob
choose 100. In that case you split the prize. Both of you are equally near to 2/3 of 100.
But then, given that Bob chooses 100, you (Ann) could have done better by choosing
any lower number, claiming the prize for yourself. In game-theoretic terms, choosing
100 is not a best response for Ann when Bob chooses 100. Technically, a best response
function outputs an action that, given the choice of the other players, yields an outcome
that is at least as good as the outcome yielded by any other action. Formally, for each
l ∈ SBob, Ann’s best response br(Ann, l) is defined as {k ∶ piAnn(k, l) ≥ piAnn(k′, l),
for all k′ ∈ SAnn}.2 Observe that for Ann this set is not a singleton. The best response
need not be unique. Playing anything lower than 100 will make her the unique winner,
given that Bob plays 100. But playing 100 is not a best response. The situation is
entirely symmetric for Bob, of course. Given that Ann plays 100, his best response is
to play something lower.
Suppose Ann and Bob then play different numbers, each lower than 100, but higher
than or equal to 1. Say Ann plays the highest number. This is not a best response for
her. She should play a lower number, either slightly above or slightly below Bob’s,
depending on how far he is from 2/3 of the average point. But doing so will lower that
point, which now makes even lower choices best responses for Bob.
This dynamic will continue until both Ann and Bob have chosen 0. There they play
a mutual best response, a.k.a. a Nash equilibrium. Given that you choose 0, Bob has
no incentive to choose anything else. In all other cases he forfeits the prize entirely to
Ann, and vice-versa for her. The formal definition of a Nash equilibrium is as follows:
2.1.2. DEFINITION. Let G be a game in strategic form and br be a best response func-
tion for that game. Then σ is a Nash equilibrium iff σi = br(i, σ−i) for all players
i ∈ I .
Best response and equilibrium play are two solution concepts for games. In their
normative interpretations, they are intended to capture the idea of a rational action or
a rational play. In this chapter I use best response as my running example. Ann and
Bob should not, on pain of irrationality, play actions that are not a best response to one
another.3 I call rational recommendations the normative prescriptions that one obtains
from such solution concepts in games, such as the recommendation that Ann should
2The general definition of the best response set br(i, σ−i) for player i to the choice σ−i of the others
is {si ∈ Si ∶ pii(si, σ−i) ≥ piAnn(s′i, σ−i), for all s′i ∈ Si}.
3Why? One way to answer is to go back to decision theory. There the standard of rationality for
decisions under risk is the maximization of expected utility. Simply put, a player should choose actions
for which the player has the strongest belief that the action will lead to a good outcome. Choosing
otherwise can lead to practical incoherence. See [55] for an overview of the normative interpretation of
decision theory, and [80] for an overview of its application to games.
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not play 100 if Bob plays that too. Different solution concepts will of course yield
different (but not unrelated!) rational recommendations in games. Moreover, Nash
equilibrium and best response are surely not the only solution concepts available. In
recent years, for instance, iterated elimination procedures, using either strict or weak
dominance, have attracted much attention from epistemic game theorists and logicians
(see [104, 78, 79, 24]). Here, however, I do not look at the structures of specific
solution concepts. There is already an extensive literature on logical characterizations
of, say, iterated strict dominance or equilibrium play [113, 96]. Rather, my aim is that
the abstract logics of rational recommendations in games, whatever the underlying
solution concept, should have a particular structure. This is what I argue now.
2.1.2 The Logical Structure of Rational Recommendations
I now review the argument given in [90, 7] for the following claim: rational obligations
and permissions in games should be seen, respectively, as giving necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for rational plays, and as a result the two notions should not be seen
as the dual of each other. This is a philosophical argument. If the argument is correct,
then this has important implications for the deontic logics of such rational obligations
and permissions.
Rationality is the key normative notion underlying solution concepts. As we have
seen, solution concepts pinpoint a subset of profiles that are intuitively deemed rational
in a game, sometimes given additional information about the strategies that are in play
or the beliefs of the players. Consider again Guess 2/3 of the Average. Here, the best
response prescribes that both Ann and Bob play a lower number, given that the other
plays 100. A Nash equilibrium profile in that game is one where Ann and Bob play a
mutual best response to what the other is doing. The profile (0, 0) is the unique Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies of that game.4
Solution concepts, interpreted normatively, give recommendations to the players.
But of what kind? My first claim is that they provide rational permissions, as opposed
to obligations.
Rational Permissions Solution concepts in games pinpoint rational permissions,
not necessarily rational obligations.
The argument for this claim starts with the basic observation that there is in general no
unique solution to a given game. Consider again the recommendation of best response
given that the other plays 100. Any number from 0 to 99 is a best response. The only
non-best response is playing 100 oneself. In the face of such a plurality of solutions it
does not make sense to say that the players ought to play all of these numbers. They
simply cannot do that. These are mutually exclusive actions. So, if “ought implies can”
4The situation is more complicated for more than four players. There everyone playing 1 can be an
equilibrium in pure strategies. A unique deviation to 0 might not lower the average sufficiently to ensure
a win.
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then it is not the case that players are under a rational obligation to play every solution.
What remains is that playing any solution of a game is rationally permissible. In Guess
2/3 of the Average, given that the other is playing 100, any number between 0 and 99 is
rationally permissible. The situation is of course not a particular best response in this
particular instance of that game. Non-unique solutions are ubiquitous in game theory.
In the face of this, the appropriate way to understand rational recommendations from
solution concepts is in terms of rational permissions.5
Our next claim is that rational permissions provide sufficient conditions for best
response. Here I only illustrate this by using our running example. The argument is
developed in detail in [90, 7]. Given that Bob plays 100, it is rationally permissible for
Ann to play any number, as long as it is lower than 100. Let me introduce some action-
theoretic terminology, which I will formalize later on. Call an action or a strategy
type just a set of actions/strategies for one player, and similarly for strategy profiles.
In Guess 2/3 of the Average, the type “playing a number lower than 100” is rationally
permitted for Ann by best response, given that Bob plays 100. If she plays any strategy
of that type then she plays a best response strategy. Playing less than 100 is sufficient
for rationality. Observe, furthermore, that playing any number which is an instance of a
logically stronger action type will also be best response for Ann against Bob’s playing
100.6 So picking among the set of even numbers lower than 100, or just picking 0 for
that matter, will imply playing a best response. From the perspective of best response
to 100 alone, these are all on a par.
So if “playing a number lower than 100” is a rationally permitted type, and a ra-
tional permission for the action type provides sufficient conditions for rationality, then
any of these logically stronger types should be seen as also permitted. Best response
cannot distinguish between them any further. In [90, 7] it is argued that this holds
more generally, for any rational permission in games. In a nutshell, this gives me the
following principle:
Strong Rational Permissions (SRP) An action type ϕ is rationally permitted
in game G if and only if playing a strategy of type ϕ implies playing a rational
strategy.
If SRP is correct, this has important consequences for the logical analysis of rational
recommendations. The most important is that one should take free choice permission
on board:7
P (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ Pϕ ∧ Pψ (FCP)
5Of course, when there is a unique profile that is rationally permitted, that profile becomes rationally
obligatory. This is the case, for instance, for the profile (0, 0), using rational recommendations from
Nash equilibrium in the game above. This is not only what the players are rationally permitted to
do. They ought to play (0, 0). This will correspond to a logical principle connecting obligations and
permissions, which I will encounter later on.
6A type ϕ is logically stronger than type ψ when playing a strategy of type ϕ implies playing strategy
of type ψ. In this case, I say ϕ is a sub-type of ψ.
7This principle has a reputation for being misconstructed in combination with SDL. If permissions
are normal modalities in the technical sense, then Pϕ → Pψ becomes easy to derive by using FCP.
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Indeed, if ϕ∨ ψ is viewed as a non-deterministic choice between playing ϕ or ψ, then
if playing a strategy of either type is sufficient for rationality, then playing both any
strategy of type ϕ and any strategy of type ψ is sufficient for rational play. So both are
permitted by SRP.
If permissions provide sufficient conditions for rationality, the natural counterpart
is the view of obligations as necessary conditions. In other words:
Weak Rational Obligations (WRO) An action type ϕ is rationally obligatory,
or rationally required in game G if and only if not playing a strategy of type ϕ
implies not playing a rational strategy.
I call this principle “weak” because it suggests a form of closure of obligations under
logically weaker types. If it is rationally required to do ϕ, then playing rationally
implies playing a strategy of type ϕ. But then this also implies playing any weaker
type of strategy, and in particular the trivial type ϕ∨¬ϕ. So logically very weak types
of action will turn out to be obligatory. I shall see this in the concrete case of Guess
2/3 of the Average in Section 2.2.
An important consequence of accepting both SRP and WRO is that obligations and
permissions are no longer necessarily duals. In our example it is not the case that
playing a number higher than 50 is permitted for Ann as best response to 100. This is
not sufficient for best response to 100, because playing 100 herself is a strategy of that
type. So by SRP this is not permitted. But not playing a number higher than 50 is just
the same as playing a number lower than or equal to 49. But this cannot be obligatory
either, because not playing this does not entail not playing a best response. So rational
permissions and rational requirements are not dual here.
I take these as the central features of rational recommendations in games: SRP,
WRO — viz. obligations and permissions provide, respectively, necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for rationality — and these two normative categories are not dual.
In this section I have sketched the philosophical arguments for these claims. They
are developed in more detail in [90, 7], where the authors present a deontic logic of
“obligation as weakest permission” that has all these features. In the next sections we
compare this logic with two very congenial proposals, an earlier one by van Benthem
and a more recent one by Trypuz and Kulicki. As will be seen, they all share the
three central features, and as such can be viewed as logical for rational recommenda-
tions in games, although they differ either in their philosophical commitment or their
expressive power.
An example of this is given in Section 2.2. So rational permissions should not be normal, and indeed
they are not in any of the logical systems presented below. FCP can also cause problems for non-
normal modalities, as long as they are extensional. This is the now familiar “vegetarian free lunch”
example [43]. If ordering a vegetarian meal is permitted, then by FCP the logically stronger action
type “ordering a vegetarian meal and not paying for it” must also be permitted, at least if the Boolean
constructors on action types are classical. See [6] for an answer to that criticism.
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2.2 Minimal Deontic Logic and Weakest Permissions
I start by comparing the logic of “obligations as weakest permissions” [89] with van
Benthem’s “minimal deontic logic” [101]. They have much in common, both for-
mally and in their analysis of rational recommendations. They differ, however, in their
view of obligation. Applied to rational recommendations, van Benthem’s deontic logic
makes obligatory every necessary condition for rational play. In other words, playing
any action type that rules out being rational is forbidden. This is not the case in the
logic of obligations as weakest permissions. There the unique obligation bearing on
the players is to play a rational strategy. The crux of this difference turns out to be the
relation between obligation and permission in these two systems.
2.2.1 Common Language
The two logics that I study now share the same language. They take both O and P as
primitive, and use a universal modality □.
2.2.1. DEFINITION. Let p be any element of a given countable set Prop0 of atomic
propositions. The language L is defined as follows:
ϕ ∶= p ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∧ ϕ ∣ □ϕ ∣ Pϕ ∣ Oϕ
The existential modality ◇ can be defined as ¬ □ ¬ as usual.
2.2.2 Propositions and Action Types
First a note on the interpretation of the structures used in the semantics of my first
two systems. These structures are familiar to modal logicians: binary relations or
neighborhood functions defined on a set of objects. These objects, however, are here
viewed from an action-theoretic perspective. Instead of thinking of them as possible
worlds, I take them to be atomic actions. When discussing concrete games, these
are either strategy profiles or strategies for individual players. While sets of states in
standard Kripke semantics are propositions, here they are taken as action types. In
my running example, for instance, “playing an even number”, “playing a number less
than 100”, or “playing 0” are all action types, with the latter just happening to be an
atomic one. So the standard Boolean connectives on propositions correspond here to
action type constructors, pretty much as in Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [98]
or Boolean Modal Logic (BML) [13], and the resulting deontic logic is one of “ought
to do”, as opposed to “ought to be.”
2.2.3 Minimal Deontic Logic
In van Benthem’s Minimal Deontic Logic (MDL) the obligation operatorO is a normal
modality, and the permission operator P is a so-called window modality [13] defined
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on the set of normatively ideal action tokens. The presentation here is slightly different
than in [101], to bring it more into line with what comes later.
2.2.2. DEFINITION. A MDL model M is a tuple ⟨W,RD, V ⟩ where:
• W ≠ ∅ is a set of atomic action (tokens).
• RD ⊆ W ×W .
• V ∶ Prop0 → ℘(W ) is a valuation function
This is just a standard Kripke model for deontic logic. The relation RD pinpoints the
normatively ideal action type, from the perspective of each atomic action (token) or
profile. In games, the normatively ideal actions will be those recommended by a spe-
cific solution concept. In principle what is rational or ideal in an MDL model may vary
from action to action. This can be used to represent typical cases of interdependence
between what one player does and what is rational for the others to do, as observed
for instance in the best response dynamic that leads to the (0, 0) equilibrium of Guess
2/3 of the average. This section and the next, however, considers only uniform models,
where RD[w] = RD[w′] for all w,w′, with RD[w] = {v ∶ RD(w, v)}. The set of
rational atomic actions is the same throughout the model.
The difference from SDL shows in the truth conditions for P .
M,w ⊨ □ϕ iff ∀v ∈ W. M, v ⊨ ϕ
M,w ⊨ Oϕ iff ∀v ∈ W. (RDwv⇒M, v ⊨ ϕ)
M,w ⊨ Pϕ iff ∀v ∈ W. (M, v ⊨ ϕ⇒ RDwv)
P is thus a “window modality” [13]. Pϕ is true iff all action types ϕ are the sub-types
of the ideal type specified by RD. In less technical terms, Pϕ is true whenever play-
ing a strategy of type ϕ ensures a rational play. So in this logical system permissions
provide sufficient conditions for an action type to be “legal” or “licensed” by a given
normative theory. The normative theory I consider now, of course, is the rational rec-
ommendations stemming from a given solution concept in games. An action type is
permitted, in this view, if playing that action type implies playing a rational strategy.
So the logic embodies SRP.
Obligations, on the other hand, can be seen as providing necessary conditions for
rationality in that system, and hence also to capture WRO. The core interaction princi-
ple behind this is the following, which I shall often encounter later on in the chapter:
Oϕ ∧ Pψ → □(ψ → ϕ)
In the context of games, this principle states that if one is not rational unless one plays
a strategy of type ϕ, while playing a strategy of type ψ guarantees a rational play, then
it must be the case that all strategies of type ψ are the strategies of type ϕ. Let Ra be
the type of all rational strategies. Then combining SRP and WRO, I have:
ψ⇒ Ra⇒ ϕ
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(K-□) □(ϕ→ ψ)→ (□ϕ→ □ψ)
(K-O) O(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Oϕ→ Oψ)
(ConV) Pϕ ∧ Pψ → P (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(NEC)
ϕ
□ϕ
(Incl) □ϕ→ Oϕ
(CoIncl) □¬ϕ→ Pϕ
(WP) Oϕ ∧ Pψ → □(ψ → ϕ)
(Flip)
ϕ→ ψ
Pψ → Pϕ
Table 2.1: The sound and complete axiom system for van Benthem’s Minimal Deontic
Logic. All propositional tautologies are taken as axioms, and Modus Ponens is a rule.
This connection between ψ and ϕ is expressed in the consequent of the previous for-
mula, crucially using the universal modality. Observe that this logic also captures the
third core feature of logics for rational recommendations in games: O and P are not
dual here.
Let me illustrate how this system would handle rational recommendations in Guess
2/3 of the Average, with Ann and Bob playing the game, and Bob playing 100. Then
best response recommends Ann to play any number lower than 100. A natural way
to represent this situation as a minimal deontic model is to take W to be the set of all
pairs (n, 100), with 0 ≤ n ≤ 100, i.e. all possible choices for Ann given that Bob
plays 100. The set of plays where Ann plays a best response to Bob playing 100,
i.e. br(Ann, 100), is then simply W minus the pair (100, 100). Defining RD[w] as
br(Ann, 100), for all w, then I get the expected recommendations. Ann ought not to
play 100, and playing anything below that is permitted, because it implies playing a
best response.
So with van Benthem’s minimal deontic logic I have the first logic for rational
recommendations in games. It is worth considering its axiomatization before moving
to my second logic. The full system is presented in Table 2.1.
Since O is given in normal Kripke semantics, it validates K and the necessitation rule.
The latter is readily derivable using NEC and Incl. So O is a normal modality. Note in
passing that this implies that in this logic some of the classical deontic paradoxes, for
instance contrary to duty [23] or Ross’s paradox, will be valid.
2.2.3. PROPOSITION. In MDL, the necessitation rule holds for O, i.e.,
ϕ
Oϕ
.
Proof:
Suppose ϕ is a theorem of MDL. Then by NEC I have □ϕ. So Oϕ is derivable from
□ϕ using Incl and Modus Ponens. □
P , on the other hand, is not a normal modality. Necessitation fails for permissions
in that logic. Permissions do validate FCP, which is directly derivable by Flip. Note
also that from this rule one can both derive the K axiom for P and the extensionality
rule E, familiar to axiomatization of non-normal modal logics, stating that if ϕ↔ ψ is
a theorem of the logic, then one can substitute ϕ and ψ within the scope of a permission
operator.
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2.2.4. PROPOSITION. In MDL, the principle FCP, the K axiom as well as the E rule
hold for P , i.e.,
1. P (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ Pϕ ∧ Pψ,
2. P (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Pϕ→ Pψ), and
3.
ϕ↔ ψ
Pϕ↔ Pψ
.
Proof:
1. Because ϕ ∨ ψ is derivable from both ϕ and ψ, I have P (ϕ ∨ ψ) → Pϕ and
P (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ Pψ by applying Flip twice. So P (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ Pϕ ∧ Pψ.
2. Suppose P (ϕ → ψ) and Pϕ are theorems of MDL. Then P ((ϕ → ψ) ∨ ϕ)
is followed by ConV. On the other hand, I know that ψ → (ϕ → ψ) ∨ ϕ is a
tautology. Then P ((ϕ → ψ) ∨ ϕ) → Pψ is derivable by using Flip. Thus, I
have Pψ by Modus Ponens.
3. Suppose ϕ↔ ψ is a theorem of MDL. So ϕ→ ψ and ψ → ϕ are both theorems.
Then, by using Flip twice, I have Pψ → Pϕ and Pϕ → Pψ. So Pϕ ↔ Pψ is
derivable.
□
2.2.4 Obligations as Weakest Permissions
The second logic I consider is the logic of obligations as weakest permissions. The
main difference from van Benthem’s system is that obligations are no longer normal
modalities. An action type ϕ is obligatory, in this logic, whenever it is exactly the
normatively ideal action type, i.e. a type of rational strategy. To put it bluntly, in this
logic agents ought to do only one thing : be rational!
2.2.5. DEFINITION. A model for the logic of obligations as weakest permissions, or
OWP-model for short, is a tuple M = ⟨H,nP , nO, ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣⟩ where
• H is a set of atomic actions.
• nP ∶ H → ℘℘(H) is a neighborhood function assigning a set of subsets of H to
each h ∈ H such that
– If X ∪ Y ∈ NP (h) then X ∈ nP (h) & Y ∈ nP (h)
• nO ∶ H → ℘℘(H) is a neighborhood function assigning a set of subsets of H to
each h ∈ H such that
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– ∅ /∈ nO(h).
– (Ought-Perm) If X ∈ nO(h) then X ∈ nP (h)
– (Weakest-Perm) If X ∈ nO(h) then Y ⊆ X for all Y ∈ nP (h).
• ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣ ∶ Prop0 → ℘(H) is a valuation function.
As usual, an OWP-frame is an OWP-model minus the valuation function ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣. I
postpone the discussion of the frame conditions for a moment, observing only that
putting (Ought-Perm) and (Weakest-Perm) together I obtain the following:
2.2.6. PROPOSITION. If nO(h) ≠ ∅ then8
nO(h) = {⋃nP (h)} (C1)
Proof:
I need to show X ∈ nO(h) implies X = ⋃nP (h). Suppose X ∈ nO(h). First, by
using the (Ought-Perm) condition, X ∈ nP (h) and then X ⊆ ⋃nP (h). Second, let
x ∈ ⋃nP (h). Then ∃Y ∈ nP (h) s.t. x ∈ Y . By using the (Weakest-Perm) condition,
x ∈ Y ⊆ X . Hence⋃nP (h) ⊆ X . In conclusion, X = ⋃nP (h). □
In other words, if an action type is obligatory, then it is the unique action type that is
obligatory, up to logical equivalence, and this is the logically weakest permission that
the agent has.
The truth conditions for O and P in OWP-models are standard for neighborhood
semantics, and validity is defined as usual. Let me abuse my notation and write ∣∣ϕ∣∣
for {h ∶M,h ⊧ ϕ}.
M,h ⊨ □ϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ H. M, h′ ⊨ ϕ
M, h ⊨ Oϕ iff ∣∣ϕ∣∣ ∈ no(h)
M,h ⊨ Pϕ iff ∣∣ϕ∣∣ ∈ np(h)
(Univ) □(ϕ↔ ψ)→ (Dϕ↔ Dψ)
(O-P) Oϕ→ Pϕ
(O-Can) Oϕ→◇ϕ
(WP) (Oϕ ∧ Pψ)→ □(ψ → ϕ)
(Flip)
ϕ→ ψ
Pψ → Pϕ
Table 2.2: The sound and complete axiom system for OWP. All propositional tautolo-
gies, Modus Ponens, as well as the S5 axioms and rules for ◇, are also assumed here.
In (Univ) D is either O or P .
The set of valid formulas is completely axiomatizable by the system in Table 2.2.
Some of its features are worth highlighting. First, the E rule mentioned earlier for P in
8Keep in mind that ∅ ∈ nO(h) and nO(h) = ∅ are two very different conditions. Here the first
would come down to a violation of the “ought implies can” principle. It makes the impossible action
type obligatory. In the second case nothing is obligatory.
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MDL is derivable here as well, both for P , in exactly the same way as above, and for
O. The latter follows from necessitation for □ and (Univ). Maybe more surprisingly,
K for O is derivable in this logic! Model-theoretically, this is a consequence of the
uniqueness of obligations in that system. If both ϕ → ψ and ϕ are obligatory, then by
Proposition 2.2.6 they must have the same extension. Axiomatically, two applications
of WP make □((ϕ → ψ) ↔ ϕ) derivable. But then a few steps of normal modal
and propositional reasoning with □ gives me □(ϕ↔ ψ), from which one application
of the E rule for O together with Univ outputs Oψ. Now deontic logicians might
fear that paradoxes loom again in the presence of the K axiom. But the undesirable
consequences of that theorem are limited by the absence of necessitation for O in that
logic. Neither the Ross nor the Contrary to Duty paradox holds here. See [89] for the
details.
2.2.7. PROPOSITION. In OWP, the E rule holds for P and O, i.e.,
1.
ϕ↔ ψ
Pϕ↔ Pψ
, and
2.
ϕ↔ ψ
Oϕ↔ Oψ
.
Proof:
1. Suppose ϕ ↔ ψ is a theorem of OWP. So, by using Flip twice, I have Pϕ ↔
Pψ.
2. Suppose ϕ↔ ψ is a theorem of OWP. By necessitation for□, I have□(ϕ↔ ψ).
So, by using Univ, it follows Oϕ↔ Oψ.
□
2.2.8. PROPOSITION. In OWP, the K axiom holds for O, i.e.,
O(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Oϕ→ Oψ).
Proof:
By applying WP twice, O(ϕ → ψ) ∧ Pϕ → □(ϕ → (ϕ → ψ)) and Oϕ ∧ P (ϕ →
ψ) → □((ϕ → ψ) → ψ) are both theorems of OWP. In accordance with O-P,
Oϕ→ Pϕ and O(ϕ→ ψ)→ P (ϕ→ ψ) are theorems of OWP too. Taking these four
theorems of OWP together, it then implies thatO(ϕ→ ψ)∧Oϕ→ □((ϕ→ ψ)↔ ϕ).
In addition, (ϕ → ψ) ↔ ϕ and ϕ ↔ ψ are logically equivalent. So I have that
□((ϕ → ψ) ↔ ϕ) ↔ □(ϕ ↔ ψ) is derived by using the E rule for □. By Modus
Ponens, O(ϕ → ψ) ∧ Oϕ → □(ϕ ↔ ψ) is derived in OWP. As what Univ shows, I
have □(ϕ↔ ψ) → (Oϕ↔ Oψ). So O(ϕ → ψ) ∧ Oϕ → (Oϕ↔ Oψ). According
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to propositional reasoning, O(ϕ→ ψ) ∧Oϕ→ Oψ is derived. □
Rational recommendations in games work in OWP-models essentially as in van
Benthem’s minimal deontic logic. Take my running example again. Ann’s obligations
are defined exactly as before. Taking H to be the set of all pairs (n, 100), nO(h)
just contains the set br(Ann, 100), for all h, and each nP (h) is defined by taking
the closure under subsets of br(Ann, 100). This gives me essentially the same result
as before: Ann ought to play something less that 100, and any sub-type of that, for
instance playing less than 10, or just 1, is permitted.
2.2.5 Comparison
Our first two logics for rational recommendations in games thus have many things
in common. They share the main substantive principles for which I argued in Sec-
tion 2.1.2: O and P are not dual, P validates FCP by Flip, and I have WP in both
logics. Furthermore, obligations validate K in both systems.
Some of the axiomatic divergences between the two systems reflect minute frame-
theoretic differences that can easily be accommodated. There is for instance no “ought
implies can” principle in MDL, because the semantics allow for “blind” atomic actions,
i.e. actions from which no normatively ideal actions can be reached. But the principle
can be added, forcing us into the class of serial MDL frames. On the other hand,
both the obligation and the permission neighborhoods can be empty in OWP models,
which explains the invalidity of □¬ϕ → Pϕ in that logic. If, however, the permission
neighborhood is not empty, then the principle holds. This is reflected by the following
theorem of OWP:
Pψ → (□¬ϕ→ Pϕ)
The derivation starts by factoring ψ into its logically equivalent (ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ).
Using the derivable E rule and Flip, one gets P (ψ ∧ ϕ). But then since ¬ϕ proposi-
tionally implies (ψ ∧ ϕ)↔ ϕ, a standard bit of normal modal reasoning with □, and
one last application of E with Univ gives me Pϕ, as required.
2.2.9. PROPOSITION. Pψ → (□¬ϕ→ Pϕ) is a theorem of OWP.
Proof:
I know ψ is logically equivalent to (ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ). By using the E rule for P ,
Flip and Modus Ponens, Pψ → P (ϕ ∧ ψ) is a theorem of OWP. On the other hand,
¬ϕ logically implies (ψ ∧ ϕ) ↔ ϕ. By applying the E rule for □, Univ and Modus
Ponens, □¬ϕ → (P (ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ Pϕ) is a theorem in OWP too. Taking these two
theorems together, I have Pψ → (□¬ϕ→ Pϕ) as a theorem of OWP. □
A similar argument explains the absence of ConV in OWP. The principle is valid
only in the class of OWP frames where the obligation neighborhood is not empty. Note
that in OWP-frames this might happen if the permission neighborhood is not empty.
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This is mirrored, once again, by the following prefixed version of Univ, which is also
a theorem of OWP.9
Oχ→ (Pϕ ∧ Pψ → P (ϕ ∨ ψ))
This time the derivation starts with applying (WP) to Oχ and Pϕ, to deliver □(ϕ →
χ), and similarly for ψ. Then after some steps of propositional and normal modal
reasoning we get □((χ ∧ (ϕ ∨ ψ))↔ (ϕ ∨ ψ)). The proof finishes by using O-P on
Oχ again, and working my way to P (ϕ∨ψ) using the same factorization and flipping
routine as above.
2.2.10. PROPOSITION. Oχ→ ((Pϕ ∧ Pψ)→ P (ϕ ∨ ψ) is a theorem of OWP.
Proof:
In accordance with WP, I have Oχ∧Pϕ→ □(ϕ→ χ) and Oχ∧Pψ → □(ψ → χ) as
theorems in OWP. They imply thatOχ∧Pϕ∧Pψ → □(ϕ∨ψ → χ) is a theorem. On
the other hand, by using normal modal logic, I have □(ϕ ∨ ψ → χ) → □((χ ∧ (ϕ ∨
ψ))↔ (ϕ∨ψ)). By using Univ, its consequent implies P (χ∧(ϕ∨ψ))↔ P (ϕ∨ψ).
In addition, by WP, Flip, and propositional logic, I have Oχ→ P (χ∧ (ϕ∨ ψ)). Tak-
ing all these together, I haveOχ→ ((Pϕ∧Pψ)→ P (ϕ∨ψ) as a theorem of OWP. □
The main point of divergence between the two systems, how they handle obliga-
tions, rests on the apparently innocuous O-P principle:
Oϕ→ Pϕ
This principle is not valid in van Benthem’s MDL, while in OWP it nails down the
uniqueness of obligations.
The absence of O-P in MDL requires us to abandon some old thinking habits from
Standard Deontic Logic. Consider again the example of Ann’s best response to Bob’s
playing 100 in Guess 2/3 of the Average. The result of the construction sketched in
Section 2.1.1 is that Ann ought not only to “play any number lower than 100”, she
ought also to play any action type that is logically weaker than “playing any number
lower than 100”. So in particular the trivial action type ⊤ is rationally required of
her. She ought to play a number, whatever that number is, simply because if she does
not play any number then she will not play any best response number. But playing
any number whatever is not permitted for Ann, despite the fact that she is rationally
required to do this. This is a particular case where obligation does not imply permis-
sion in MDL. This might feel counterintuitive to the reader, probably because of the
ease with which we have learned to derive permissions from obligations in Standard
Deontic Logic. Against this one should keep in mind the interpretation of obligations
and permissions in MDL as necessary and sufficient conditions for rationality. Nec-
essary conditions need not be sufficient, of course, so O should not imply P in that
interpretation.
9I am grateful to Frederik van de Putte for drawing our attention to this fact.
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In fact adding this principle to MDL results in the same deontic trivialization as
when FCP is added to SDL (c.f. footnote 7 on p. 15). Everything becomes permitted.
Necessitation for O gives O⊤, which then with O-P and Flip yields Pϕ for any ϕ
whatsoever, as anything implies the tautology. OWP avoids this trivialization because
obligations are not closed under logical consequences. Although it satisfies K, this
logic invalidates the so-called inheritance rule:
ϕ→ ψ
Oϕ→ Oψ
This can be illustrated again in my running example. Ann’s best response to Bob
playing 100 is to play any number lower than his. This logically implies that she plays
a number. But, in contrast to MDL, here it does not follow that she ought to play any
number as well. What Ann ought to do, here, is to play only a best response. This is a
direct consequence of the interplay between O-P and WP.
2.2.11. PROPOSITION. For arbitrary ϕ, Pϕ is derivable after adding O-P into MDL.
Proof:
By the necessitation rule for O in MDL, I have O⊤. Then P⊤ is followed by O-P.
On the other hand, by using Flip, P⊤ → Pϕ for any ϕ. Thus, Pϕ is derivable, after
adding O-P into MDL. □
More generally, by accepting that obligation implies permission, OWP is com-
mitted to the view that obligations pinpoint necessary and sufficient conditions for
rationality. Hence the uniqueness of obligations, up to coextensionality. As mentioned
earlier, the only types of strategy agents ought to play in that logic are rational strate-
gies.
MDL and OWP do overlap, but precisely in the trivial cases where nothing but
the trivial action type ⊤ is obligatory, and hence everything is permitted.10 Indeed,
any MDL-model where RD = W ×W can be turned into an OWP-model, by taking
nO(w) = {W} for all w, and nP (w) the full power set of W , and conversely for
starting from such an OWP-model. It should be clear that the two will satisfy exactly
the same formulas. The converse is also true. For any MDL-frame where RD is not
the universal relation, taking the set of accessible atomic actions at each w to construct
nO(w) will yield divergent obligations in OWP and MDL, at some w.
Let me summarize the findings of this first comparison. The most important point
of agreement between MDL and OWP, the way in which they differ most from Stan-
dard Deontic Logic, is that rational obligation and permission provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for rational play in games. This is witnessed by their acceptance
of the Flip rule and the WP axiom. Accepting this view, however, raises a dilemma.
10Note that with Flip or FCP in the system, ⊤ being the only obligatory action and everything being
permitted are just two sides of the same coin.
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On the one hand one can stay as close as possible to SRP and WRO. Then one is
forced, on pain of trivialization, to abandon the familiar “O implies P” principle. This
leads to the situations like Ann’s described above, where a player ought to play an
action type that is not rationally permitted. On the other hand, if one chooses to re-
tain the implication from obligation to permission, then one restricts the former to one
particular necessary condition for rationality, namely the necessary and sufficient one,
abandoning the “only if” direction of WRO. In short, the main axiomatic difference
between MDL and OWP reflects a difference in philosophical commitment, to the fa-
miliar “obligation implies permission” principle and to the main features of logics of
rational recommendations in games.
2.3 Deontic Action Logics
I now look at a richer language to describe rational recommendations in games, De-
ontic Boolean Action Logic (DBAL), proposed in [99]. This logic differs from MDL
and OWP in that it draws a sharper distinction between the Boolean construction of
action types and the Boolean connectives applied to obligations and permissions. In
contrast to the previous section, where we mainly looked at axiomatic differences be-
tween MDL and OWP, here the main contributions are translation results, showing that
DBAL is embeddable in MDL.
2.3.1 Deontic Boolean Action Logic
By interpreting the points in MDL and OWP models as actions, atomic and complex
formulas in Lwere naturally interpreted as action types, constructed much as in Propo-
sitional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [98]. The logic I consider now explicitly uses a lan-
guage similar to Boolean Modal Logic (BML), and in doing so it distinguishes action
type constructors and standard Boolean connectives for formulas. The result is the
following two-sorted language:
2.3.1. DEFINITION. The language L∗ for Deontic Boolean Action Logic (DBAL) is
defined as follows:
ϕ ∶= α ≐ α ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ→ ϕ ∣ Pα ∣ Fα
α ∶= a ∣ 1 ∣ α ∣ α ∪ α ∣ α ∩ α
where a is one element of a finite set Act0 of action generators.
Action types α ∈ Act are thus constructed out of primitive action types, taken from
a given set of action generators Act0, the trivial 1 action, and the usual BML connec-
tives of complementation α, nondeterministic choice ∪ and parallel execution ∩. The
impossible action 0 is defined as 1.
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Strictly speaking, the language itself has three types of atomic sentence. First, the
language can describe the equivalence of action types, using the ≐ connective. Second
come the deontic statements, stating that certain action types are (rationally) permitted
or forbidden. An obligation to do α, in that language, is defined as the complement α
of that action type being prohibited, namely Oα ∶= Fα.
This syntax reveals the main difference between DBAL and the two systems pre-
sented in the previous section. In DBAL only action types are allowed within the scope
of the deontic modalities. So I am still in the realm of logics for “ought to do”. Here,
however, no deontic modality, or Boolean connective for that matter, can occur in the
scope of an F or a P . Formulas of the form PFα or F¬α are not well-formed here.
The deontic modalities function as properties of action types, and deontic statements
that such-and-such a type is forbidden or permitted are (structured) atomic sentences
in this language. The Boolean connectives ¬,→, etc., are here to form complex state-
ments about equivalence and the deontic properties of action types.
The semantics offer tools to interpret the construction of complex action types and
their deontic properties. Although there is a syntactic distinction between the action-
theoretic and the rest of the language here, in the model I only work with atomic actions
and deontic properties.
2.3.2. DEFINITION. A DBAL model M is a tuple ⟨E,LEG, ILL, I⟩ where:
• E is a non-empty set of atomic actions
• LEG and ILL are subsets of ℘(E) such that
(a) If X ∈ K and Y ⊆ X then Y ∈ K, where K ∈ {LEG, ILL}
(b) If X ∈ K and Y ∈ K then X ∪ Y ∈ K, where K ∈ {LEG, ILL}
(c) LEG ∩ ILL = {∅}
• I ∶ Act0 → ℘(E) is an interpretation function assigning each action generator
to a subset of actions, i.e., I(a) ⊆ E where a ∈ Act0
Reflecting the syntactic primitives, DBAL models come equipped with two sets of
action types, the legal and the illegal. In its LEG instance, condition (a) gives us
the by now familiar downward closure of the permissions, corresponding to FCP. For
ILL this condition gives us, given the definition of obligation, the supersets closure
condition that I have already encountered in MDL. To spell this out in detail I need
first to extend the interpretation function to arbitrary action types.
I(1) ∶= E
I(α) ∶= E − I(α)
I(α ∪ β) ∶= I(α) ∪ I(β)
I(α ∩ β) ∶= I(α) ∩ I(β)
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(OR-P) P (α ∪ β)↔ Pα ∧ Pβ
(OR-F) F (α ∪ β)↔ Fα ∧ Fβ
(0-P/F) α ≐ 0↔ Fα ∧ Pα
(Incl) Pα ∧ Fβ → α ∩ β ≐ 0
(BA) ϕ ∧ α ≐ β → ϕ[α/β]
Table 2.3: The sound and complete axiom system for Deontic Boolean Action Logic.
All propositional tautologies are also taken as axioms, as well as the usual axioms for
Boolean algebras for Boolean action terms α. Modus Ponens is taken as a rule. Above
ϕ[α/β] indicates that all occurrences of α in ϕ are replaced by β.
With this in hand the truth conditions for formulas of L∗ become the following. Ob-
serve that the Boolean connectives for formulas are interpreted globally, rather than
locally.
M ⊨ α ≐ β iff I(α) = I(β)
M ⊨ ¬ϕ iff M ⊭ ϕ
M ⊨ ϕ ∧ ψ iff M ⊨ ϕ & M ⊨ ψ
M ⊨ Pα iff I(α) ∈ LEG
M ⊨ Fα iff I(α) ∈ ILL
The sound and complete axiomatization of DBAL is very close to that for van
Benthem’s MDL, modulo the additional apparatus to describe the equivalence of ac-
tion types, and the fact that prohibitions are primitive, rather than obligations. See
Table 2.3. One indeed recognizes FCP and its converse (ConV) in the biconditional
(OR-P). Observe that the following valid condition, analogous to (WP) is expressible
in this system:
2.3.3. PROPOSITION. Oα ∧ Pβ → (β ∩ α) ≐ β is a theorem of MDL.
Proof:
By using Incl and the definition of obligation, Oα ∧ Pβ → α ∩ β ≐ 0 is a theorem of
DBAL. In addition, as the axioms for Boolean action terms, α∩β ≐ 0→ (β∩α) ≐ β.
Taking them together, it is clear that the result holds. □
2.3.2 Equivalence of Level-1: MDL and DBAL
I now show that a DBAL corresponds to a simple fragment of MDL. They are inter-
translatable. I start with the syntactic translation, from DBAL to MDL. Let Act0 be
my given set of action generators. I first create one atomic proposition per generator.
So set PropAct0 = {pa ∶ a ∈ Act0}. Call LAct0 the language L generated by the rule
on page 17 using PropAct0 . The translation function T ∶ L∗ → LAct0 is then defined
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as follows:
T (a) ∶= pa
T (1) ∶= ⊤
T (α) ∶= ¬T (α)
T (α ∪ β) ∶= T (α) ∨ T (β)
T (α ∩ β) ∶= T (α) ∧ T (β)
T (α ≐ β) ∶= □(T (α)↔ T (β))
T (¬ϕ) ∶= □¬T (ϕ)
T (ϕ→ ψ) ∶= □(T (ϕ)→ T (ψ))
T (Pα) ∶= PT (α)
T (Fα) ∶= O¬T (α)
Now letM = ⟨E,LEG, ILL, I⟩ be a DBAL model. I construct a uniform MDL model
M
T = ⟨W,RD, V ⟩ as follows. The only subtle matter lies in the construction of RD,
as Act0 is finite but E need not be, not all subsets of E need to be definable. I use
definable ones here:
• W = E
• For all w ∈ W , RD[w] = I(α), where M ⊨ Pα and for all β that M ⊨ Pβ
and I(β) ⊆ I(α)
• V (pa) = I(a)
2.3.4. PROPOSITION. Let M = ⟨E,LEG, ILL, I⟩ be a DBAL model. Then MT is an
MDL model.
Proof:
The only non-trivial condition is that for RD. I need to check that the set RD[w] is
well defined. This follows directly from the finiteness of Act0 and the fact that if Pα
and Pβ are true, then P (α ∪ β) is too. □
With this in hand I can show the main result of this section, namely that the translation
T is truth-preserving.
2.3.5. THEOREM. For any formula ϕ of L∗, DBAL model M , and state w ∈ W for
M
T :
M ⊨ ϕ iff MT , w ⊨ T (ϕ)
Proof:
The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ ∈ L∗, which in turns requires sub-
inductions on action types for atomic formulas. The former is straightforward. I focus
on the latter cases.
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There are three cases to consider. First ϕ = α ≐ β, where α, β ∈ Act. Then
M ⊨ α ≐ β iff I(α) = I(β) iff V (pα) = V (pβ), by construction. But the latter
happens iff MT , w ⊨ □(T (α)↔ T (β)). The inductive steps follow similarly, using
the inductive hypothesis to go from I(α) and I(β), for complex α and β, to the truth
sets ∣∣T (α)∣∣ and ∣∣T (β)∣∣, respectively.
Now consider the case where ϕ = Pα for any α ∈ Act. Then M ⊨ Pα iff
I(α) ∈ LEG. Now the key observation, which follows directly from our construction,
is that the latter happens iff V (pa) ⊆ RD(w) in MT , for any w, and similarly for
arbitrary action type α.
Finally, suppose that ϕ = Fα for any α ∈ Act. I have that M ⊨ Fα iff I(α) ∈
ILL. Now I know that I(α)∩X = ∅ for allX ∈ LEG. But by my construction ofMT
this means that RD[w] ∈ LEG, so RD[w]∩ V (pα) = ∅, so RD[w] ⊆ W − V (pα) =∣∣¬T (α)∣∣, so M,w ⊨ O¬T (α). The inductive step proceeds similarly.
□
Observe that the syntactic translation maps formulas of L∗ into a simple fragment
of MDL. First of all, the fragment without embedded deontic operators, simply by the
syntactic restrictions on DBAL. No □ or ◇ occur in the scope of a deontic operator
either. Furthermore, no atomic proposition occurs “free” in the translated formulas.
They are always in the scope of either a universal modality, when translated from
atoms α ≐ β, or a deontic operator. Finally, since Act0 is finite, this translation only
uses finitely many atomic proposition. Call this simple fragment L1. I show now that
L1 can be translated back into DBAL. The translation goes in two steps, first for action
types and then for arbitrary formulas.
Let L0 be a fragment of MDL where no modal operator (□,O or P ) occurs, defined
over a given finite set of atomic propositions Prop0. Define ActProp = {ap ∶ p ∈
Prop0}. Then the action translation τ ∶ L0 → L is defined as follows:
τ(p) ∶= ap
τ(¬ϕ) ∶= τ(ϕ)
τ(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∶= τ(ϕ) ∩ τ(ψ)
Now I am ready to define my translation from L1 to L∗. Recall that no atomic proposi-
tion occurs “free” in L1. The translation ρ ∶ L1 → L∗ is thus only defined for complex
formula, and ultimately relies on the action-translation τ just defined.
ρ(¬ϕ) ∶= ¬ρ(ϕ)
ρ(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∶= ρ(ϕ) ∧ ρ(ψ)
ρ(◇ϕ) ∶= ¬τ(ϕ) ≐ 0
ρ(Pϕ) ∶= P (τ(ϕ))
ρ(Oϕ) ∶= F (τ(ϕ))
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I now show how to transform MDL models into DBAL ones. The construction
works locally, generating one DBAL model for each point w in the original deontic
model. Of course, in the special case of uniform MDL models, where the set of nor-
matively ideal or rational atomic actions is the same at all w, this is not necessary.
Let M = ⟨W,RD, V ⟩ be a MDL model. Given a point w∗ ∈ W , I can construct
M
w
∗
= ⟨E,LEG, ILL, I⟩ w.r.t. w∗ as follows:
• E = W
• LEG = {X ∶ X ⊆ RD[w∗]}
• ILL = {X ∶ RD[w∗] ⊆ X}
• I(τ(p)) = ∣∣p∣∣ for each p ∈ Prop0 in DAL-language
The resulting model is indeed a DBAL model.
2.3.6. PROPOSITION. The model Mw
∗
= ⟨E,LEG, ILL, I⟩ w.r.t. w∗ ∈ W con-
structed before is a DBAL model.
Proof:
The verification of LEG is easy to see, so I only verify those three conditions for ILL.
1. Suppose X ∈ ILL and Y ⊆ X . Then I have RD[w∗] ⊆ X and X ⊆ Y . So
RD[w∗] ⊆ Y . So Y ∈ ILL.
2. Suppose X ∈ ILL and Y ∈ ILL. Then RD[w∗] ⊆ X and RD[w∗] ⊆ Y . This
then impliesRD[w∗] ⊆ X∩Y . That is,RD[w∗] ⊆ X ∪ Y . ThusX∪Y ∈ ILL.
3. First I show that LEG and ILL are not empty. Otherwise, either X /⊆ RD[w∗]
for any X ⊆ W , or RD[w∗] /⊆ X for any X ⊆ W . However, none of them
happen. So LEG and ILL are not empty. I will show that LEG ∩ ILL = {∅}.
If not, then there is some X ∈ LEG and X ∈ ILL such that X ≠ ∅. So
X ⊆ RD[w∗] and RD[w∗] ⊆ X . It follows that X ⊆ X . But that is not possible
because X ≠ ∅. So, LEG ∩ ILL = {∅}.
□
With this in hand I can now show the main result of this section:
2.3.7. THEOREM. LetM = ⟨W,RD, V ⟩ be a MDL model. Then for any w∗ ∈ W , any
formulas ψ ∈ L0 and ϕ ∈ L1,
1. M,w ⊨ ψ iff w ∈ I(τ(ψ)) for every w ∈ W , i.e., ∣∣ψ∣∣ = I(τ(ψ))
2. M,w∗ ⊨ ϕ iff Mw
∗
⊨ ρ(ϕ)
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Proof:
Statement 1 follows directly from the construction of Mw
∗
and the definition of the
translation function τ . For statement 2, I only show the cases of◇ϕ, Pϕ and Oϕ. The
cases for the Boolean connectives follow directly.
1. Case ◇ϕ: Suppose M,w∗ ⊨ ◇ϕ. Then there is some w′ ∈ W such that
M,w
′ ⊨ ϕ. By using 1 and the construction, w′ ∈ I(τ(ϕ)) where w′ ∈ E.
This means that Mw
∗
⊨ ¬(τ(ϕ) ≐ 0). For the other directoin, suppose Mw∗ ⊨
¬(τ(ϕ) ≐ 0), so there is some w′ ∈ I(τ(ϕ)). By using 1, M,w′ ⊨ ϕ. That is
M,w ⊨◇ϕ.
2. Case Pϕ: Suppose M,w∗ ⊨ Pϕ. That is, ∣∣ϕ∣∣ ⊆ RD[w∗]. Then I(τ(ϕ)) ∈
LEG by (1) and the construction. Thus Mw
∗
⊨ P (τ(ϕ)). For the other di-
rectoin, suppose Mw
∗
⊨ P (τ(ϕ)). That is to say, I(τ(ϕ)) ∈ LEG. By the
construction, it implies ∣∣ϕ∣∣ ⊆ RD[w∗]. So I have M,w∗ ⊨ Pϕ.
3. Case Oϕ: Suppose M,w∗ ⊨ Oϕ. That is RD[w∗] ⊆ ∣∣ϕ∣∣. Then I(τ(ϕ)) ∈
ILL by (1) and the construction. Namely I(τ(ϕ)) ∈ ILL. So I have M,w∗ ⊨
Fτ(ϕ). For the other directoin, suppose M,w∗ ⊨ Fτ(ϕ). This implies that
I(τ(ϕ)) ∈ ILL. So RD[w∗] ⊆ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ by the first result and the construction.
Thus M,w∗ ⊨ Oϕ.
□
Taken together, these two translation results show that DBAL can be embedded in
MDL. The upshot of the comparison between MDL and OWP was that the two log-
ics embodied different philosophical commitments regarding the structure of rational
obligations and permissions. This is not the case here. The main difference between
MDL and DBAL is that the latter does not allow deontic modalities to be embedded.
2.3.3 Alternative: Propositional Boolean Dynamic Logic
An alternative to Deontic Boolean Action Logic is the Propositional Boolean Dynamic
Logic (PBDL) introduced by Castro and Maibaum [21], which goes further than DBAL
in that it makes a distinction between propositions and action types. In doing so the
language for PBDL contains both atomic propositions and action modalities. In addi-
tion, PBDL replaces the atomic construction for obligation with “weak permission.”
which is not contained in the three logics just presented. The dual of this weak permis-
sion is the standard notion of obligation, which here expresses necessary conditions for
rationality. These two differences prevent a complete embedding of PBDL into OWP,
or vice versa. I show, however, two translation results concerning interesting fragments
of each of these logics.
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2.3.8. DEFINITION. The language L+ for PBDL is defined as follows:
ϕ ∶= p ∣ α ≐ α ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ→ ϕ ∣ ⟨α⟩ϕ ∣ Pα ∣ PWα
α ∶= a ∣ 0 ∣ 1 ∣ α ∣ α ∪ α ∣ α ∩ α
where p is an element of the countable set of atomic propositions Prop0, and a is an
element of the finite set of action generators Act0. I denote the set of all actions as Act.
The syntax of PBDL is richer than DBAL. Action types in PBDL are constructed
like DBAL, but formulas are constructed as in PDL. The language contains two types
of atomic sentence and two deontic modalities, PW for weak and P for strong permis-
sions. Obligation is then defined using a combination of the two types of permissions:
Oα ∶= Pα ∧ ¬PWα. The second new type in the language is the standard PDL-
style action modality ⟨⋅⟩. [⋅] is defined in the form of ¬⟨⋅⟩¬. Formulas of the form(α ≐ α) ∨ ϕ or [α ∪ β](Pα ∧ Pβ) are well-formed here.
The semantics of PBDL is also richer than DBAL. The PBDL models use the stan-
dard Kripke structures to interpret action types, their deontic properties, and their dy-
namic effects on propositions as well. Like the syntactic difference between proposi-
tions and actions, the models for PBDL are two-sorted: possible worlds for interpreting
propositions, and possible events for interpreting action types. The model contains one
Kripke relation R over worlds for giving the dynamic functions, and one Kripke re-
lation RP connecting worlds and events for evaluating the deontic properties. PBDL
models also have to contain two interpretations, one ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣ for primitive propositions,
and one I for primitive actions.
2.3.9. DEFINITION. A PBDL model is a tuple M = ⟨W,E,R, I, RP , ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣⟩ where
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds
• E is a non-empty set of possible events
• R ⊆ W × W × E is a functional relation requiring that: if R(w, u, e) and
R(w, v, e) then u = v
• I ∶ Act0 → ℘(E) is an interpretation function on actions such that I(a) ⊆ E for
each a ∈ Act0, which satisfies the following three conditions:
(I.1) For each a ∈ Act0, ∣I(a) −⋃{I(b) ∶ b ∈ (Act0 − {a})}∣ ≤ 1
(I.2) For each e ∈ E, if e ∈ I(a) ∩ I(b) such that a ≠ b ∈ Act0, then
⋂{I(a) ∶ a ∈ Act0 ∧ e ∈ I(a)} = {e}
(I.3) E = ⋃a∈Act0 I(a)
• RP ⊆ W × E is a relation between worlds and events
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• ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣ ∶ Prop0 → ℘(W ) is an interpretation function such that ∣∣p∣∣ ⊆ W for
each p ∈ Prop0
Since R is functional, we write Re(w) = u for R(w, u, e). The extension of the
interpretation function I on actions from the set of actions to the set of all possible
events is defined in the same way as in DBAL. The conditions I.1 to I.3 are there to
ensure that the interpretation of action types is well constructed. I leave out the details
here. See [21] for a discussion.
The truth conditions for formulas of L+ are defined in a standard method for Kripke
models. Observe that the Boolean connectives and the equivalence between action
types are interpreted locally as usual, while the dynamic sentences, strong permission
and weak permission are interpreted in the following way:
M,w ⊨ ⟨α⟩ϕ iff ∃u ∈ W∃e ∈ I(α) s.t. Re(w) = u & M,u ⊨ ϕ
M,w ⊨ Pα iff ∀e ∈ I(α) s.t. RPwe
M,w ⊨ PWα iff ∃e ∈ I(α) s.t. RPwe
Strong permission and weak permission together capture rationality. They are in-
terpreted in a universal/existential character by RP , in which strong permission plays
as the sufficient condition for rationality, while the dual of weak permission as the nec-
essary condition for rationality. See Table 2.4 for the axiom system for PBDL. Strong
permission satisfies FCP and its converse ConV by one biconditional axiom. Observe
that a validity similar to WP is contained in this system:
2.3.10. PROPOSITION. Oα∧Pβ ∧¬(β ≐ 0)→ (β ∩α) ≐ β is a theorem of PBDL.
Proof:
By using OSW, I haveOα → ¬PWα. By using 0-P/W, I have Pβ∧¬(β ≐ 0)→ PWβ.
Taking these two results with CW, I infer (1): Oα∧Pβ ∧¬(β ≐ 0)→ ¬PW (α∩ β).
One the other hand, from ConV, it has (2): Pβ → P (α ∩ β). Taking (1) and (2)
together with 0-P/W, it concludes Oα ∧ Pβ ∧ ¬(β ≐ 0)→ (β ∩ α) ≐ β. □
2.3.4 Equivalence of Level-0: PBDL and OWP
Now I provide a correspondence from PBDL and OWP, and this result shows that
PBDL does partially overlap OWP. In other words, a fragment of the language for
PBDL is a translation of a fragment for OWP, and vice versa. The corresponding
construction is similar to the method introduced in [77].
I start with a syntactic translation from a fragment of PBDL to a fragment of OWP
in two steps. First I define a fragment of PBDL in which no dynamic sentences and
weak permission occur. Let L− be the fragment of language for PBDL, which in-
volves formulas containing atomic propositions, action generators, and the formulas
constructed with Boolean connectives, dynamic operator, and strong permission. To
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Basic axioms and rule:
(OR-P) P (α ∪ β)↔ Pα ∧ Pβ
(ConV) Pα ∨ Pβ → P (α ∩ β)
(CW) PW (α ∩ β)→ PWα ∧ PWβ
(0-P/W) Pα ∧ ¬PWα → α ≐ 0
(OSW) Oα↔ Pα ∧ ¬PW (α)
(UN) (a1 ∪⋯∪ an) ≐ 1
(BA) ϕ ∧ α ≐ β → ϕ[α/β]
(K) [α](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([α]ϕ→ [α]ψ)
(NEC)
ϕ[α]ϕ
The other axioms:[0]ϕ[α ∪ β]ϕ↔ [α]ϕ ∧ [β]ϕ
α ≐ β → [γ](α ≐ β)⟨β⟩(α ≐ α′)→ α ≐ α′⟨γ⟩ϕ→ [γ]ϕ
P0
¬PW0
PW (α ∪ β)↔ PWα ∨ PWβ
PWγ → Pγ
Table 2.4: The sound and complete axiom system for Castro and Maibaum’s Propo-
sitional Boolean Dynamic Logic. All propositional tautologies, Modus Ponens, and
the axioms for Boolean Algebras for action terms are also taken into account. Above
γ ∈ Act0, and ϕ[α/β] indicates that all occurrences of α in ϕ are replaced by β.
construct the translation fragment of PBDL, I allow for dynamic operators and per-
missions to scope over formulas of L−. I simply call this fragment L×. Let L be the
language for OWP. The translation proceeds in two steps. Define σ ∶ L− → L be a
translation as follows:
σ(a) ∈ Prop0, for each a ∈ Act0
σ(0) ∶= ⊥
σ(1) ∶= ⊤
σ(α) ∶= ¬σ(α)
σ(α ∪ β) ∶= σ(α) ∨ σ(β)
σ(α ∩ β) ∶= σ(α) ∧ σ(β)
σ(p) ∈ Prop0, for each p ∈ Prop0
σ(α ≐ β) ∶= □(σ(α)↔ σ(β))
σ(¬ϕ) ∶= ¬σ(ϕ)
σ(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∶= σ(ϕ) ∧ σ(ψ)
σ(Pα) ∶= Pσ(α)
And then I can define δ ∶ L× → L be a translation, for each of the formulas α ∈ L−,
ψ ∈ L−, and ϕ ∈ L×,
δ(ψ) ∶= σ(ψ)
δ(⟨α⟩ϕ) ∶=◇(σ(α) ∧◇δ(ϕ))
δ(¬PWα) ∶= ⋀
β∈Act
[Pσ(β)→ □(σ(β)→ σ(α))]
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The resulting δ(¬PWα) embodies WRO. So α is a type of strategy required to be
played, iff all rationally permissible strategies are α-type strategies.
Let M = ⟨W,E,R, I, RP , ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣⟩ be a PBDL model. I construct a model M∗ =⟨H,nP , nO, ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣∗⟩ as follows:
• H = W ∪ E.
• nP (h) = { {X ⊆ E ∶ ∀e ∈ X. RPhe} if h ∈ W∅ if h ∈ E
• nO = ∅
• ∣∣σ(a)∣∣∗ = I(a)
• ∣∣σ(p)∣∣∗ = ∣∣p∣∣
I denote M∗ as the unique model generated from a PBDL model M . It should be
noticed that M∗ is an OWP model.
2.3.11. PROPOSITION. Given a PBDL model M = ⟨W,E,R, I, RP , ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣⟩, M∗ is an
OWP model.
Proof:
The condition for nP is easy to verify by the construction. As nO is empty, the three
conditions required for OWP models are automatically satisfied. □
I now can show one of the main results in this section.
2.3.12. THEOREM. Given a PBDL model M = ⟨W,E,R, I, RP , ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣⟩. Then, for
each α, ϕ ∈ L−, and ψ ∈ L×,
e ∈ I(α) if and only if e ∈ ∣∣σ(α)∣∣∗
M,w ⊨ ϕ if and only if M∗, w ⊨ σ(ϕ)
M,w ⊨ ψ only if M∗, w ⊨ δ(ψ)
Proof:
It is not difficult to prove e ∈ ∣∣σ(α)∣∣∗ iff e ∈ I(α). Now I am going to prove that
M,w ⊨ ϕ iff M∗, w ⊨ σ(ϕ) for each ϕ ∈ L−. I do so by induction on the complexity
of ϕ ∈ L−.
1. The cases of atomic propositions, negation, implication are easy to verify by the
construction.
2. The case of α ≐ β:
M,w ⊨ α ≐ β iff I(α) = I(β)
iff e ∈ ∣∣σ(α)∣∣∗⇔ e ∈ ∣∣σ(β)∣∣∗
iff M∗, w ⊨ □(σ(α)↔ σ(β))
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3. The case of Pα: According to the aforementioned construction, then
M,w ⊨ Pα iff ∀e ∈ I(α). RPwe
iff ∣∣σ(α)∣∣∗ ∈ nP (w)
Next I will verify that M,w ⊨ ψ ⇒ M∗, w ⊨ δ(ψ) for each ψ ∈ L×. I show this by
induction on the complexity of ϕ ∈ L×.
1. The case of ⟨α⟩ϕ:
M,w ⊨ ⟨α⟩ϕ iff ∃(w, u, e) ∈ R and e ∈ I(α) s.t. M,u ⊨ ϕ
only if ∃w, e, u ∈ W s.t. e ∈ ∣∣σ(α)∣∣∗ and u ∈ ∣∣δ(ϕ)∣∣∗
iff M∗, w ⊨◇(σ(α) ∧◇δ(ϕ))
2. The case of ¬PWα:
M,w ⊨ ¬PWα iff ¬∃e ∈ I(α) s.t. RPwe
iff ∀e ∈ E. (RPwe⇒ e ∈ I(α))
only if ∀β ∈ Act.∀e ∈ E. ((e ∈ I(β)⇒ RPwe)
⇒ (e ∈ I(β)⇒ e ∈ I(α)))
iff ∀β ∈ Act.[∣∣σ(β)∣∣∗ ∈ nP (w)⇒ ∣∣σ(β)∣∣∗ ⊆ ∣∣σ(α)∣∣∗]
iff M∗, w ⊨ Pσ(β)→ □(σ(β)→ σ(α)), for all β ∈ Act
iff M∗, w ⊨ ⋀
β∈Act
[Pσ(β)→ □(σ(β)→ σ(α))]
□
Now I can start with the second contribution in this section, which is a correspon-
dence result from a fragment of OWP to a fragment of PBDL. Recall that OWP and
MDL share the common language. So given the language L for PBDL, similarly, I
simply call the fragment of OWP where no modal operator (□, O or P ) occurs L0,
and the fragment, the so-called L1 of OWP, is defined within the classical conjunction,
negation, and modal operators based on L0. Again, since Act0 is finite, my translation
only considers finitely many atomic propositions. I show that L1 can be translated back
to PBDL in a non-trivial way. Similarly, the translation runs in two steps.
Let L0 be a fragment of OWP in which neither□,O, nor P occur. Define a function
µ ∶ L0 → L
+ as an action-translation as follows:
µ(p) ∈ Act0 for each p ∈ Prop0
µ(¬ϕ) ∶= µ(ϕ)
µ(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∶= µ(ϕ) ∩ µ(ψ)
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I can then define a translation from L1 to L
+. The translation  ∶ L1 → L
+ is defined
for complex formulas, which relies on the action-translation µ defined above.
(p) ∈ Prop0 for each p ∈ Prop0
(¬ϕ) ∶= ¬(ϕ)
(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∶= (ϕ) ∧ (ψ)
(◇ϕ) ∶= ⟨µ(ϕ)⟩⊤
(Pϕ) ∶= Pµ(ϕ)
(Oϕ) ∶= Pµ(ϕ) ∧ ¬PWµ(¬ϕ)
Notice that obligation in OWP can be translated by a combination of strong permission
and weak permission in PBDL via the translation .
The transformation from the OWP models to PBDL models need certain restric-
tions. Not every OWP model can be transformed into a PBDL model. To do so, the
transformation needs to satisfy two conditions. The first is the valuation of atomic
propositions in the transformed models should satisfy the required conditions (I.1)-
(I.3). Second, the domain of the transformed model should be restricted to the valua-
tion of atomic propositions in OWP.
To satisfy the first restriction, I define the following “functional OWP models.” An
OWP model MOWP = ⟨H,nP , nO, ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣⟩ is functional, if and only if it satisfies the
following three conditions:
• For each p ∈ Prop0, ∣∣∣p∣∣ −⋃{∣∣q∣∣ ∶ q ∈ (Prop0 − {p})}∣ ≤ 1
• For each w ∈ W , if w ∈ ∣∣p∣∣ ∩ ∣∣q∣∣ such that p ≠ q ∈ Prop0, then
⋂{∣∣p∣∣ ∶ p ∈ Prop0 and w ∈ ∣∣p∣∣} = {w}
• W = ⋃p∈Prop0 ∣∣p∣∣
The three conditions correspond to the conditions (I.1)-(I.3) in PBDL models.
I now can construct a model transformed from a functional OWP model. Let
MOWP = ⟨H,nP , nO, ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣⟩ be a functional OWP model, I then can construct a model
M
∗ = ⟨W,E,R, I, RP , ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣∗⟩ as follows:
• W = E = H
• R = {(x, y, y) ∣ (x, y) ∈ Alt}
• RP = {(x, y) ∣ ∃X ∈ nP (x) s.t. y ∈ X}
• I(µ(p)) = ∣∣p∣∣
• ∣∣(p)∣∣∗ = ∣∣p∣∣ for each p ∈ Prop0 in OWP-language
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I denote M∗ as the unique model generated from a functional OWP model MOWP.
2.3.13. PROPOSITION. Given a functional OWP model MOWP = ⟨H,nP , nO, ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣⟩,
then the model M∗ defined above is a PBDL model.
Proof:
I only need to check whether R is functional. Because MOWP is functional, it is thus
easy to check that R in M∗ is also functional. □
With this result in hand, I now can turn to the final step of my transformation.
2.3.14. THEOREM. Given a functional OWP model M = ⟨H,nP , nO, ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣⟩, I con-
struct the model M∗ = ⟨W,E,R, I, RP , ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣∗⟩ generated from M . Then, given any
OWP sentence ϕ and h ∈ ⋃p∈Propo0 ∣∣p∣∣,
1. If ϕ ∈ L0, then M,h ⊨ ϕ iff h ∈ I(µ(ϕ))
2. If ϕ ∈ L1, then M,h ⊨ ϕ iff M∗, h ⊨ (ϕ)
Proof:
1. Suppose ϕ ∈ L0. By induction on the complexity of ϕ.
(a) For the case of p ∈ Prop0, then
M,h ⊨ p iff h ∈ ∣∣p∣∣ iff h ∈ I(µ(p))
(b) For the case of ϕ = ψ ∧ ϕ ∈ L0, then also ψ, ϕ ∈ L0. Now I have
M,h ⊨ ψ ∧ ϕ iff M,h ⊨ ψ and M,h ⊨ ϕ
iff h ∈ I(µ(ψ)) and h ∈ I(µ(ϕ))
iff h ∈ I(µ(ψ)) ∩ I(µ(ϕ))
iff h ∈ I(µ(ψ) ∩ µ(ϕ))
iff h ∈ I(µ(ψ ∧ ϕ))
(c) For the case of ¬ϕ ∈ L0, then also ϕ ∈ L0. We can see that
M,h ⊨ ¬ϕ iff M,h ⊭ ϕ
iff h /∈ I(µ(ϕ))
iff h ∈ I(µ(ϕ))
iff h ∈ I(µ(¬ϕ))
2. Suppose ϕ ∈ L1. By induction on the complexity of ϕ.
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(a) For the case of p ∈ Prop0, then
M,h ⊨ p iff h ∈ ∣∣p∣∣ iff h ∈ ∣∣(p)∣∣∗ iff M∗, h ⊨ (p)
(b) For the case of ψ ∧ ϕ ∈ L1, then also ψ, ϕ ∈ L1. I can then infer
M,h ⊨ ψ ∧ ϕ iff M,h ⊨ ψ and M,h ⊨ ϕ
iff M∗, h ⊨ (ψ) and M∗, h ⊨ (ϕ)
iff M∗, h ⊨ (ψ) ∧ (ϕ)
iff M∗, h ⊨ (ψ ∧ ϕ)
(c) For the case of ¬ψ ∈ L1, then also ψ ∈ L1. So I infer
M,h ⊨ ¬ψ iff M,h ⊭ ψ
iff M∗, h ⊭ (ψ)
iff M∗, h ⊨ (¬ψ)
(d) For the case of ◇ψ ∈ L1, then also ψ ∈ L0 by the definition. So
M,h ⊨◇ψ iff ∃h′ ∈ H s.t. Alt(h, h′) and M,h′ ⊨ ψ
iff ∃h′ ∈ I(µ(ψ)) s.t. Rh′(h) = h′ and M∗, h′ ⊨ ⊤
iff M∗, h ⊨ ⟨µ(ψ)⟩⊤
iff M∗, h ⊨ (◇ψ)
(e) Similar to the case of Pψ ∈ L1, then ψ ∈ L0. So
M,h ⊨ Pψ iff ∣∣ψ∣∣ ∈ nP (h)
iff ∀h′ ∈ ∣∣ψ∣∣ that RPhh′ by the Construction of RP
iff ∀h′ ∈ I(µ(ψ)) that RPhh′
iff M∗, h ⊨ Pµ(ψ)
iff M∗, h ⊨ (Pψ)
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(f) For the case of Oψ ∈ L1, then I infer ψ ∈ L0. So
M,h ⊨ Oψ iff ∣∣ψ∣∣ ∈ nO(h)
iff ∣∣ψ∣∣ =⋃nP (h), by nO(h) ≠ ∅
iff ∣∣ψ∣∣ ⊆⋃nP (h) and ⋃nP (h) ⊆ ∣∣ψ∣∣
iff ∣∣ψ∣∣ ⊆⋃nP (h) ∈ nP (h) and ⋃nP (h) ⊆ ∣∣ψ∣∣
by the condition for nP
iff ∀h′ ∈ I(µ(ψ)).RPhh′, and
∀h′ ∈⋃nP (h).[h′ ∈ I(µ(ψ))]
iff ∀h′ ∈ I(µ(ψ)).RPhh′, and
∀h′.[RP (h, h′)⇒ h′ ∈ I(µ(ψ)]
iff M∗, h ⊨ Pµ(ψ) and M∗, h ⊨ ¬PWµ(ψ)
iff M∗, h ⊨ Pµ(ψ) ∧ ¬PWµ(¬ψ)
iff M∗, h ⊨ (Oψ)
□
As these two translation results show, PBDL and OWP are partially overlap. One of
their differences is similar to that between DBAL and MDL: the former does not allow
deontic modalities be iterated. The second difference is that the language in PBDL
is more fine-grained than that in OWP. Because the effect of the dynamic sentences
and weak permissions, only part of the language of PBDL can be translated into the
language of OWP.
2.4 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to provide an explicit comparison between four related
logics which, I argued, are well-suited to studying rational recommendations in games:
van Benthem’s “Minimal Deontic Logic”, Anglberger et al.’s “Obligation as Weakest
Permission”, Trypuz and Kulicki’s “Deontic Boolean Action Logic,” and Castro and
Maibaum’s “Propositional Boolean Dynamic Logic.” All four systems can be seen
as endorsing the idea that obligations and permissions in games provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for rationality. The scope of O and P in the first two logics
are propositions, and then modalities can be iterated; while the latter two distinguish
propositions and action types, and no deontic modalities can be iterated. I have argued
that the first two differ in their view of the relation between obligations and permis-
sions: in OWP the former imply the latter, but not in MDL. As a result of this, I argued,
MDL stays closer to the core philosophical principles for rational recommendations
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in games, while OWP stays closer to the intuitive idea that an action type cannot be
obligatory while at the same time not being permitted. I then showed that DBAL can
be embedded in MDL, and PBAL be partially embedded in OWP. The upshot of the
first translation result is that even though the former two logics draw a sharper syntac-
tic distinction between propositional connectives and constructors for complex action
types, this distinction is blurred again at the semantic level. For instance, DBAL can be
seen as a syntactically restricted MDL, but this need not be conceptually implausible.
Given the action-theoretic interpretation I used for the semantics of MDL, formulas of
the form OPϕ means that the “action type” Pϕ is obligatory . I leave it to the reader
to decide whether Pϕ can plausibly support this action-theoretic reading.
The comparisons in this chapter have shown that in the context of rational recom-
mendations in games, it is natural to assume that permissions satisfy FCP. This is so
because they are viewed as providing sufficient conditions for rationality. Of course
the resulting logics remain prone to the free choice permission paradox discussed in
the introduction. This is due to the fact that the underlying logic of actions is classical
in all the systems that I studied in this chapter. I address this issue in the next chapter,
where I study the logics where the action-theoretic notions are not classical.
Chapter 3
Free Choice Permission in Open Reading
A Perspective in Substructural Logics
This chapter proposes a new solution to the Free Choice Permission Paradox [11, 43,
122], combining ideas from substructural logics and non-monotonic reasoning. Recall
that free choice permission is intuitively understood as “if it is permitted to do α or β
then it is permitted to do α and it is permitted to do β.” This is usually formalized as
follows:
P (α ∨ β)→ Pα ∧ Pβ, (FCP)
where → represents the material conditional “if . . . then . . . .” There are many well-
known problems associated with FCP. I have already alluded to one in the Introduction.
In this chapter I focus on three of them. First, in many deontic systems adding FCP
allows for a form of conjunctive inference which seems clearly unacceptable: if it is
permitted to order a vegetarian lunch then it is permitted to order a lunch and not pay
for it. This is the so called “vegetarian free lunch” example [43]. Second, many deontic
logics become resource-insensitive in the presence of FCP. They validate inferences of
the form “if the patient with stomach trouble is allowed to eat one cookie then he is
allowed to eat more than one,” which are also counter-intuitive. Third, in its classical
form FCP entails that the classically equivalent formulas can be substituted to the scope
of a permission operator. This is also implausible: It is permitted to eat an apple or
not iff it is permitted to sell a house or not. The challenge for a logic of free choice
permission is to exclude such counter-intuitive consequences while not giving up too
much deductive power. In other words, I need a suitable non-classical calculus for free
choice permission. I suggest one way of doing this is using a family of substructural
logics augmented with a principle borrowed from non-monotonic reasoning.
The solution that I put forward in this chapter is to build a family of logics including
FCP on top of a plausible calculus for action types. This calculus must, in my view,
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be at the same time relevant, non-monotonic and resource-sensitive. So the present
chapter can be seen as a follow-up to a suggestion made in [6]. It is structured as
follows. I first clarify various background concepts related to free choice permission,
and apply the semantic strategy suggested in [6] to analyze those three problems. In the
next two sections I emphasize that one of the main goals of this chapter is to balance
the counter-intuitive consequences of free choice permission with the deductive power
of its logic. My solution is to augment substructural logics with a principle from non-
monotonic reasoning, as a plausible characterization of a conditional over action types.
I argue that this preserves enough deductive power while keeping counter-intuitive
FCP inferences at bay. And these logics are presented in the fourth section, where it is
shown that they are sound and complete, and the basic logic and one of its extensions
satisfy cut elimination.
3.1 Background Concepts
This section will circumscribe the understanding of FCP that I will study in this chapter
by correlating it with a number of different views of permissions: strong permission,
weak permission, explicit permission/implicit permission, the “open reading.” Further-
more, I propose an intuitive reading of conditionals on actions, which is proved to be
suitable for analyzing FCP in the next section.
3.1.1 Strong Permission
Here I review some of the notions already presented in the Introduction. Free choice
permission is often argued as going hand in hand with the idea of strong permis-
sion [117, 8]. The notion of strong permission goes back at least to von Wright who
stated that an action is strongly permitted “if the authority has considered its normative
status and decided to permit it [117].” 1 Recall that in contrast to strong permission,
weak permission is defined as the absence of prohibition, i.e. the dual of obligation in
standard deontic logic [73, 72]. Due to these presence/absence features, von Wright
roughly classified strong permission as explicit permission and weak permission as
tacit permission [119]:
I think we are well advised to distinguish between things being permitted
in the weak sense of simply not being forbidden and things being permitted
in some stronger sense. Exactly in what this stronger sense ‘consists’ may
be difficult to tell. That which is in the strong sense permitted is, somehow,
expressly permitted, subject to norm and not just void of deontic status
altogether.
1Subsequent literature has not always used “strong permissions” in the same sense as von Wright.
Asher and Bovenac [8] use the term in a way which is closer to what I call the "open reading" in Section
1.2. In [71] two different senses of explicit permissions, static and dynamic, are distinguished and
studied. In this chapter I will use "strong permission" in von Wright’s sense, unless otherwise specified.
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It has been defended that strong permission satisfies free choice whereas weak
permission does not [118, 26]. More precisely, it is strongly permitted to do α or β, iff
it is strongly permitted to do α and it is strongly permitted to do β; while it is weakly
permitted to do α or β, iff it is weakly permitted to do α or it is weakly permitted to
do β. In [118, p.31], von Wright claimed that strong permission is closely associated
with free choice permission. In this chapter I do not take a stand on whether strong
permission as illustrated above is free choice permission or the other way around. I do
observe, however, that the permissions that I study here share a number of important
features with strong permissions: they are explicit, they are not the dual of obligations,
and they of course satisfy a restricted form of FCP.
3.1.2 Open Reading
The so-called open reading of permission is defined as follows:
An action type α is permitted iff each instantiation of action type α is normatively okay.
(OR)
The open reading provides a “sufficiency” reading [112]: instantiating a permitted
action type is sufficient for being okay [101, 100, 58, 7], which I have already studied
in detail in Chapter 2. The open reading thus becomes: if instantiating action type α
is instantiating action type β, I conclude that if it is permitted to do β then it is also
permitted to do α.
α ⊸ β ⊢ Pβ → Pα (OR+)
Here ⊢ is a logical consequence relation about deontic propositions and ⊸ a condi-
tional over action types. A classical reading of α ⊸ β is “an instantiation of action
type α is an instantiation of action type β.” In addition, Pβ → Pα is read as “If type
β is permitted then so is type α.” The representation OR+ captures the idea of OR:
whether α is a permitted action type, depends on whether action type α is sufficient for
action type β, and whether type β is permitted. In Section 3.2.1 I will argue that the
conditional⊸ should be non-monotonic, resource sensitive, and relevant.
FCP follows from OR in a classical reading of the conditional⊸ [6, 7, 27]. Given
that an instantiating type α is an instantiation of this disjunctive type (α or β), if type (α
or β) is permitted then type α is also permitted. The idea of open reading goes back to
open interpretation in dynamic deontic logic [18] and disjunctive permissions in con-
ditional logic [46, 67]. The open reading underlies the analysis of rational permission
in games in Chapter 2.
One of the driving ideas of this chapter is to take a controlled version of OR, in
the form of OR+, as the core of free choice permission. In this controlled version, the
conditional⊸ on actions should not be classical. So is the consequence relation⊢ for
permission.
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3.1.3 The “Licensed Instance” Relation on Actions
The key to my solution of the free choice permission paradox is to interpret the ⊸
connective used above in such a way that its logical behavior becomes non-classical.
Recall that this connective takes two action types as arguments. I view it as stating a
particular relation between those types: “being a licensed instance of.” More precisely,
I say that α is a licensed instance of β in state s just in case:
(b1) executing α in s is an instance of β, and
(b2) the execution of α is otherwise licensed in s.
For α to be a licensed instance of β the first must of course constitute a way of doing
the second. So this relation between action types can be seen as a special case of the
“by means of” relation introduced by Goldman [36] and later applied in legal theory
by Lindahl [63]. Since the “by means of” relation is already non-classical, this means
that my connective ⊸ will be as well. But not all instances are licensed. Ordering a
lunch and not paying for it is not a licensed instance of ordering a lunch.
The relation “being a licensed instance of” is non-monotonic, resource sensitive
and relevant. Non-monotonicity and relevance are direct consequences of (b2). If α
is licensed it doesn’t mean that α together with β will be. My cookie example above
shows that this relation is also resource sensitive. Eating one cookie might be licensed,
while eating more might not be.
On the positive side, this relation seems to satisfy a property that I will call “rational
monotony” below. It states that if α is a licensed instance of β, and that it is not the
case that something else than γ is a licensed instance of β, than doing α together with
γ is a licensed instance of β. I will argue below that the close cousin called “cautious
monotony” is, however, not acceptable for the “being a licensed instance of” relation.
3.2 The Basic Inferences of Free Choice Permission
In this section I will differentiate different types of inferences on FCP (i.e. disjunctive
and conjunctive) by adopting the so-called open reading as the semantic core.
3.2.1 Disjunctive and Conjunctive Free Choice Inferences
Using OR+, the three types of undesired counter-intuitive consequences of free choice
permission can be illustrated as special cases of two general patterns of free choice
permission inferences: disjunctive and conjunctive free choice inferences.
Disjunctive inferences are the canonical forms of inferences using FCP. The premise
in a disjunctive inference contains “or” inside the scope of permission. Here is one in-
stance of the typical disjunctive inferences:
∵ (1a) It is permitted to eat an apple or eat a pear.
∴ (1b) It is permitted to eat an apple, and (1c) it is permitted to eat a pear.
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This instance of disjunctive FCP inference is that from the premise (1a) I can infer the
consequents (1b) and (1c). FCP will be valid if the conditionals α ⊸ (α ∨ β) and
β ⊸ (α ∨ β) are valid.
OR+ leads to several problems if ⊸ is classical. The first one I notice is that it
entails unrestricted substitutions of classically equivalent formulas [122]. An instance
derived from OR+ is the following:
α⧟ β ⊢ Pβ ↔ Pα (P-E)
where α ⧟ β means that α ⊸ β and β ⊸ α, and α ↔ β means that α → β and
β → α. This principle P-E is a form of the substitution principle. If ⧟ is strong
enough to make classical tautologies equivalent, then “eating an apple or not is permit-
ted iff selling a house or not is permitted.” Yet these permissions seem different. The
permission to sell a house or not involves a different authority than the permission to
eat an apple or not. Eating an apple or not is, in my view, irrelevant to selling a house 2.
In my view a plausible calculus of actions should give up the substitution of classically
equivalent formulas.
By conjunctive inference I mean the inference of the following form:
∵ (2a) It is permitted to order a vegetarian lunch.
∴ (2b) It is permitted to order a vegetarian lunch and not pay for it.
whose abstract form is shown as follows:
Pα → P (α ∧ β), (CI)
where β is an arbitrary action type. CI is valid under OR+, if (α ∧ β) ⊸ α is valid.
Yet the classical “vegetarian free lunch” example is one instance of CI. Moreover, CI is
logically equivalent to FCP under OR+ if⊸ is classical 3. This is not the case that in the
logic that I develop below. Otherwise CI will bring at least two “abnormal” cases into
the permissions. The first case is the unrestricted “vegetarian free lunch” example just
mentioned. The implied permission (2b) is not a normal case to the explicit permitted
type (2a), because the composition of ordering a lunch and not paying for this order is
not a licensed instance of ordering a lunch. The monotonic (α ∧ β) ⊸ α should be
restricted by the notion of licensed instance.
CI also encounters problems from resource-sensitivity. If eating one cookie is per-
mitted, for a patient with stomach trouble, it is unfortunate to imply that eating more
than one is also permitted. In this case, the classical conditional (α ∧ ⋯ ∧ α) ⊸ α
indicates an unrestricted resource composition. The above two conjunctive cases are
2I take “irrelevance” in a different sense, but still very close to relevant logic [88]: only α ⊸ (β∨ ∼
β) is not valid in my logics. My logics validate (α◦ ∼ α) ⊸ β, which is rejected in relevant logic. In
this chapter ∼ and ¬ are different negations, and ∼ will be seen as the negation for actions.
3By taking α⧟ ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α∧ ∼ β)) and α⧟ ((α ∨ β) ∧ (α∨ ∼ β)) as classical validities,
the logical equivalence between CI and FCP holds after using the substitution of logical equivalences.
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brought up by the unrestrained conjunctions appearing in the conditional over action
types, in which the conjunctions lead to resource-insensitive action compositions and
so abnormal cases of permission.
My solution to the aforementioned problems related to FCP and CI is a semantic
one. I insist on OR as the semantic core of permissions, and propose a non-classical
interpretation for the conditional ⊸ as well as for OR+, in which the conditional is
required to be relevant, non-monotonic, and resource sensitive. This interpretation
provides a mechanism to select licensed instances on action types, especially action
compositions.
3.2.2 Goal: Balance between Cautiousness and Deductive Power
Unrestricted classical conditional on actions is thus problematic in the presence of FCP.
To avoid this I follow the solution proposed by Barker [11] and move to a substructural
interpretation of the conditional and the conjunction. Yet in doing so one should be
careful not to put the deductive barrier too high. In the words of van Benthem [102,
p.95]: “This is like turning down the volume on your radio so as not to hear the bad
news. You will not hear much good news either.” Indeed, as we have seen earlier there
are still plausible cases of FCP inferences. Combining the idea of “licensed instance”
on action types, my strategy to do so is to adopt this action types relation, and borrow
the principle shared in “licensed instance” from non-monotonic logic. This provides
just enough deductive power to keep control of conjunctive FCP inferences. This is
what I do in the next section.
3.3 Rational Monotonicity in a Substructural Frame-
work
In this section I argue for a combination of ideas from substructural logics [87, 33] and
non-monotonic reasoning to achieve a good balance in deductive power. From now on
the intuitive reading of the conditional⊸ in OR+ is “be a licensed instance of” adopted
from Section 3.1.3.
3.3.1 From Classical to Non-Classical: Give Up Left-Hand Weak-
ening and Mingle
A plausible calculus of action types should give up left-hand weakening and mingle
as rules of inference. The absence of these rules will exclude the two unwelcome
classical properties in OR+ mentioned above: unrestricted monotonicity and resource-
insensitivity.
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The following left-hand weakening should be excluded as one of the rules of infer-
ence on licensed action types. For arbitrary γ,
α ⊸ β ⊢ (α ∧ γ)⊸ β
The reason for giving up this rule under the “licensed instance” interpretation has al-
ready been alluded to. This principle is a form of monotonicity. But it should be clear
that even though α is a licensed instance of β, it doesn’t mean that α together with γ is.
The unrestricted left-hand weakening can allow for (α∧β)⊸ α and (α∧⋯∧α)⊸ α,
which brings back the foregoing examples of monotonic and resource insensitive con-
ditionals on action types.
A similar reasoning forces me to reject the following mingle rule for the “licensed
instance” interpretation:(α ⊸ β) ∧ (γ ⊸ β) ⊢ (α ∧ γ)⊸ β
Indeed, (α ∧ β) ⊸ α and (α ∧ ⋯ ∧ α) ⊸ α are two instances of mingle. The
mingle rule can even bring the following additional unlicensed instance into actions
as well as the abnormality on permissions. (3a) selling the house to Ann is a licensed
instance of selling the house, and (3b) selling the house to Bob is a licensed instance
of selling the house. Applying mingle to these two conditionals on action types, I
can conclude the counter-intuitive (3c) that selling the house to Ann and selling the
house to Bob is a licensed instance of selling the house. Yet the conclusion (3c) selling
one house to two individuals is not a licensed instance of a selling contract. Though
action type α and action type γ are both licensed instances of action type β, if they are
mutually exclusive, then their composition as a contradiction is not a licensed instance
of the action type β any longer. The mingle rule therefore is not a desired rule for the
“licensed instance.”
3.3.2 Getting Back Some Deductive Power: CautiousMonotony or
Rational Monotony?
To recover the plausible free choice permission inferences, I will examine two princi-
ples from non-monotonic reasoning. I want to restore certain plausible examples such
as ordering a lunch and paying for it is a licensed instance of ordering a lunch.
The first option is the following non-monotonic principle:(α ⊸ γ) ∧ (α ⊸ β) ⊢ (α ◦ β)⊸ γ (CaM)
where fusion ◦ is a non-classical counterpart of the classical conjunction ∧. This
principle is called cautious monotony. It means that, if action type α is a licensed
instance of action type γ, and it is also a licensed instance of action type β, then the
composite action type α and β is still a licensed instance of action type γ. By using
CaM, the selling example can be accommodated as follows. Let (3b’) be the case that
50 Chapter 3. Free Choice Permission in Open Reading
selling the house to Ann is a licensed instance of not selling the house to Bob. Applying
CaM to (3a) and (3b’), I conclude (3c’) that selling the house to Ann and not selling
the house to Bob is a licensed instance of selling the house.
Yet accepting CaM re-introduces the kind of resource-insensitivity that I want to
avoid in this chapter. I can infer (α ◦ ⋯ ◦ α) ⊸ α by applying (α ⊸ α) on CaM.
Therefore this non-monotonic principle does not help to solve the problems I want to
address here. Instead, I consider a closely related principle: rational monotony.
Rational monotony states that: If action type α is a licensed instance of action type
γ, and it is not the case that action type α is a licensed instance of any actions except β,
then the composition of action type α and action type β is a licensed instance of action
type γ. I read ∼ β as the action type “any actions except β,” and it is equal to saying
β ⊸ 0, where 0 is an impossible action. It captures the intuition of any actions except
β: this action type β fails to be licensed. Formally, rational monotony is presented in
the following form:
(α ⊸ γ) ∧ ¬(α ⊸∼ β) ⊢ (α ◦ β)⊸ γ (RaM)
Under a classical reading of conjunction and implication, rational monotony im-
plies cautious monotony. This is not the case here.
3.4 A Substructural Calculus of Actions and Permis-
sions
The goal of this section is to develop a family of sound and complete substructural
logics for actions and permissions. I argued earlier that, in the context of free choice
permission, the calculus of actions should not include the classically valid left-hand
weakening and mingle, which are the undesired logical assumptions emphasized on
action compositions, and the substitution under (classical) equivalence, which is the
other unwanted assumption applied on conditional over actions. The calculus I develop
is a family of substructural logics. All logics in this family exclude the structural
rules for left-hand weakening, mingle and cautious monotony. They can thus avoid
the unrestricted monotonic “vegetarian free lunch” and the resource-insensitive cases.
Because the negation on actions is defined by the non-classical conditional⊸ together
with the impossible action type 0, the irrelevant (α ⊎ ∼ α)⧟ (β ⊎ ∼ β) fails too 4.
Furthermore, to restore the deductive power, one of these logics will include RaM. I
adopt OR as my semantic core, and develop a family of logics that contains OR+ as
the main proof theoretical principle.
4To mark the disjunction for action types, here I use ⊎ to replace the classical disjunction ∨.
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3.4.1 Substructural Logics for Actions and Permissions
The presentation in this section is close to the standard systems and the standard se-
mantics in [87]. Notice that the following is a calculus of actions as types and permis-
sions as propositions. The language is then of two sorts: one is well-formed types for
actions, and the other is well-formed formulas for permissions.
3.4.1. DEFINITION. [Types and Formulas] The set LA of well-formed types of actions
and the set Ln of well-formed formulas of norms are defined as follows:
LA ∶ α∷ = 0 ∣ a ∣ α ⊎ α ∣ α ◦ α ∣∼ α
Ln ∶ ϕ∷ = α ⊸ α ∣ Pα ∣ ⊥ ∣ ϕ→ ϕ
where a ∈ Act0 the (countable) set of action generators, and α ∈ LA. LetL = LA∪Ln.
The set LA of well-formed action types are constructed out of the set Act0 of prim-
itive action types and the impossible action 0, by taken together with ⊎ the Boolean
disjunction, the fusion ◦ the non-classical conjunction, and ∼ the action negation. So
α⊎ β is a choice between actions α and β, read as “doing α or doing β.” And α ◦ β is
an action composition, read as “doing α together with β.” 5 Then the action negation
∼ α is read as “doing anything else than α.” Moreover, ∼ is not a De Morgen negation,
in the sense that, although α ⊸∼∼ α holds, its converse ∼∼ α ⊸ α does not.
The set Ln of well-formed formulas includes three kinds of atomic formula. The
first kind of atomic formula is constructed by the binary conditional ⊸ over action
types, which is understood as the “licensed instance” relation discussed in Section 3.1.3.
So the “licensed instance” formula α ⊸ β is read as “doing α is a licensed instance
of doing β.” Paying for a lunch is a licensed instance of ordering a lunch. In contrast,
not-paying for a lunch is not a licensed instance of ordering a lunch in commercial cir-
cumstances. I simply construct a set LB of “action-formulas” by taking all action types
and “licensed instance” formulas. The second kind of primitive well-formed formulas
capture permissions of actions, which is constructed by taking the P -modality for (free
choice) permission, in the scope of which only action types occur. Then Pα indicates
that doing α is permitted. The third kind of primitive well-formed formula is the false
constant ⊥. Taking all three kinds of primitive well-formed formula together with the
material conditional→, I can construct the whole set Ln of well-formed formulas. Ob-
serve that the classical negation ¬ over formulas can be defined as ¬ϕ ∶= ϕ → ⊥. So
the true constant⊤ ∶= ¬⊥. The classical disjunction ∨ over propositions is defined as
usual: ϕ∨ ψ ∶= ¬ϕ→ ψ. I use the Greek letters α, β, γ, . . . to represent action types,
and ϕ, ψ, χ, . . . to represent formulas. Sometimes, in certain particular situations, I
5The composition operator ◦ is not the sequent composition operator in propositional dynamic logic
(PDL) [44, p.168]. This operator ◦, sometimes, may be understood as a non-standard concurrency
operator of actions [44, p.268, p.276]. For example, Listen ◦WriteNote. I suggest reading α ◦ β
as “doing action α and action β (together).” Though it seems impossible to excute EatCookies ◦
DrinkCoffee at the same time, I can still think of eating cookies and drinking coffee as a licensed
action.
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use the capital letters A,B,C, . . . to encompass either action types or formulas, if no
confusion arises.
I can then introduce another important syntactic component in substructural logic:
structures. In my logics, structures are categorized into two sorts, corresponding to
action-formulas in LB and deontic formulas in Ln.
3.4.2. DEFINITION. [Structures] The set S = SB ∪ Sd of structures is defined as fol-
lows:
SB ∶ X∷ = ψ ∣ X;X where ψ ∈ LB
Sd ∶ X∷ = ϕ ∣ X,X where ϕ ∈ Ln
Observe that L ⊆ S, and the set S of structures is the union of the set SB of action-
structures and the set Sd of deontic-structures. The semicolon ; is a binary punctuation
mark over action-formulas ψ ∈ LB. Usually X;Y is read as “a structure X combines
with a structure Y .” The comma , is a binary punctuation mark over well-formed
formulas ϕ ∈ Ln. Then X, Y is read as “a structure X and a structure Y .” Here I
use X, Y, Z,H,⋯ to represent structures in S. I write X[Y ] as a structure X with
a substructure Y , while writing X[Z/Y ] as a structure X replacing the occurrences
of the substructure Y by Z. For instance, α◦ ∼ α is a substructure for the structure(α◦ ∼ α;α;α◦ ∼ α), and then (α◦ ∼ α;α;α◦ ∼ α)[0/α◦ ∼ α] = (0;α;0).
The models for my logics are the standard models in substructural logics [87]. The
basic ontological entities in these models are states, which, as I will show in Sec-
tion 3.4.4, are incomplete. Here states have two characters in accordance with the
valuation function V : to instantiate action types, and to give well-formed formulas
truth value. In other words, action types can be instantiated or not at states, while for-
mulas can be true or false at states. Moreover, two different types of relations should be
contained in the substructural models. One is the ternary relation M , which is under-
stood as a semantic characterization of the licensed instance relation in Section 3.1.3,
in the sense that Mxyz holds, iff it satisfies: (b1) x and y together is an instance of
z; and (b2) the third state z gives rise to a reason for the circumstance to consist of
x and y. Mxyz is read as “ the circumstance consisting of state x together with state
y is licensed by state z.” I simply call M “state-license,” and use it to interpret the
“licensed instance” relation on action types. See Figure 3.1. The frame conditions for
M -relation will be discussed in Section 3.4.2. The second main relation is the binary
relation OK for interpreting (free choice) permission. OK(x, y) is read as “a state x
is normatively okay w.r.t. a state y.”
3.4.3. DEFINITION. [Models] A model is a tuple M = ⟨W,M,OK, V ⟩ where
• W is a non-empty set of possible states
• M ⊆ W ×W ×W is a ternary relation on W
• OK ⊆ W ×W is a binary relation on W
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x y
z
Figure 3.1: A state-license Mxyz: (1) a state consisting of x and y is an instance of z,
and (2) the circumstance together with x and y is licensed by the third state z.
• V ∶ Act0 ∪ {0,⊥}→ ℘(W ) is a valuation function
The OK-relation is a standard to evaluate the deontic facts at each state, while the M -
relation, as a characterization of “licensed instance” between actions, governs how to
regulate and license one action in accordance with a given deontic standard.
As usual, a frame for my substructural logics is a model minus the valuation V .
Observe that the language L is two-sorted, and so are the truth conditions. Now I
can interpret action types and formulas in L and structures in S by taking these models
as a standard method in substructural logics [87].
3.4.4. DEFINITION. [Truth Conditions] Let M = ⟨W,M,OK, V ⟩ be a model. A
well-formed type α ∈ LA is instantiated at state w in modelM, writtenM, w ⊧ α, iff
M, w ⊧ a iff w ∈ V (a)
M, w /⊧ 0 for all w ∈ W
M, w ⊧ α ⊎ β iff M, w ⊧ α or M, w ⊧ β
M, w ⊧ α ◦ β iff ∃y, z ∈ W. (Myzw,M, y ⊧ α & M, z ⊧ β)
M, w ⊧∼ α iff ∀y, z ∈ W.(Mwyz⇒M, y /⊧ α)
Now I construct the truth conditions for well-formed formulas: ϕ ∈ Ln is true at state
w in model M, written M, w ⊧ ϕ, iff
M, w ⊧ α ⊸ β iff ∀y, z ∈ W.(Mwyz & M, y ⊧ α⇒M, z ⊧ β)
M, w ⊧ Pα iff ∀y ∈ W. (M, y ⊧ α⇒ OK(y, w))
M, w /⊧ ⊥ for all w ∈ W
M, w ⊧ ϕ→ ψ iff M, w ⊧ ϕ⇒M, w ⊧ ψ
So I can extend the truth conditions to all structures such that
M, w ⊧ X;Y iff ∃y, z ∈ W. (Myzw,M, y ⊧ X & M, z ⊧ Y )
M, w ⊧ X, Y iff M, w ⊧ X & M, w ⊧ Y
The truth conditions for action types are interpreted via the concept “instantiation.”
V (a) is a set of states that can instantiate action generator a ∈ Act0, and thenM, w ⊧
a indicates that action generator a is instantiated at state w. α⊎β is instantiated at state
w iff either α or β is instantiated at this state. The non-classical interpretations over
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actions are for the fusion ◦ and the action negation ∼, which need to be interpreted via
state-license M . α ◦ β is instantiated at w, iff there exist y and z s.t. (b1’) the state
consisting of y, the instantiation of α, and z, the instantiation of β, is an instance of w
which instantiates α ◦ β, and (b2’) the circumstance consisting of y and z is licensed
by w. For instance, ordering a lunch together with paying for it would be instantiated
at w, iff there are two states y and z s.t. y instantiates ordering a lunch, z instantiates
paying for the meal, and (b1”) y and z together is an instance of w as well as (b2”)
the circumstance consisting of y and z is licensed by w. We can see that the state-
license in an existential manner can offer a good interpretation for α ◦ β: there exists
a licensed instantiation of doing α and β together. Similarly, the action negation ∼ α
is instantiated at w, iff, that if w together with arbitrary state y is a licensed instance,
then this state y does not instantiate α.
The truth conditions for well-formed formulas are interpreted via the usual concept
“truth.” An action-formula α ⊸ β is true at w iff the state consisting of w and arbitrary
state instantiating α is always a licensed instance of β. With this in hand, for instance,(α ◦ β) ⊸ α, where α is ordering a lunch and β is paying for the meal, is true at
state w, iff an instantiation of α ordering a lunch and β paying for the meal together
is a licensed instance of α ordering a lunch. A deontic formula Pα is true at w iff
for arbitrary state instantiating α, it is normatively okay w.r.t. the state w. The truth
conditions for⊥ and→ are defined as usual.
The truth conditions for structures are similar as for formulas. Validity is defined
as usual. A structure X is valid in a model M, denoted as M ⊧ X , iff M, w ⊧ X for
all w ∈ W . M ∈ F indicates that M is a model based on a frame F with a valuation
function. A structure X is valid in a frame F , denoted as F ⊧ X , iff M ⊧ X for all
M ∈ F . I define X ⊧F A iff if M, w ⊧ X then M, w ⊧ A where M ∈ F .
I define the turnstile⊢ ⊆ S ×L as the basic syntactic consequences of actions and
permissions, iff it is closed under the axioms and rules in Table 3.1, which is presented
in the sequent calculus style. I read X;B ⊢ A as “if X combines with B, normally,
then A”, where X;B is a combination in the premise and A is a consequent. I write
the equivalent consequences A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A as A ⊣⊢ B. In accordance with
Table 3.1, Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Table 3.4, a system in sequent calculus is defined
in a standard way [75, 81]. Here (Id) and (0) are called axioms, and the others are rules
in a given sequent calculus N . I define derivations and their heights in Definition 3.4.5
and Definition 3.4.6, which are inspired by the notions in [75, 81]. They are the key
notions for cut elimination.
3.4.5. DEFINITION. [Derivations] I say X ⊢ A is a derivation in the system N , iff:
1. either X ⊢ A is an instance of axioms in N , or
2. there are derivations Y ⊢ B and Z ⊢ C s.t. X ⊢ A is concluded by the
application of a rule in N on Y ⊢ B and Z ⊢ C as its premises.
3.4.6. DEFINITION. [Heights of Derivations] Given a system N , I say X ⊢ A is a
derivation with the height n, denoted as X ⊢n A, iff
3.4. A Substructural Calculus of Actions and Permissions 55
(Id) a ⊢ a where a ∈ Act0
(∼ L) X ⊢ α Y [0] ⊢ γ
Y [∼ α;X] ⊢ γ
(◦L) X[α; β] ⊢ γ
X[α ◦ β] ⊢ γ
(⊎L) X[α] ⊢ γ X[β] ⊢ γ
X[α ⊎ β] ⊢ γ
(0) X[0] ⊢ γ for all γ ∈ LA
(∼ R) X;α ⊢ 0
X ⊢∼ α
(◦R) X ⊢ α Y ⊢ β
X;Y ⊢ α ◦ β
(⊎R1)
X ⊢ α
X ⊢ α ⊎ β
(⊎R2)
X ⊢ β
X ⊢ α ⊎ β
Table 3.1: The fragment of the sequent calculus N0 for action types LA.
(⊸ L) X ⊢ α Y [β] ⊢ γ
Y [(α ⊸ β);X] ⊢ γ
(⊥) X[⊥] ⊢ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Ln
(→ L) X ⊢ ϕ Y [ψ] ⊢ χ
Y [ϕ→ ψ,X] ⊢ χ
(⊸ R) X;α ⊢ β
X ⊢ α ⊸ β
(OR) X ⊢ α ⊸ β
X, Pβ ⊢ Pα
(→ R) X,ϕ ⊢ ψ
X ⊢ ϕ→ ψ
Table 3.2: The fragment of the sequent calculus N0 for norms Ln.
1. either X ⊢0 A is an instance of axioms in N , or
2. ∃Y ⊢n−k B,Z ⊢k C s.t. X ⊢n+1 A is a derivation concluded by the application
of a rule in N with premises Y ⊢n−k B and Z ⊢k C, where 0 ≤ k ≤ n.
A derivation X ⊢0 A with the height 0 is an instance of an axiom. In Table 3.1,
Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Table 3.4, if the upper consequences are at height n then the
lower consequences are at height n + 1. The left rules and right rules are to introduce
each operator from the upper consequences to its derived consequence. The left rules
show how to introduce the operator in the left side of ⊢ and the right rules show how
to introduce the operator in the right side of ⊢. For instance, (◦L) and (◦R) are the
left introduction and the right introduction for the fusion ◦.
Given any sequent calculus systemN , an extensionNR ofN with a setR of axioms
or rules means thatNR is closed under all the axioms and rules fromN in addition with
those in R. X ⊢ A is a theorem of the system N iff it is derivable in N . I use Th(N)
to denote all theorems of the sequent calculus N . Then NR as an extension of N with
R can be denoted as Th(N) ⊆ Th(NR), sometimes is simplified as N ⊆ NR. Notice
that the system N0 in Table 3.1, Table 3.2, and Table 3.3 is the basic substructural
logic in which left-hand weakening, mingle, and cautious monotony are absent. Based
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(Cut) X ⊢ A Y [A] ⊢ B
Y [X/A] ⊢ B
where either A,B ∈ LA or A,B ∈ Ln.
(Tra) X ⊢ α ⊸ β Y ⊢ β ⊸ γ
X, Y ⊢ α ⊸ γ
Table 3.3: The fragment of the sequent calculus N0 for actions LA and norms Ln.
(BI) Z[X;Y ] ⊢ A
Z[Y ;X] ⊢ A
(B) H[(X;Y );Z] ⊢ A
H[X; (Y ;Z)] ⊢ A
(M) H[X] ⊢ A
H[X;X] ⊢ A
(CaM) X ⊢ α ⊸ β Y ⊢ α ⊸ γ
X;Y ⊢ (α ◦ β)⊸ γ
(RaM) X ⊢ α ⊸ γ
X,¬(α ⊸∼ β) ⊢ (α ◦ β)⊸ γ
Table 3.4: Additional Rules, where either A ∈ LA or A ∈ Ln.
on the additional rules in Table 3.4, I can extend the basic system N0 of actions and
permissions as follows. NE is an extension of N0 together with BI and B (which are
called exchange rules). NM is an extension ofNE with M, whileNRaM is an extension
of NE with RaM. And so NCaM is an extension of NM with CaM. I therefore have
two families of substructural logics of actions and permissions, and their relations are
presented in the following branching chains:
N
0 ⊆ NE ⊆ N
RaM
⊆ NM ⊆ NCaM
All substructural logics in the upper branch exclude left-hand weakening, mingle, and
cautious monotony. The lower branch shows how cautious monotony correlates with
mingle, and why it is resource insensitive. In addition, the upper family of substructural
logics has the following useful properties.
3.4.7. THEOREM. 1. ID is a theorem of N0: α ⊢ α for all α ∈ LA.
2. (OR+) is a theorem of N0.
3. Action composition is associative and commutative in NE:
A;B ⊢ C
BI
B;A ⊢ C
(A;B);C ⊢ D
B, BI
A; (B;C) ⊢ D
4. The following two rules are theorems of N0:
X ⊢ ϕ
(¬L)
Y [¬ϕ,X] ⊢ ψ X,ϕ ⊢ ⊥ (¬R)X ⊢ ¬ϕ
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Proof:
1. To show that α ⊢ α for all α ∈ LA.
• If α = a ∈ Act0, by (Id), I have a ⊢ a.
• If α = 0, by (0), I have 0 ⊢ 0.
• If α = β ⊎ γ, then, by (⊎L), (⊎R1), and (⊎R2), the proof is:
β ⊢ β
(⊎R1)β ⊢ β ⊎ γ
γ ⊢ γ
(⊎R2)γ ⊢ β ⊎ γ
(⊎L)
β ⊎ γ ⊢ β ⊎ γ
• If α = β ◦ γ, then, by (◦L) and (◦R), the proof is:
β ⊢ β γ ⊢ γ
(◦R)
β; γ ⊢ β ◦ γ
(◦L)
β ◦ γ ⊢ β ◦ γ
• If α =∼ β, then, by (∼ L) and (∼ R), the proof is:
β ⊢ β 0 ⊢ 0
(∼ L)∼ β; β ⊢ 0
(∼ R)∼ β ⊢∼ β
2. The first derivation goes by the rule (⊸ R).
3. The derivation goes as follows:
α ⊸ β ⊢ α ⊸ β
OR
α ⊸ β, Pβ ⊢ Pα
→ R
α ⊸ β ⊢ Pβ → Pα
4. These two instances are derived in the following:
X ⊢ ϕ Y [⊥] ⊢ ψ
(→ L)
Y [ϕ→ ⊥, X] ⊢ ψ
(Definition)
Y [¬ϕ,X] ⊢ ψ
X,ϕ ⊢ ⊥
(¬R)
X ⊢ ϕ→ ⊥
(Definition)
X ⊢ ¬ϕ
□
3.4.8. THEOREM. The “licensed instance” relation⊸ is irreflexive, asymmetric, and
transitive in the following sense:
1. ⊤ ⊢ α ⊸ α is invalid.
2. α ⊸ β ⊢ β ⊸ α is invalid.
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3. (α ⊸ β), (β ⊸ γ) ⊢ α ⊸ γ is a theorem of N0.
And⊸ satisfies rational monotony:
1. (α ⊸ γ),¬(α ⊸∼ β) ⊢ (α ◦ β)⊸ γ is a theorem of NRaM .
Proof:
1. Construct a model M = ⟨W,M,OK, V ⟩ s.t. W = {x, y, z}, Mxyz, OK = ∅,
and V (a) = {y}. Obviously M, x /⊧ a⊸ a.
2. Construct a model M = ⟨W,M,OK, V ⟩ s.t. W = {x, y, z}, Mxyz, OK = ∅,
V (a) = {y} and V (b) = {y, z} where a, b ∈ Act0. I see that M, x /⊧ a ⊸ b but
M, x /⊧ b⊸ a.
3. This theorem is ensured by (Tra) in N0.
4. This is an instance of (RaM).
□
3.4.2 Standard Translation and Frame Correspondence
I apply the standard first-order translation ST for the ternary frames suggested in [59,
p.29] for (OR)’s modal correspondence, as well as for rules (Tra), (BI), (B), (M),
(CaM), and (RaM)’s correspondences. First, the definition of the standard first-order
translation is given as follows:
3.4.9. DEFINITION. [Standard Translation]
STx(a) ∶= A(x)
STx(0) ∶= false
STx(α ⊎ β) ∶= STx(α) ∨ STx(β)
STx(α ◦ α) ∶= ∃y∃z.(Myzx ∧ STx(α)[x ∶= y] ∧ STx(β)[x ∶= z])
STx(∼ α) ∶= ∀y∀z.(Mxyz → ¬STx(α)[x ∶= y])
STx(α ⊸ β) ∶= ∀y∀z.(Mxyz ∧ STx(α)[x ∶= y]→ STx(β)[x ∶= z])
STx(Pα) ∶= ∀y.(STx(α)[x ∶= y]→ OK(y, x))
STx(⊥) ∶= false
STx(ϕ→ ψ) ∶= STy(ϕ)→ STy(ψ)
STx(X;Y ) ∶= ∃y∃z.(Myzx ∧ STx(X)[x ∶= y] ∧ STx(Y )[x ∶= z])
STx(X, Y ) ∶= STx(X) ∧ STx(Y )
It is straightforward to check that this standard translation is adequate [13]. Now I turn
to the frame correspondence. I will present in turn the correspondents of (OR), (Tra),
(BI), (B), (M), (CaM), and (RaM).
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3.4.10. DEFINITION. [Open Reading] Let a tuple F = ⟨W,M,OK⟩ be a frame. I say
F is an open-reading frame iff F satisfies the following (or) condition:
∀w∀x∀y′[∀y(Mwy′y → OK(y, x))→ OK(y′, x)].
The open reading frame condition can be taken as a closure. Given a state w, if for
any y, which licenses to the circumstance consisting of w and y′, is normatively okay,
then y′ is also normatively okay. This frame condition can be seen as a closure of
normatively okay states closed under the state-license relation w.r.t. a given w:
OR(w) = {(y′, x) ∈ OK ∣ ∀y.[Mwy′y⇒ (y, x) ∈ OK]}.
3.4.11. DEFINITION. [License-Transitivity] Let a tuple F = ⟨W,M,OK⟩ be a frame.
I say F is a license-transitive frame iff F satisfies the following (tra) condition:
∀x∀y∀z∃u[Mxyz →Mxyu ∧Mxuz].
x
y
z
s u x
y
′
z
′
s
′
u
′
Figure 3.2: Two kinds of combination of state-licenses starting at x.
3.4.12. DEFINITION. [Cautious Monotonicity] Let a tuple F = ⟨W,M,OK⟩ be a
frame. I say F is a cautiously monotonic frame iff F satisfies the following (cam)
condition:
∀x∀y∀z∀s∀u∃y′∃z′∃m∃n[(Mxyz ∧Msuy) ∧ (s = y′ ∨ s = m)∧(u = z′ →Mxy′z′)→ (z = n→Mxmn)].
By use of the intuitive structure depicted in Figure 3.2 I want to shed light on the
formal semantics, i.e. given a combination of state-licenses Mxyz and Msuy. In
condition (cam), the conjunct (u = z′ → Mxy′z′) indicates that it is possible that
the circumstance consisting of state x together with state y′ is licensed by state u,
and, similarly, the conclusion (z = n → Mxmn) indicates that it is possible that the
circumstance consisting of state x together with state m is licensed by state z. Hence,
the condition (cam) indicates that the given combination of two state-licenses can be
shortened: if there exists a state-license of x by u, then there exists a state-license of
x by z. However, this existential character is not adequate for capturing the licensed
instance on action types.
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3.4.13. DEFINITION. [Rational Monotonicity] Let a tuple F = ⟨W,M,OK⟩ be a
frame. I say F is a rationally monotonic frame iff F satisfies the following (ram)
condition:
∀x∀y∀z∀s∀u∀y′∀z′∀s′∀u′[(Mxyz ∧Msuy) ∧ (Mxy′z′ ∧Mz′s′u′)
→ (Mxsz ∨Mxy′z)].
Similar to condition (cam), the condition (ram) also provides a method to shorten the
same combination of state-licenses starting at x: If there are two kinds of combination
of state-licenses starting at x, then the circumstances of state x together with two kinds
of “closest licensed” state (s or y′ in Figure 3.2) are licensed the “closest licensing”
state z. In contrast to (cam), here the shortening strategy given by (ram) can provide
a standard to select suitable state-licenses, which fits into the universal character of
licensed instance.
Let F = ⟨W,M,OK⟩ be a frame. Then 6
• F is a (bi)-frame iff it satisfies that ∀xyz.(Mxyz →Myxz).
• F is a (b)-frame iff it satisfies that ∀xyzw.[Mx(yx)w →M(xy)zw].
• F is a (mig)-frame iff it satisfies that ∀x∀y∀z[Mxyz → x = z ∨ y = z].
3.4.14. DEFINITION. [Correspondences] A frame condition (r) that corresponds to the
rule (R) is defined as follows: For any frame F , F is a (r)-frame iff (R) is valid in F .
The frame conditions (bi), (b), and (mig) are suggested in [87, p.250], and cor-
responds to (BI), (B), and (M) respectively.7 I propose the conditions (or), (tra), and
(ram) in this chapter. I show that (or) corresponds to (OR), (tra) corresponds to (Tra),
and (ram) corresponds to (RaM).
3.4.15. THEOREM. The (or) condition corresponds to (OR).
α ⊸ β ⊧F Pβ → Pα iff F ⊧ ∀w∀x∀y′[∀y(Mwy′y → OK(y, x))→ OK(y′, x)].
Proof:
For the Left-to-Right direction, I apply the contrapositive method in [59, p.43]. Sup-
pose a ⊸ b ⊧F Pb → Pa. That is, for any valuation V and any state w, if w /∈
V (Pb → Pa) then w /∈ V (a ⊸ b). Let A,B be predicates denoting the sets of
6The following shorthands are used to define frame conditions for the rules indicated in brackets:
• M(xy)zw ∶= ∃u.(Mxyu ∧Muzw).
• Mz(xy)w ∶= ∃u.(Mxyu ∧Mzuw).
7My proofs are similar but different than [87]: It has to contain an inclusion relation in the given
frames.
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possible states where a, b hold, respectively. This is reflected in the corresponding
second-order formula
∀B∀A∀w[∃x(∀y(By → OK(y, x)) ∧ ∃y′(Ay′ ∧ ¬OK(y′, x)))
→ ∃s∃u(Mwsu ∧ As ∧ ¬Bu)]
This formula is equal to
∀A∀B∀w∀x∀y′∃y∃s∃u[(By → OK(y, x)) ∧ (Ay′ ∧ ¬OK(y′, x))
→ (Mwsu ∧ As ∧ ¬Bu)]
Then I define a minimal valuation V ∗ as follows:
• V ∗(a) = {v ∣ v = y′}
• V ∗(b) = {v ∣ v = y → OK(y, x)}
This corresponds to the syntactic substitution
• A∗(v) ∶= v = y′
• B∗(v) ∶= v = y → OK(y, x)
The required frame condition is obtained by instantiation:
∀w∀x∀y′∃y∃s∃u[(B∗y → OK(y, x)) ∧ (A∗y′ ∧ ¬OK(y′, x))
→ (Mwsu ∧ A∗s ∧ ¬B∗u)]
After the instantiation, the first-order form is presented as follows
∀w∀x∀y′∃y[¬OK(y′, x)→Mwy′y ∧ ¬OK(y, x)]
This can be simplified as
∀w∀x∀y′[∀y(Mwy′y → OK(y, x))→ OK(y′, x)].
As universal second-order formulas imply all their instantiations, this shows that the
original (OR) rule implies this frame property.
But also conversely, the Right-to-Left direction, I can prove that (OR) is true as
each frame satisfies condition (or). Let M, w ⊧ α ⊸ β. I need to show that
M, w ⊧ Pβ → Pα. Suppose M, x ⊧ Pβ. Let M, y′ ⊧ α. Assume that it is not
the case that OK(y′, x). Applying this to (or), it follows that ∃y s.t. Mwy′y and
¬OK(y, x). From Mwy′y,M, y′ ⊧ α and M, w ⊧ α ⊸ β, I have M, y ⊧ β. But I
already know that ¬OK(y, x). It then implies that M, x /⊧ Pβ, which contradicts my
assumption M, x ⊧ Pβ. □
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3.4.16. THEOREM. The (tan) condition corresponds to (Tra).(α ⊸ β), (β ⊸ γ) ⊧F α ⊸ γ iff F ⊧ ∀x∀y∀z∃u[Mxyz →Mxyu ∧Mxuz].
Proof:
The proof is similar to the previous one. □
3.4.17. THEOREM. The (ram) condition corresponds to RaM. In other words,(α ⊸ γ),¬(α ⊸∼ β) ⊧F (α ◦ β)⊸ γ
iff
F ⊧ ∀x∀y∀z∀s∀u∀y′∀z′∀s′∀u′[(Mxyz ∧Msuy) ∧ (Mxy′z′ ∧Mz′s′u′)
→ (Mxsz ∨Mxy′z)].
Proof:
From the Left-to-Right direction of the proof, I apply the contrapositive method in [59,
p.43] again. Suppose (a ⊸ c),¬(a ⊸∼ b) ⊧F (a ◦ b) ⊸ c. That is, for any valuation
V and any state x, if x /∈ V (a ◦ b ⊸ c) and x /∈ V (a ⊸∼ b), then x /∈ V (a ⊸ c).
Let A,B,C be the predicates denoting the sets of possible states where a, b, c hold,
respectively. This is reflected in the corresponding second-order formula
∀A∀B∀C∀x[∃y∃z.(Mxyz ∧ ∃s∃u.(Msuy ∧ As ∧Bu) ∧ ¬Cz)∧
∃y′∃z′.(Mxy′z′ ∧ Ay′ ∧ ∃s′∃u′.(Mz′s′u′ ∧Bs′))→ ∃y′′∃z′′.(Mxy′′z′′ ∧ Ay′′ ∧ ¬Cz′′)].
This formula is equal to
∀A∀B∀C∀x∀y∀z∀s∀u∀y′∀z′∀s′∀u′[(Mxyz ∧Msuy ∧ As ∧Bu ∧ ¬Cz)∧(Mxy′z′ ∧ Ay′ ∧Mz′s′u′ ∧Bs′)→ ∃y′′∃z′′(Mxy′′z′′ ∧ Ay′′ ∧ ¬Cz′′)].
Next I define a minimal valuation V ∗ as follows:
• V ∗(a) = {s, y′}
• V ∗(b) = {u, s′}
• V ∗(¬c) = {z}
This corresponds to the syntactic substitution
• A∗(w) ∶= (w = s) ∨ (w = y′)
• B∗(w) ∶= (w = u) ∨ (w = s′)
• C∗(w) ∶= (w ≠ z)
3.4. A Substructural Calculus of Actions and Permissions 63
The required frame condition is obtained by instantiation:
∀x∀y∀z∀s∀u∀y′∀z′∀s′∀u′[(Mxyz ∧Msuy ∧ A∗s ∧B∗u ∧ ¬C∗z)∧(Mxy′z′ ∧ A∗y′ ∧Mz′s′u′ ∧B∗s′)→ ∃y′′∃z′′(Mxy′′z′′ ∧ A∗y′′ ∧ ¬C∗z′′)].
The first-order form is presented as
∀x∀y∀z∀s∀u∀y′∀z′∀s′∀u′[(Mxyz ∧Msuy) ∧ (Mxy′z′ ∧Mz′s′u′)
→ ∃y′′∃z′′(Mxy′′z′′ ∧ ((y′′ = s) ∨ (y′′ = y′)) ∧ (z′′ = z)].
which is equal to
∀x∀y∀z∀s∀u∀y′∀z′∀s′∀u′[(Mxyz ∧Msuy) ∧ (Mxy′z′ ∧Mz′s′u′)
→ (Mxsz ∨Mxy′z)].
As universal second-order formulas imply all their instantiations, this shows that the
original RaM axiom implies this frame condition. Even so, to illustrate my general
proof method, I provide some explicit steps leading “backwards.” Consider any valua-
tion. Assume that(Mxyz ∧Msuy ∧ As ∧Bu ∧ ¬Cz) ∧ (Mxy′z′ ∧ Ay′ ∧Mz′s′u′ ∧Bs′)
and show the consequent that
∃y′′∃z′′(Mxy′′z′′ ∧ Ay′′ ∧ ¬Cz′′)
First, I define the special valuation V ∗ as above. This follows(Mxyz ∧Msuy ∧ A∗s ∧B∗u ∧ ¬C∗z) ∧ (Mxy′z′ ∧ A∗y′ ∧Mz′s′u′ ∧B∗s′)
for any x, if A∗(x), then A(x)
for any x, if B∗(x), then B(x)
for any x, if ¬C∗(x), then ¬C(x)
Moreover, A,¬C occur monotone positively in the consequent. Therefore, I see that
∃y′′∃z′′(Mxy′′z′′ ∧ A∗y′′ ∧ ¬C∗z′′)
and together with semantic monotonicity, this implies
∃y′′∃z′′(Mxy′′z′′ ∧ Ay′′ ∧ ¬Cz′′).
Now it is the Right-to-Left direction of the proof: Assume that F is a (ram)-frame.
I will show that F validates (RaM). Let Mwxy, M, x ⊧ α ◦ β, M, w /⊧ α ⊸∼ β and
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M, w ⊧ α ⊸ γ. From M, w /⊧ α ⊸∼ β, I have ∃y′, s′ ∈ W s.t. Mwy′z′,M, y′ ⊧ α
and M, z′ /⊧∼ β. It follows that ∃y′, z′, s′, u′ ∈ W s.t. Mwy′z′,Mz′s′u′,M, y′ ⊧ α,
and M, s′ ⊧ β. From M, x ⊧ α ◦ β I have ∃s, u ∈ W s.t. M, s ⊧ α,M, u ⊧ β,
and Msuy. Applying all these results on (ram), I have Mwsz or Mwy′z. If Mwsz,
from M, s ⊧ α and M, w ⊧ α ⊸ γ, I have M, z ⊧ γ. If Mwy′z, similarly, I have
M, z ⊧ γ. Hence, I know that M, w ⊧ (α ◦ β)⊸ γ. □
3.4.18. THEOREM. (or) corresponds to (OR), (tra) corresponds to (Tra), (bi) corre-
sponds to (BI), (b) corresponds to (B), (mig) corresponds to (M), (cam) corresponds to
(CaM), and (ram) corresponds to (RaM).
3.4.3 Soundness and Completeness
Now I move onto the proof of soundness and completeness of the logics N0, NE , and
N
RaM with respect to the class of frames just defined. I define the normatively non-
empty, non-trivial prime theories which later are used as canonical states, which are
based on structures rather than formulas (as L ⊆ S).
3.4.19. DEFINITION. [Theories, Prime Theories, Non-Trivial, Normatively Non-Empty,
and Consequents]
• A set w of structures S is a theory for logic N iff X ∈ w and X ⊢N B imply
B ∈ w, where X ∈ S and B ∈ L.
• A theory w is prime iff α ⊎ β ∈ w implies α ∈ w or β ∈ w.
• A theory w is trivial iff either 0 or⊥ is contained in w; otherwise it is non-trivial.
• A theory w is normatively empty iff P0 /∈ w; otherwise it is normatively non-
empty.
• Given a theory w. I say thatA ∈ L is a consequent of a set w, denoted as w ⊢ A,
iff ∃X ∈ w s.t. X ⊢ A where X ∈ S.
Definition 3.4.19 is close but different than the definitions in [87, p.89-90]. I can now
construct the canonical model as follows.
3.4.20. DEFINITION. [Canonical Model] Given a logic N , the canonical model MC
w.r.t. N is a structure ⟨WC ,MC◦ ,MC⊸, OKC , V C⟩ defined as follows:
• WC be the set of all normatively non-empty, non-trivial, and prime theories over
the structure S for logic N
• MC◦ suw iff for all α ∈ s and β ∈ u I have that α ◦ β ∈ w
• MC⊸wsu iff for all α ⊸ β ∈ w and α ∈ s I have that β ∈ u
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• OKC(s, w) iff for all α ∈ s I have that Pα ∈ w
• V C ∶ ACT0 ∪ {0,⊥} → ℘(WC) s.t. w ∈ V C(a) iff a ∈ w, where a ∈
Act0 ∪ {0,⊥}
3.4.21. THEOREM. Let MC = ⟨WC ,MC◦ ,MC⊸, OKC , V C⟩ be the canonical model. I
then have that MC◦ is equal to M
C
⊸ .
This theorem is similar to the lemma in [87, p.254]. According to this theorem, I can
simplify the canonical model into MC = ⟨W,M,OK, V ⟩ without the superscript C,
if no confusion arises.
The strategy that I use to prove this witness lemma is different from that in [87,
p.255], because, without the inclusion relation in the frame, the key theorem Pair Ex-
tension Theorem [87, p.94] is not applicable in my logics. My general strategy is to
apply consistency as in standard Existence Lemma in normal modal logic [13, p.200-
201], i.e., (1) it is not the case that α and ∼ α are consequents in a set, and (2) it is not
the case that either 0 or⊥ are consequents in a set.
3.4.22. LEMMA (WITNESS LEMMA). Let MC = ⟨W,M,OK, V ⟩ be the canonical
model, I have
1. If α ◦ β ∈ w, then exist s, u ∈ W s.t. Msuw, α ∈ s and β ∈ u.
2. If α ⊸ β /∈ w, then exist s, u ∈ W s.t. Mwsu, α ∈ s and β /∈ u.
3. If Pα /∈ w, then exists s ∈ W s.t. ¬OK(s, w) and α ∈ s.
Proof:
I prove the third case here as an example. The proofs of the first two cases are
similar.
Suppose Pα /∈ w. Enumerate α1,⋯, αn,⋯ ∈ LA. Construct un as follows:
1. u0 = {α}
2. ui+1 = { ui ∪ {αi} if Pαi /∈ wui otherwise.
I need to show that un ⊬ 0 for each n ∈ ω. I do so by induction on n.
1. If n = 0. If u0 ⊢ 0, then it implies α ⊢ 0. This follows α = 0 because
applying (0) is the only way to introduce 0. So the assumption Pα /∈ w means
that P0 /∈ w. But it contradicts w is normatively non-empty.
2. Assume that ui ⊬ 0. To show that ui+1 ⊬ 0. If not, then ui ∪ {αi} ⊢ 0 where
Pαi /∈ w. Since ui ⊬ 0, it follows that αi ⊢ 0 according to Definition 3.4.19
about consequents. This result implies that αi = 0 and P0 /∈ w. Similar to
the previous argument, this conclusion will lead to a contradiction. Therefore it
concludes that ni+1 ⊬ 0.
66 Chapter 3. Free Choice Permission in Open Reading
Hence, un ⊬ 0 for each n ∈ ω. Let u∗ = ⋃i∈ω ui. So u∗ ⊬ 0. Otherwise ∃i ∈ ω such
that ui ⊢ 0, which contradicts un ⊬ 0 for each n ∈ ω.
And then I enumerate ϕ1,⋯, ϕn,⋯ ∈ Ln. Construct u′n as follows:
1. u′0 = u
∗
2. u′i+1 = { u′i ∪ {ϕi} if⊥ /∈ u′i ∪ {ϕi}u′i otherwise.
I need to show that u′n ⊬ ⊥ for each n ∈ ω. Observe that its proof is easy to verify
in the same method. Hence, u′n ⊬ ⊥ for each n ∈ ω. Let u = ⋃i∈ω u′i. So u ⊬ ⊥.
Otherwise ∃i ∈ ω such that u′i ⊢ ⊥, which contradicts u
′
n ⊬ ⊥ for each n ∈ ω. In
conclusion: u ⊬ 0 and u ⊬ ⊥.
It remains to be shown that u is a normatively non-empty non-trivial prime theory.
First show that u is a theory. Assume that X ∈ u and X ⊢ D where X ∈ S and
D ∈ L. If u is not a theory, then D /∈ u. By construction of u, if D ∈ LA, it follows
that ∃ui s.t. ui ∪ {D} ⊢ 0. Because ui ⊬ ⊥, by Definition 3.4.19, it then follows
that D ⊢ 0. According to (Cut), it implies that X ⊢ 0. Yet it contradicts u ⊬ 0. If
D ∈ Ln, then the proof is similar. In sum, D ∈ u where D ∈ L, and thus u is a theory.
Secondly I show that the theory u is prime. Assume that β ⊎ γ ∈ u. Suppose β, γ /∈ u.
So ∃ui, uj s.t. ui ∪ {β} ⊢ 0 and uj ∪ {γ} ⊢ 0. Let ui ⊆ uj . Then uj ∪ {β} ⊢ 0 and
uj ∪ {γ} ⊢ 0. Because ui ⊬ 0. Similar to the previous argument, I have that β ⊢ 0
and γ ⊢ 0. By (⊎L) it follows that β ⊎ γ ⊢ 0. Yet it contradicts u ⊢ 0. So u is a
prime theory. The third is to show that u is non-trivial. If not, then 0,⊥ ∈ u. By (0),
(⊥) and u is a theory, I then infer u ⊢ 0 and u ⊢ ⊥, which contradicts my previous
results. As the construction of u, P0 ∈ u. So u is normatively non-empty.
I need to construct a s as follows. Enumerate α1,⋯, αn,⋯ ∈ LA. Construct sn as
follows: For any n ∈ ω,
1. s0 = {α}
2. si+1 = { si ∪ {αi} if si ∪ {αi} ⊬ 0si otherwise.
I need to show that sn ⊬ 0 for each n ∈ ω. The proof is similar to the previous one.
Let s∗ = ⋃i∈ω si. Notice that s∗ ⊬ 0. Its verification follows from sn ⊬ 0 for each
n ∈ ω. And then, I enumerate ϕ1,⋯, ϕn,⋯ ∈ Ln. Construct s′n as follows:
1. s′0 = u
∗
2. s′i+1 = { s′i ∪ {ϕi} if⊥ /∈ s′i ∪ {ϕi}s′i otherwise.
Observe that s′n ⊬ ⊥ for each n ∈ ω. Let s = ⋃i∈ω s′i. So s ⊬ ⊥. Similarly, I have
s ⊬ 0 and s ⊬ ⊥. The verification of s as a normatively non-empty non-trivial prime
theory is similar to the previous proof for u.
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Because α ∈ u and Pα /∈ w, I conclude thatOK(s, w) does not hold. In summary,
there exists a non-empty non-trivial prime theory s such that¬OK(s, w) and α ∈ s. □
3.4.23. LEMMA (TRUTH LEMMA). Given the canonical modelMC = ⟨W,M,OK, V ⟩,
I have
w ⊨ A iff A ∈ w,
where A ∈ L.
The truth lemma can be proved by applying the witness lemma in the standard way [13].
To prove the completeness, I need the Lindenbaum Lemma. Its proof strategy is
similar to Lemma 3.4.22.
3.4.24. LEMMA (LINDENBAUM LEMMA). Let MC = ⟨W,M,OK, V ⟩ be the canon-
ical model. If X ⊬ A, then ∃w ∈ W s.t. X ∈ w and A /∈ w, where A ∈ L.
Proof:
Let X ⊬ A. Enumerate C1,⋯, Cn,⋯ ∈ L. Construct wn as follows:
1. w0 = {X}
2. wi+1 = { wi ∪ {Ci} if wi ∪ {Ci} ⊬ A;wi otherwise.
I need to show that wn ⊬ A for all n ∈ ω. I prove this by induction on n ∈ ω.
1. When n = 0. If not, then X ⊢ A. This contradicts the assumption.
2. When n = i + 1. Assume that wi ⊬ A. I need to show that wi+1 ⊬ A. By the
construction of wi+1, I have wi+1 = wi ∪ {Ci} such that wi+1 ⊬ A. Otherwise
wi+1 = wi. Then obviously wi+1 ⊬ A by wi ⊬ A.
Let w = ⋃i∈ω wi. I need to show that w ⊬ A. If not, then ∃wi ⊆ w∃Y ∈ wi s.t.
Y ⊢ A. This directly contradicts wi ⊬ A.
Now I show that w is a non-empty non-trivial prime theory. The argument is simi-
lar to the previous one in Lemma 3.4.22. By the construction of w, X ∈ w but A /∈ w.
Hence I get the result. □
3.4.25. THEOREM (SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS). The logicsN0, NE andNRaM
are sound and complete w.r.t. the class of (or), (b) and (bi), and (ram) frames.
Proof:
The soundness and completeness can be proved in a standard way within witness
lemma, truth lemma, and Lindenbaum lemma, as well as correspondence theorems 3.4.18.
Here I prove the soundness of N0.
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• For (Id) it is clear.
• For (0). Let M, w ⊧ X[0]. Induction on the complexity of X . The first case
is that X ∈ SB. The first subcase is that X ∈ LB. Assume that X =∶ α ∈ LA,
then X[0] = α[0] = 0. However, this implies M, w ⊧ 0 for all w ∈ W . I
then of course have M, w ⊧ γ for arbitrary γ ∈ LA. Assume that X =∶ α ⊸
β ∈ LB, the proof is similar. The second subcase is X = (Y ;Z). I assume that
X[0] = Y [0];Z. So there exist y, z ∈ W s.t. Mwyz and M, y ⊧ Y [0]. By
the inductive hypothesis, this implies M, y ⊧ 0 by the validity of (0). Yet it
is impossible, as y is non-trivial. Then neither does M, w ⊧ X[0]. So I have
M, w ⊧ γ for arbitrary γ ∈ L in a trivial way. This is similar to the second case
X ∈ Sd.
• The other cases are standard, except for (OR) and (Tra). Luckily, these two cases
are ensure by theorem 3.4.18. Similar to the soundness of NE and NRaM .
The completeness is as standard in [13]. □
The soundness and completeness can be proved in a standard way within wit-
ness lemma, truth lemma, and Lindenbaum lemma, as well as correspondences the-
orem 3.4.18.
3.4.4 Applications to Free Choice Inferences
The substructural logics I have just studied provide a good balance between cautious-
ness and deductive power. They avoid the unwelcome free choice inferences, while
still allowing plausible ones. Here I call the frame class of all frames satisfying (or),
(bi), (b), and (ram) the open-reading frame class.
3.4.26. THEOREM. The following consequences are not valid in the open reading
frame class: given α, β, γ ∈ LA − {0}, and X ∈ S where 0 is not a substructure
in X ,
1. (α ◦ β) ⊢ α
2. α ⊸ β ⊢ (α ◦ γ)⊸ β
3. (α ◦ α) ⊢ α
4. α ⊸ α ⊢ (α ◦ α)⊸ α
5. (α ⊸ β), (γ ⊸ β) ⊢ (α ◦ γ)⊸ β
6. X ⊢ (α⊎ ∼ α)
7. X ⊢ (α⊎ ∼ α)⧟ (β⊎ ∼ β)
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8. X ⊢ α ⊸ (β⊎ ∼ β)
The above invalidities are part of my solution to the three counter-intuitive free choice
permission inferences discussed earlier. First, since the monotonic α ⊸ β ⊢ (α ◦
γ) ⊸ β is not valid in the open reading frame class, α ⊸ β ⊢ Pβ → P (α ◦ γ)
is not valid either. So the systems N0, NE , and NRaM can exclude the unrestricted
monotonic cases like “if it is permitted to order a vegetarian lunch, then it is permitted
to order a vegetarian lunch and not pay for it.” Second, because the resource-insensitive
α ⊸ α ⊢ (α ◦ α) ⊸ α is invalid in the open reading frame class, α ⊸ α ⊢
Pα → P (α ◦ α) is also not valid. I then can exclude resource insensitive cases like
“if it is permitted to eat one cookie then it is permitted to eat more than one” in the
sequent calculus systems N0, NE , and NRaM too. Third, the irrelevant cases are also
excluded in the sequent calculus N0, because X ⊢ (α⊎ ∼ α) ⧟ (β⊎ ∼ β) and
X ⊢ α ⊸ (β⊎ ∼ β) are not valid in the open reading frame class. Thus I cannot
conclude the following two consequences X ⊢ P (α⊎ ∼ α) ⊂→ P (β⊎ ∼ β) and
X ⊢ P (β⊎ ∼ β) → Pα, which contain cases like “it is permitted to eat an apple
or not iff it is permitted to sell a house or not” and “if it is permitted to eat an apple
or not then it is permitted to sell a house.” The family of substructural logics N0,
N
E , and NRaM studies in the previous section avoid the aforementioned unrestricted
monotonic, resource insensitive, and irrelevant free choice permission inferences.
The family of substructural logicsN0, NE , andNRaM can also exclude the follow-
ing conflict cases by excluding the mingle rule:(α ⊸ β), (γ ⊸ β) ⊢ Pβ → P (α ◦ γ),
by giving up (α ⊸ β), (γ ⊸ β) ⊢ (α ◦ γ) ⊸ β. So, though in a normal situation
given “selling the house to Ann is a licensed instance of selling the house” and “selling
the house to Bob is a licensed instance of selling the house,” I will not conclude the
conflict case “if it is permitted to sell the house then it is permitted to sell the house to
Ann and sell the house to Bob” in N0, NE , and NRaM .
On the other hand, the logic NRaM in this family can derive some restricted mono-
tonic cases in the following form:(α ⊸ β),¬(α ⊸∼ γ) ⊢ Pβ → P (α ◦ γ).
For instance, the good variant of the vegetarian lunch example can be derived in logic
N
RaM . From a normal situation “it is not the case that ordering a lunch is a licensed
instance of doing any other action except paying for the lunch,” this logic can derive
the consequence that “if it is permitted to order a lunch then it is permitted to order the
lunch and pay for it.”
3.4.27. THEOREM (INCOMPLETE AND CONSISTENT). 1. The consequence α⊎ ∼
α is not valid in (or)-frames, so the states to instantiate types are not complete. In
fact, this property ensures that the free choice permission inferences are relevant.
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2. The (bi)-frame class of all frames, (α◦ ∼ α) ⊢ 0 is valid.8 So the states to
instantiate types are consistent.
3. The double negation introduction α ⊢∼∼ α is valid in the (bi)-frame class, but
this is not the case for the double negation elimination ∼∼ α ⊢ α.
The family of N0 and its extensions NE and NRaM not only excludes the undesired
properties discussed in Section 3.2 and saves the deductive power of free choice per-
mission inferences. It also satisfies some interesting properties: the states are incom-
plete but consistent.9
3.4.5 Proof Theory
Cut elimination states that, if X ⊢ A is a derivation by the application of the cut rule,
then it can be a derivation without using the cut rule. Cut elimination is important
because it implies the subformula property. The definition of cut-height that I use is
inspired by [75, p.35], and the definition of principal formulas is inspired by [75, p.29].
3.4.28. DEFINITION. [Cut-Height] The cut-height of a derivation with application of
the rule of cut in a proof is the sum of heights of the two premises of cut plus 1.
3.4.29. DEFINITION. [Principal Formulas] A formula is principal in a derivation iff it
is introduced in a conclusion derived from a rule in the system.
The cut elimination can be formalized in the following way, by using cut-height.
3.4.30. DEFINITION. [Cut Elimination] A system satisfies the cut elimination iff for
arbitrary conclusion Y [X] ⊢ B concluded from the cut rule with premises X ⊢n A
and Y [A] ⊢m B in a cut-height n + m + 1, the system can derive Y [X] ⊢ B in a
cut-height at most n +m, where n,m ∈ ω.
3.4.31. THEOREM. The systems N0 and NE satisfy cut elimination.
Proof:
Given a derivation X ⊢ A which is derived from the cut rule. The proof of cut
elimination is proved in the standard way by inducing on the cut-height of X ⊢ A.
Here I only present the interesting cases in below.
8So the action negation ∼ still satisfies the ex contradictione quodlibet rule (ECQ) (α◦ ∼ α) ⊢ β in
the (bi)-frame class, which is rejected in relevant logics.
9Given arbitrary frame F for open reading, all states in F are consistent and not complete, can be
understood in this way: (α◦ ∼ α)⊸ β is valid in F , but not α ⊸ (β⊎ ∼ β).
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• X ⊢ A is a derivation by applying Cut with at least one premise such that its
height of derivation is 0. Consider two subcases: either (1) the left premiseX ⊢0
A is an instance of either (Id), (0) or (⊥); or (2) the right premise Y [A] ⊢0 B
is an instance of either (Id), (0) or (⊥).
For the first subcase, I only present the derivation by (0) as an example for the
first subcase:
X[0] ⊢0 γ Y [γ] ⊢n β (Cut)
Y [X[0]] ⊢n+1 β
It’s clear that Y [X[0]] ⊢0 β according to (0).
For the second subcase, I have
Y ⊢n 0 X[0] ⊢0 γ (Cut)
X[Y ] ⊢n+1 γ
Two possibilities of this proof:
1. If 0 in Y ⊢n 0 is principal. The non-trivial case is that Y ⊢n 0 is derived
by (∼ L). Then Y ⊢n 0 is in the form Z[∼ α;Z ′] ⊢n 0, and the above
proof is in the following form:
Z
′ ⊢n−k−1 α Z[0] ⊢k 0 (∼ L)
Z[∼ α;Z ′] ⊢n 0 X[0] ⊢0 γ (Cut)
X[Z[∼ α;Z ′]] ⊢n+1 γ
where 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. This proof can be transferred into:
Z
′ ⊢n−k−1 α
Z[0] ⊢k 0 X[0] ⊢0 γ (Cut)
X[Z[0]] ⊢k+1 γ (∼ L)
X[Z[∼ α;Z ′]] ⊢n+1 γ
whose cut-height is at most n.
2. If 0 in Y ⊢n 0 is not principal. For example, Y ⊢n 0 is derived by (◦L),
and the proof concerned is presented as follows:
Y [α; β] ⊢n−1 0 (◦L)
Y [α ◦ β] ⊢n 0 X[0] ⊢0 γ (Cut)
X[Y [α ◦ β]] ⊢n+1 γ
Obviously this proof can be transferred into:
Y [α; β] ⊢n−1 0 X[0] ⊢0 γ (Cut)
X[Y [α; β]] ⊢n γ (◦L)
X[Y [α ◦ β]] ⊢n+1 γ
whose cut-height is at most n.
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• Cut with premises which are derived with height is at least 1. So its premises
cannot be derived from (Id), (0) nor (⊥). In this case, there are three subcases:
Cut formula A is not principal in the left premise; Cut formula A is principal in
the left premise only; and Cut formula A is principal in both premises. Given
n,m ≥ 1:
1. For the first subcase, I only show the application of (⊸ L) as an example.
Suppose that the concluded derivation is in the cut-height n+m+ 1 where
n ≥ k ≥ 1:
Z ⊢n−k γ X[β] ⊢k−1 α (⊸ L)
X[γ ⊸ β;Z] ⊢n α Y [α] ⊢m δ (Cut)
Y [X[γ ⊸ β;Z]] ⊢n+m+1 δ
This proof can be transformed into the following proof such that the con-
cluded derivation is in a cut-heightm+k, which is of course at most n+m:
Z ⊢n−k γ
X[β] ⊢k−1 α Y [α] ⊢m δ (Cut)
Y [X[β]] ⊢m+k δ (⊸ L)
Y [X[γ ⊸ β;Z]] ⊢n+m+1 δ
2. For the second subcase, I show two applications as examples.
– Application of (⊸ R). Suppose that the concluded derivation is in a
cut-height n +m + 1:
X ⊢n α
Y [α]; β ⊢m−1 γ (⊸ R)
Y [α] ⊢m β ⊸ γ (Cut)
Y [X] ⊢n+m+1 β ⊸ γ
This proof can be transformed into the following proof such that the
concluded derivation in a cut-height is n+m, which is at most n+m:
X ⊢n α Y [α]; β ⊢m−1 γ (Cut)
Y [X]; β ⊢n+m γ (⊸ R)
Y [X] ⊢n+m+1 β ⊸ γ
3. For the third subcase, I show two applications:
– Application of (⊸ R) and (⊸ L): Suppose that the concluded deriva-
tion is in a cut height n +m + 1 where m ≥ k ≥ 1:
X;α ⊢n−1 β (⊸ R)
X ⊢n α ⊸ β
Z ⊢m−k α Y [β] ⊢k−1 γ (⊸ L)
Y [α ⊸ β;Z] ⊢m γ (Cut)
Y [X;Z] ⊢n+m+1 γ
It can be transformed into the proof which concluded the original
derivation in cut-heights n + m − k and n + m, which are both at
most n +m:
Z ⊢m−k α X;α ⊢n−1 β (Cut)
X;Z ⊢n+m−k β Y [β] ⊢k−1 γ (Cut)
Y [X;Z] ⊢n+m γ
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– Application of (OR): Suppose that the concluded derivation is in a cut-
height n +m + 1:
X; β ⊢n−1 α (OR)
X,Pα ⊢n Pβ
Y ; γ ⊢m−1 β (OR)
Y, Pβ ⊢m Pγ (Cut)
Y, (X,Pα) ⊢n+m+1 Pγ
It can be transformed into the proof which concluded the original
derivation in the cut height at most n +m:
Y ; γ ⊢m−1 β X; β ⊢n−1 α (Tra)(Y,X); γ ⊢n+m−1 α (OR)
Y,X, Pα ⊢n+m Pγ
– Application of (Tra): Suppose that the concluded derivation is in a
cut-height n +m + 1:
X;α ⊢n−k−1 β Z ′[Y ; β] ⊢k Pγ (Tra)
Z
′[(X, Y );α] ⊢n Pγ Z; δ ⊢m−1 γ (OR)Z, Pγ ⊢m Pδ (Cut)
Z,Z
′[(X, Y );α] ⊢n+m+1 Pδ
It can be transformed into the proof concluding the original derivation
in the cut height at most n +m:
X;α ⊢n−k−1 β
Z
′[Y ; β] ⊢k Pγ Z, Pγ ⊢m Pδ (Cut)
Z,Z
′[Y ; β] ⊢k+m+1 Pδ (Tra)
Z,Z
′[(X, Y );α] ⊢n+m+1 Pδ
□
In conclusion, this section provides a family of sound and complete substructural
logics with cut-elimination that characterize a calculus for one kind of conditional
over action types and permissions, such that it can avoid deriving the undesired con-
sequences in free choice permission, which are irrelevant, unrestricted monotonic, and
resource insensitive.
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion of Related Work
This chapter suggests a family of substructural logics for excluding the unrestricted
monotonic, resource insensitive, and irrelevant free choice permission inferences. One
logic among this family can derive the consistent monotonic cases of free choice per-
mission by accepting my version of rational monotony (RaM). The driving idea of this
family of substructural logics comes from the open reading of free choice permission.
Following this semantic core, these logics offer various sound and complete calculus
on action types and permissions, such that the calculus not only is monotonic, resource
sensitive, and relevant, but also consistent and incomplete.
The logic I develop in this chapter is close to, but different from the one devel-
oped by Barker in [11]. First, my substructural logics are weaker than Barker’s linear
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logic [11], though similar in that Barker’s and my proposal both exclude contraction
and left-hand weakening.10 Statements like “if it is permitted to do A and B then it is
permitted to do B and A” are derivable by using the multiplicative “and” in Barker’s
linear logic. These statements are not derivable in my substructural logic N0. In ad-
dition my logic NRaM gains deductive power in comparison to Barker’s by using the
reformed rational monotony. My logic NRaM is thus able to derive more intuitive free
choice permission statements like “if it is permitted to order a lunch then it is permitted
to order a lunch and pay for it,” which are not derivable in Barker’s logic.
In this chapter I have not considered conditional permissions [71, 37]. Instead I
focus on the analysis of prima facie permissions through the study of the consequences
on action types. Even though my logics are inspired by non-monotonic reasoning, both
in their interpretations (by the reading “licensed instances”) and its proof system (by
(RaM)), they are substantially weaker because of the resource-sensitive and relevant
aspects of them.
Obligations are missing in this chapter. This is the natural step for future work. For
instance, I can define obligations as the dual of permissions, viewing permissions as
weak permissions. This logic would be still weaker than standard deontic logic, since
negation is not classical in my logics. Another option is to view permissions as strong
permissions.11 In this case, it is not clear whether obligations should be defined as the
dual of permissions. And so the relation between obligations and permissions might
become weaker.
The logics developed in this chapter provide a view of action guiding by taking the
logical property RaM into normative reasoning. What RaM gives is a simple evaluation
of how plausible a composition of two action types is, if one would not undermine the
licensed aspect of the other. However, in a more concrete case, such an evaluation
could be more complicated. In the next two chapters, I will see two other different
properties in non-monotonic reasoning for normative concepts, in order to deal with
concrete cases, especially in a number of legal situations.
10Removing (OR) and (Tra) from the logic N0, obviously, this system is a basic substructural logic
for full Lambek calculus FL [33]. It is weaker than Barker’s linear logic, because my fusion is neither
associative nor commutative in N0.
11As I discussed earlier, strong permissions are not the dual of obligations.
Chapter 4
Permission in Dynamics: Power and Immunity
In this chapter I look at permission from the perspective of legal theory. More precisely,
I am interested in the Hohfeldian typology of rights. The main contribution is a new
theory of what I call dynamic rights: Power and Immunity. This theory uses modern
tools from dynamic epistemic logic, but gives it a deontic interpretation.
The Hohfeldian [49] typology of rights distinguishes what one might call static and
dynamic rights. Static basic rights encompass claims and privileges, as well as their
respective correlatives of duties and no-claim. On the dynamic side one finds power
and immunity together with the correlatives of liability and no-power. See Figure 1.3
for the classic presentation.
What I call here static and dynamic rights have been labelled in various ways in
the formal literature. Kanger called static rights the “type of the states of affairs” and
dynamic ones the “type of influence” [56]. Makinson instead used the “deontic family”
and the “legally capacitative family” for static and dynamic rights, respectively [68].
Bentham, von Wright and Hart on the other hand used “legal validity” and “norm-
creating action” [63], while Lindahl [63] followed this action viewpoint, and called it
“the range of action.”
Although logical approaches to legal competences are scarcer than for static nor-
mative positions, existing theories can be divided into two broad families. The first
formalizes power and immunity as (legal) permissibility, or absence thereof, to see to
it that a certain normative position obtains [57, 63]. Lindahl [63], for instance, cap-
tured j’s power to make it the case that i ought to see to it that ϕ using a combination
of action and embedded deontic modalities:
P DojO(Doiϕ)
I call such an approach reductive because it takes power and immunity as definable in
the language of obligations, permissions, and action, where claims and privileges are
also defined. Non-reductive approaches, on the other hand, view power and immunity
as position-changing actions that are not reducible to static normative positions [68,
54]. A typical example of this is Jones and Sergot [54], who captured legal power
through “counts as” conditionals.
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Each of these families has assets and drawbacks. Reductive approaches come with
a rich logical theory of the relationship between static normative conditions and legal
competences, with the latter inheriting its logic from the former. Defining power as
above, however, obfuscates the dynamic character of legal competence by reducing
it to permissibility, a simple static legal relation. This dynamic aspect was arguably
crucial for Hohfeld who defined power as the ability to “change legal relations” [49,
p.44-45]. The formalization above furthermore conflates legal ability (rechtliches Kön-
nen) with legal permissibility (rechtliches Dürfen), although these two concepts are
distinct [68, 54]. Non-reductive approaches, on the other hand, do better justice to the
dynamic character of legal competences by taking norm-changing actions as first class
citizens in the logic. This allows us, by the same token, to distinguish legal ability and
legal permissibility. The cost of this is a relatively weak logic of legal competences,
which is at least at the outset completely independent from the logic of the static nor-
mative position.
The dynamic logic that I present in this chapter provides a plausible middle ground
between these two types of approaches. It is reductive, and as such comes with a rich
set of principles of interaction between static and dynamic rights. It does so, however,
while retaining both the dynamic character of legal competences and the distinction
between legal ability and legal permissibility.
The reader familiar with dynamic epistemic logic [103] will recognize both the
modelling methodology and many of the canonical results (axiomatization, bisimula-
tion invariance) that I present here. What I propose is a deontic re-interpretation of this
framework. I show that this yields interesting insights for the theories of legal com-
petence, and can be applied to the concrete question of the distinction between legal
ability and legal permissibility.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. My main contribution being the dy-
namic part of the model, for the static part I use a fairly standard model for conditional
obligations. I present it briefly in Section 4.1, and then move to dynamic modalities
and legal competence in Section 4.2. I show how the two put together capture the four
Hohfeldian basic types of right, present a complete axiomatization, and study its model
theory. I then turn to the combinatorics of conditional normative positions both in stat-
ics and dynamics in Section 4.3. Finally, I apply it to a concrete case in the German
civil code in order to show that legal ability and legal permissibility can be naturally
distinguished in this logic.
4.1 Static Rights
My starting point is a conditional version of the Kangerian model of claims and priv-
ileges [56, 63, 68]. The latter is the standard in current theories of the normative
position [94], and hence comes with well-studied models of claims and privilege. The
conditional version I propose follows the one developed in [110], but goes back at least
to [41]. Little, however, rests on this modelling choice in the sense that the dynamic
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methodology that I present later is fairly modular. In other contexts it has been success-
fully used to extend very different static logical systems [105, 106]. The same exercise
could be done here.
On the surface, the language I use differs from classical Kangerian approaches in
that it contains two Kripke modalities on two underlying independent preference or-
ders, along with the usual “seeing to it that” modality.1 I use this language instead
of the classical deontic one for technical reasons. It facilitates the axiomatization of
the dynamic modalities. It is well known, however, the language with one preferential
modality, which lies on a converse well-founded pre-order,2 can define the conditional
obligations and permissions [15, 111]. We will come back to this at the end of the sec-
tion. The logic of conditional obligation can be completely axiomatized, both in the
current language [103] or by taking just conditional obligations as primitive [9]. Sev-
eral works have done this for the reducible characterization of the conditional within
the converse well-founded condition [108, 35], but its complete axiomatization with
Löb axiom is left open [9, 35]. Here, instead, I follow a suggestion made in [9], and
introduce two independent Kripke modalities [<] and [≅]. The standard preferential[≤] modality is definable in this language.
4.1.1. DEFINITION. Let Prop be a countable set of propositions and I a set of agents.
The language L is defined as follows:
ϕ ∶= p ∈ Prop ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∧ ϕ ∣ [<]ϕ ∣ [≅]ϕ ∣ Aϕ ∣ Doiϕ
where i ∈ I.
I write ⟨<⟩ϕ for ¬[<]¬ϕ, ⟨≅⟩ϕ for ¬[≅]¬ϕ, and Eϕ for ¬A¬ϕ. A formula Aϕ is
read as “it is necessary that ϕ.” Doiϕ indicates a non-deontic or ontic [114] action
of agent i, and should be read in the usual sense of “i sees to it that ϕ.” In addition,
the modality [<] is the Kripke modality for the “strictly better” relation, and [≅] for
the “as good as” relation. I define a formula [≤]ϕ as ([<]ϕ ∧ [≅]ϕ) for the standard
preferential concept “at least as good as,” and write ⟨≤⟩ϕ for ¬[≤]¬ϕ.
The semantics of this language is provided in the models including two preferential
orders < and ≅, augmented with a Kripke relation for the Doi operators. Because of
1In the literature of formal theories of rights, there are two main accounts to define “seeing to it
that.” One formulates “seeing to it that” into an unary normal Kripke modality, which, for instance in
the Kangerian tradition [56, 63, 68], usually satisfies T axiom as well as the E rule the substitution of
logical equivalence, but in STIT it can also be a S5 modality [22, 50]. The other dominant account
defines “seeing to it that” in the form of binary conditionals, as the Jones and Sergot framework [54]
presented, in which the logic of “seeing to it that” is quite weak.
2An order is a pre-order iff it is reflexive and transitive. A relationR is converse well-founded (CWF)
iff for each non-empty set X , there exists a R-greatest element of X , an element w of X s.t. ¬wRx
for all x ∈ X . This is equal to saying there is no infinite path of x0R⋯RxnR⋯. In the literature
of dynamic update on preference [9, 110, 35], a pre-order ≤ is CWF iff for each non-empty set X ,
there exists a <-greatest element of X . In fact, the CWF condition is stronger than David Lewis’s limit
assumption [60], which restricts those sets merely representing formulas.
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this, the standard preferential models [109, 110] can be embedded into my construc-
tion, by defining the standard pre-order as the union of these two preference orderings.
I do not assume that the two preference orderings are connected, and nor does the
pre-order. This will give rise to slight differences from, e.g. [109, 110].
4.1.2. DEFINITION. Let Prop and I be as above. A preference-action model M is a
tuple ⟨W,<,≅, {∼i}i∈I , V ⟩ where:
• W is a non-empty set of states
• < is a converse well-founded and transitive relation on W , and ≅ is an equiva-
lence relation on W , such that they satisfy this property:
∀xy ∈ W.(z ≅ y ∧ y < x→ z < x) (Interaction1)
• for each i ∈ I, ∼i is an equivalence relation
• V ∶ Prop→ P(W ) is a valuation function
Observe that Interaction1 corresponds to [<]ϕ→ [≅][<]ϕ. I can then define a relation
≤ according to this Inclusion property: ≤=< ∪ ≅. Indeed, ≤ is transitive and reflexive.
And this model satisfies two further interaction principles, which will be useful later
on:
(Interaction2) ∀xy ∈ W.(z ≤ y ∧ y < x→ z < x)
(Interaction3) ∀xy ∈ W.(z ≅ y ∧ y ≤ x→ z ≤ x)
Preference-action frames are preference-action models minus the valuation. The
assumption that the relations ∼i are equivalence relations is present only to simplify
the treatment of static rights and thus put the emphasis on my dynamic extension. As
above, this assumption could be lifted. I can then interpret the sentences in language L
according to a preference-action model as follows.
4.1.3. DEFINITION. The truth conditions for sentence ϕ ∈ L are defined in the fol-
lowing:
M, w ⊧ p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w ⊧ ¬ϕ iff M, w /⊧ ϕ
M, w ⊧ ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w ⊧ ϕ and M, w ⊧ ψ
M, w ⊧ [<]ϕ iff M, w′ ⊧ ϕ for all w′ > w
M, w ⊧ [≅]ϕ iff M, w′ ⊧ ϕ for all w′ ≅ w
M, w ⊧ Aϕ iff M, w′ ⊧ ϕ for all w′ ∈ W
M, w ⊧ Doiϕ iff M, w′ ⊧ ϕ for all w′ ∼i w
Validity on models and frames, and the classes thereof, is defined as usual. I define∣∣ϕ∣∣, the truth set of ϕ, as {w ∶M, w ⊧ ϕ}. Notice that the truth condition for [≤]
turns out to be the standard one:
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M, w ⊧ [≤]ϕ iff M, w′ ⊧ ϕ for all w′ ≥ w
As mentioned, conditional obligation, understood in terms of “truth in all the most
preferred worlds,” is definable in this language. The argument is standard [15], I
nonetheless give the proof for the sake of completeness. Let O(ψ/ϕ) be defined as
follows:
M, w ⊧ O(ψ/ϕ) iff M, w′ ⊧ ψ for all w′ ∈ max≥(∣∣ϕ∣∣)
with max≥(X) = {w ∈ X ∶ ¬∃w′ ∈ X s.t. w′ > w}. Then conditional obligation is
definable as:
O(ψ/ϕ)↔ A(ϕ→ ⟨≤⟩(ϕ ∧ [≤](ϕ→ ψ)))
Proof:
I need to show that M, w ⊧ O(ψ/ϕ)⇔M, w ⊧ A(ϕ→ ⟨≤⟩(ϕ ∧ [≤](ϕ→ ψ))).
(LtR) Assume that M, w ⊧ O(ψ/ϕ), which means that max≥(∣∣ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣ψ∣∣. Let
M, u ⊧ ϕ. By reflexivity of ≤ it follows that u ≤ u, which indicates that{w′ ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ ∣ u ≤ w′} ≠ ∅. By applying that ≤ is converse well-founded, I
have (∗) ∃w ∈ {w′ ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ ∣ u ≤ w′} s.t. if s ∈ {w′ ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ ∣ u ≤ w′} then
w /< s. Given arbitrary t ≥ w that t ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣. I need to show t ∈ max≥(∣∣ϕ∣∣).
By w ≥ u and transitivity, it has t ≥ u. It means that t /> w by applying (∗),
and then t ≅ w by the Inclusion condition. Given v > t, it implies that v ≥ u
by t ≥ u and Interaction2. It also implies that v > w by t ≅ w and Interaction1.
Together with (∗) this implies v /∈ {w′ ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ ∣ u ≤ w′}. Since v ≥ u, it then
concludes that v /∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣. I therefore conclude that t ∈ max≥(∣∣ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣ψ∣∣. I
then have M, w ⊧ □(ϕ→ ⟨≤⟩(ϕ ∧ [≤](ϕ→ ψ))).
(RtL) Assume that M, w ⊧ □(ϕ → ⟨≤⟩(ϕ ∧ [≤](ϕ → ψ))). Let u ∈ max≥(∣∣ϕ∣∣).
It means that u ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ and ∀s ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ that u /< s. It follows that M, u ⊧⟨≤⟩(ϕ ∧ [≤](ϕ → ψ)) by the assumption, which implies that ∃u′ ≥ u s.t.
M, u′ ⊧ ϕ and M, u′ ⊧ [≤](ϕ → ψ). Yet I know that u′ /> u by the first
conclusion and the previous result, it then has u′ ≅ u by Inclusion. On the
other hand, according to M, u′ ⊧ [≤](ϕ → ψ), it implies that ∀s ≥ u′ that
M, s ⊧ ϕ → ψ. By u′ ≅ u and Interaction3, it follows that ∀s ≥ u that
M, s ⊧ ϕ→ ψ. Because u ≥ u by reflexivity andM, u ⊧ ϕ, it thus follows that
u ∈ ∣∣ψ∣∣. Hence I can conclude that max≥(∣∣ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣ψ∣∣.
□
Unconditional obligations Oϕ are defined as O(ϕ/⊤), and permission as “weak
permissions”, i.e. P (ϕ/ψ) iff ¬O(¬ϕ/ψ). With this in hand I have the machinery
required to define claims and privileges, which I do again using the standard Kangerian
approach:
• Given ψ, agent i has a claim against j regarding ϕ: O(Dojϕ/ψ)
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• Given ψ, agent i has a privilege against j regarding ϕ: ¬O(Doi¬ϕ/ψ) iff
P (¬Doi¬ϕ/ψ)
I close this section with a short example, to which I will return later.
4.1.4. EXAMPLE. Ivy has parked her car but she forgot to put the mandatory parking
permit in her windshield. Parking with a parking permit (¬p) is strictly better than
parking without (p). It can of course have deontic consequences, but only if a city
clerk with the power to issue parking tickets passes by. Absent this deontic action
of issuing a ticket, the city has no claim against Ivy regarding the payment of a fine
(¬O(DoIvyf/p)). Not possessing a permit being mandatory for parking, Ivy is forbid-
den to park. In other words, the city has a claim against her not to park her car where
she did (O(DoIvy¬p)). This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
(w1, v)f, p
(w2, n)¬f, p (w3, n) ¬f,¬p
(w4, v) f,¬p
Figure 4.1: A static model of Ivy’s example. The arrows → represent the preference
order < between states.
The theory of normative positions for unconditional static rights is well studied [94],
but less so for conditional ones. I will come back to it in Section 4.3.2.
4.2 Dynamic Rights
4.2.1 Core Model
My modeling of legal competence follows the so-called “event models” methodology
developed in [9] for epistemic modalities. The key idea there is to model the structure
of a particular learning event using the same tools as for an agent’s static information
state, that is Kripke models. The result of updating one’s knowledge or belief in the
light of new information is then computed using some form of restricted product of
these models. See [103] for details. Transposed into my deontic context, the proposal
is to model explicitly the structure of deontic action or legal competences using what
I call deontic action models. These are agent-indexed to capture the fact that differ-
ent agents will have different legal competences. The deontic action models I define
include two preference ordering over acts as Definition 4.1.2 does.
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4.2.1. DEFINITION. A deontic action model Ai for agent i is a tuple ⟨A,>Ai ,≅Ai
, P re⟩ where:
• A is a non-empty finite set of acts.
• >Ai is a converse well-founded and transitive relation on A
• ≅Ai is an equivalence relation on A
• Pre ∶ A→ L is a precondition function.
Each act a ∈ A should be seen as a deontic action or a legal ability. It encodes an action
that agent i can take in order to bring about changes in obligations and permissions or,
in more Hohfeldian terminology, changes in underlying legal relations. These acts
also come in different levels of ideality, which is encoded by the preference orders
>Ai , ≅Ai , and ≥Ai , among which ≥Ai is a standard reflexive and transitive relation [9,
103] defined using >Ai and ≅Ai , as in the previous section. Finally, the preconditions
function Pre specifies for each act a the conditions in the underlying static models that
need to obtain for a to be executable in the first place.
4.2.2. EXAMPLE. John is city clerk. He can confirm a violation of the parking reg-
ulations (v), or not (n). He confirms a violation if a fine applies (f ), otherwise (¬f )
not. Given that Ivy’s car has no permit in the windshield, the preferred situation is one
where the fine indeed applies. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
n¬f v f
Figure 4.2: The deontic action model AJohn for John the city clerk. The arrow ↦
represents the preference order >Aj . The precondition of n and v are written down to
the left and the right, respectively.
The effect of executing a deontic action in a particular situation is computed by the
so-called lexicographic update.
4.2.3. DEFINITION. Let M be a preference-action model and Ai be a deontic action
model. The preference-action model M⊗Ai = ⟨W ′,>′,≅′, {∼′i}i∈I , V ′⟩ is defined as
follows:
• W ′ = {(w, a) ∣M, w ⊧ Pre(a), where a ∈ A}.
• (w, a) >′ (w′, a′) iff either a >Ai a′ or a ≅Ai a′ and w > w′.
• (w, a) ≅′ (w′, a′) iff a ≅Ai a′ and w ≅ w′.
• (w, a) ∼′ (w′, a′) iff w ∼i w′
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• (w, a) ∈ V ′(p)⇔ w ∈ V (p).
The lexicographic update takes pairs of preference-action models and deontic action
models and returns an updated model M ⊗ Ai. The adjective “lexicographic” comes
from the update rule for the preference orders >′ and ≅′, which give priority to the
deontic action. The domain of that new model is the set of pairs (w, a) such thatM, w
satisfies the pre-condition of a, written M, w ⊧ Pre(a). Instead, combining the two
update rules for >′ and ≅′, I get the following rule for the pre-order ≥′:(w, a) ≥′ (w′, a′) iff either a >Ai a′ or a ≅Ai a′ and w ≥ w′.
Lexicographic updates capture what I call pure deontic actions. These are actions
that only change legal relations. This is encoded in the condition defining the valuation
V
′ in the updated model: (w, a) ∈ V ′(p) ⇔ w ∈ V (p). One can take pure deontic
action to be acts that are explicitly defined by the legislator, for instance entering into
a contract or getting married. Of course non-deontic action might change the legal
relation too. By breaking your neighbor’s window you create a claim for her against
you to cover the repair costs. Such mixed deontic and non-deontic actions are the
object of [54]. A full comparison between their and my models of deontic actions and
legal competences is left for future work.
4.2.4. LEMMA. The lexicographic update models are preference-action models.
Proof:
Clearly that ≥′=>′ ∪ ≅′ and >′ ∩ ≅′= ∅. In this case, I need to show that ≤′ is reflexive
and transitive, <′ is CWF, and ≅′ is an equivalence relation. I only prove the interesting
case that <′ is CWF, and the other cases are easily checked. Now I need to show that
∀X ≠ ∅, ∃x ∈ X s.t. ∀y ∈ X that y />′ x.
Let ∅ ≠ X = {(w, a) ∣ w ∈ Y ⊆ W and a ∈ B ⊆ A} where Y ≠ ∅ and
B ≠ ∅. As > and >Ai are CWF, there are w∗ be a >-maximal element on Y and a∗
be a >Ai-maximal element on B. Namely that ∀y ∈ Y that y /> w∗ and ∀b ∈ B that
b />Ai a∗. Given (y, b) ∈ X , then b />Ai a∗, and if b ≅Ai a∗, then obviously y /> w∗.
So (y, b) />′ (w∗, a∗). This means that (w∗, a∗) is the >′-maximal element on X . □
4.2.5. EXAMPLE. John notices that Ivy’s car doesn’t have a permit. He issues a park-
ing ticket, which results in the city having a claim against Ivy regarding the payment
of a fine. This is represented by updating the model in Figure 4.1 with the one in Fig-
ure 4.2. The result is in Figure 4.3. After the ticket has been issued, all states a fine
applies to (f ) are strictly better than those in which they do not (¬f ). Now Ivy still
ought not to park there, but she ought to pay a fine.
Of course, executing different deontic actions will have different effects on the same
initial legal relations. This notion of “different deontic action” can be made precise
using the standard notions of bisimulation [13] and action emulation [115], but I leave
it until Section 4.2.3. For now it is sufficient to illustrate this with an intuitive example.
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(w1, v)f, p
(w2, n)¬f, p (w3, n) ¬f,¬p
(w4, v) f,¬p
Figure 4.3: The model M⊗ EJohn resulting from John’s execution of a deontic action
to issue a parking ticket.
4.2.6. EXAMPLE. Suppose that Mary has the authority to grant Ivy an exception that
allows her to park without a permit. Such a deontic action is represented in Figure 4.4,
and the result of updating Ivy’s initial situation (Figure 4.1) is in Figure 4.5, where Ivy
still ought not to pay a fine but now enjoys a privilege to park her car. Notice that this
update crucially uses a non-connected preference relation in the action model.
a1⊤
a2 p
a3 ¬p
Figure 4.4: The deontic action model AMary for Mary.
To express the effect of deontic action the language L is extended with a dynamic,
unary operator [Ai, a], with the following semantics:
• M, w ⊧ [Ai, a]ϕ iff if M, w ⊧ Pre(a) then M⊗Ai, (w, a) ⊧ ϕ.
A formula [Ai, a]ϕ thus reads “if i’s deontic action a is executable, then doing so
results in ϕ.” Dynamic modalities allow me to introduce my key notions, powers
and immunity. Let T (i, j, ψ/ϕ) denote an arbitrary (conditional) normative position
definable in the static language L. Then:
• i has a power against j regarding T (i, j, ψ/ϕ):
⋁
a∈Ai
[Ai, a]T (i, j, ψ/ϕ)
• i has an immunity against j regarding T (i, j, ψ/ϕ):
¬ ⋁
a∈Aj
[Aj, a]T (i, j, ψ/ϕ)
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(w1, a1)f, p
(w2, a1)¬f, p (w4, a1)f,¬p
(w3, a1)¬f,¬p
(w1, a2)f, p (w4, a4)f,¬p
(w2, a2)¬f, p (w3, a3)¬f,¬p
Figure 4.5: The modelM⊗AJohn resulting from Mary’s granting Ivy an exception to
park without a permit.
In other words, i has a power against j regarding the normative position T (i, j, ψ/ϕ)
whenever there is a deontic action that i can be executed which results in T (i, j, ψ/ϕ).
Similarly, i has an immunity against j regarding T (i, j, ψ/ϕ) if j doesn’t have a power
against i regarding that position. A quick check of the example above reveals that, as
expected, John has a power against Ivy regarding her paying a fine.
This formalization of dynamic rights has two assets in comparison with classical,
reductive approaches. First, it explicitly captures, both semantically and syntactically,
the dynamic character of power and immunity. Second, as I will see below, this clear
static-dynamic distinction allows for a natural distinction between legal ability and
legal permissibility. This analysis of power and immunity does so, however, while
staying reductive. This is what I show now.
4.2.2 Axiomatization and Reduction to Static Positions
Axiomatizing the set of validities for the frames, models and updates just defined pro-
ceeds in two modules: one for the static modalities of L and one for the dynamic
extension. For the static part the axiomatization proceeds close to a standard manner.
I use the K axiom for <, together with the Löb axiom for well-foundedness and tran-
sitivity. [≅], A and Doi are S5 modalities. Interaction between [<], [≅] and A can be
captured by two standard inclusion axioms and one interaction axiom. Of course, each
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modality satisfies Modus Ponens and the necessitation rule. See Table 4.1 for details.
Axioms for [<]:
K ⊢ [<](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([<]ϕ→ [<]ψ)
Löb ⊢ [<]([<]ϕ→ ϕ)→ [<]ϕ
Axioms for [≅]:
K ⊢ [≅](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([≅]ϕ→ [≅]ψ)
T ⊢ [≅]ϕ→ ϕ
4 ⊢ [≅]ϕ→ [≅][≅]ϕ
5 ⊢ ¬[≅]ϕ→ [≅]¬[≅]ϕ
The same axioms are used mutatis mutandis for A and Doi.
Inclusion axioms:
Incl1 ⊢ Aϕ→ [<]ϕ
Incl2 ⊢ Aϕ→ [≅]ϕ
Interaction axiom:
Int ⊢ [<]ϕ→ [≅][<]ϕ
All modalities satisfy:
NEC If⊢ ϕ then⊢ Bϕ where B ∈ {[<], [≅], A,Doi}.
Table 4.1: Sound and complete axiomatization of preference-action frames
Axiomatizing the dynamic part uses the well-known “reduction axioms” method-
ology [9, 110]. Formulas containing dynamic modalities are shown to be semantically
equivalent to formulas of L, that is without dynamic modalities. The formulas in Ta-
ble 4.2 indeed show how to “push” dynamic modalities inside the various connectives
and modal operators of the static language, until they range over atomic propositions
where they can be eliminated. These formulas are sound with respect to the lexico-
graphic update over preference-action models. Taking them as axioms thus makes
formulas containing dynamic modalities provably equivalent to formulas of L. Com-
pleteness for the extended language then follows from completeness of the static part
with respect to the class of preference-action models.
Through the soundness of the reduction axioms, together with the fact that condi-
tional obligations are definable inL, I obtain that powers and abilities are also reducible
to static normative positions. So the approach presented here is reductive. This reduc-
tion, however, is more complex than the simple reduction proposed for instance in [63].
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⊢ [Ai, a]p↔ (Pre(a)→ p)
⊢ [Ai, a]¬ϕ↔ (Pre(a)→ ¬[Ai, a]ϕ)
⊢ [Ai, a](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ [Ai, a]ϕ ∧ [Ai, a]ψ
⊢ [Ai, a]Aϕ↔ (Pre(a)→ A[Ai, a]ϕ)
⊢ [Ai, a][<]ϕ↔ (Pre(a)→ ⋀c>AiaA[Ai, c]ϕ)
⊢ [Ai, a][≅]ϕ↔ (Pre(a)→ ⋀c≅Aia[≅][Ai, c]ϕ)
⊢ [Ai, a]Dojϕ↔ (Pre(a)→ Doj[Ai, a]ϕ)
Table 4.2: Reduction Axioms for Lexicographic Update
Here is the valid reduction validity for conditional obligation:[Ai, a]O(ψ/ϕ)↔ [Pre(a)→
A⋀
d∈A
((⟨Ai, d⟩ϕ ∧ A ⋀
c>Aid
[Ai, c]¬ϕ)→ O([Ai, d]ψ/ ⋁
c≅Aid
⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ))]
with ⟨Ai, d⟩ϕ being the dual of [Ai, a]. The complexity of this formula results from
it essentially encoding syntactically the lexicographic update rule in combination with
the specific semantic definition of obligations as truth in all the most ideal worlds. For
unconditional obligations, however, it simplifies to the following:[Ai, a]O(ψ)↔ [Pre(a)→
A⋀
d∈A
((pre(d) ∧ A ⋀
c>Aid
¬pre(c))→ O([Ai, d]ψ/ ⋁
c≅Aid
pre(c)))]
The effect of changes in legal relations are thus reducible to statements describing legal
relations holding before the deontic action takes place. In particular, the latter formula
states that executing an action a would result in an obligation to ψ exactly when, if a is
executable in the first place, for any maximally ideal and executable action d, it ought
to be the case before executing d that ψ would hold after d.
The reduction allows to distinguish the legal permissibility of a deontic action a
and its legal ability. The latter boils down to a being executable in a particular situa-
tion, which in turn reduces to the preconditions of a obtaining. This, however, is not
equivalent to the execution of a being permitted. Defining permissibility of deontic
action requires some additional machinery. I return to this question in Section 4.4.
4.2.7. THEOREM. All reduction axioms for lexicographic update including the condi-
tional obligation are valid.
Proof:
Here I am only interested in the reductions of [Ai, a][<]ϕ, [Ai, a][≅]ϕ, as well as[Ai, a]O(ψ/ϕ). The other cases are similar to those in the literature [103, p.162-
164] [9].
First, I will prove the validity of reduction axiom of [Ai, a][<]ϕ.
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(LtR) LetM,w ⊧ ⟨Ai, a⟩⟨<⟩ϕ. It follows thatM, w ⊧ Pre(a) andM⊗Ai, (w, a) ⊧⟨<⟩ϕ. By the later case, ∃(w′, a′) ∈ M ⊗ Ai s.t. (w′, a′) >′ (w, a) and M ⊗
Ai, (w′, a′) ⊧ ϕ. I thus have that ∃w′ ∈ W and ∃a′ ∈ A s.t. M, w′ ⊧ Pre(a′),
and a′ >Ai a and M ⊗ Ai, (w′, a′) ⊧ ϕ. This follows that M, w′ ⊧ ⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ
where a′ >Ai a. Then M, w ⊧ E⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ where a′ >Ai a, which indicates that
M, w ⊧ ⋁a′>AiaE⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ.
(RtL) Let M, w ⊧ Pre(a) ∧⋁a′>AiaE⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ. It means that M, w ⊧ Pre(a) and
∃w′ ∈ W s.t. ∃a′ >Ai a and M, w′ ⊧ ⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ. According to this result,(w′, a′) ∈M⊗Ai, M, w′ ⊧ Pre(a′), and M⊗Ai, (w′, a′) ⊧ ϕ. By a′ >Ai a,
it follows (w′, a′) >′ (w, a). So M⊗Ai, (w, a) ⊧ ⟨<⟩ϕ
Next I prove that [Ai, a][≅]ϕ↔ (Pre(a)→ ⋀c≅Aia[≤][Ai, c]ϕ).
(LtR) LetM,w ⊧ ⟨Ai, a⟩⟨≅⟩ϕ. It follows thatM, w ⊧ Pre(a) andM⊗Ai, (w, a) ⊧⟨≤⟩ϕ. By the latter case, ∃(w′, a′) ∈ M ⊗ Ai s.t. (w′, a′) ≅′ (w, a) and
M ⊗ Ai, (w′, a′) ⊧ ϕ. I thus have that ∃w′ ∈ W and ∃a′ ∈ A s.t. M, w′ ⊧
Pre(a′), and a′ ≅Ai a, w′ ≅ w, and M ⊗ Ai, (w′, a′) ⊧ ϕ. It follows that
M, w′ ⊧ ⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ where a′ ≅Ai a. Because w′ ≅ w, I have M, w ⊧ ⟨≅⟩⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ where a′ ≅Ai a. It is M, w ⊧ ⋁a′≅Aia⟨≅⟩⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ.
(RtL) Let M, w ⊧ Pre(a) ∧ ⋁a′≅Aia⟨≅⟩⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ. It means that M, w ⊧ Pre(a)
and M, w ⊧ ⋁a′≅Aia⟨≅⟩⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ. So ∃w′ ≅ w s.t. ∃a′ ≅Ai a and M, w′ ⊧⟨Ai, a′⟩ϕ. According to this result, it follows that (w′, a′) ∈M ⊗Ai, M, w′ ⊧
Pre(a′), and M ⊗ Ai, (w′, a′) ⊧ ϕ. By w′ ≅ w and a′ ≅Ai a, it follows(w′, a′) ≅′ (w, a). I thus have M ⊗ Ai, (w, a) ⊧ ⟨≅⟩ϕ. Because M, w ⊧
Pre(a), it follows that M, w ⊧ ⟨Ai, a⟩⟨≅⟩ϕ.
Finally I prove the validity of the reduction axiom of [Ai, a]O(ψ/ϕ). I need to
show that
∀(x, c) ∈M⊗Ai. (x, c) ∈ max≥(∣∣ϕ∣∣)⇒ (x, c) ∈ ∣∣ψ∣∣ (6)
iff
∀y ∈ W∀d ∈ A.y ∈ (∣∣⟨Ai, d⟩ϕ ∧ A ⋀
c>Aid
[Ai, c]¬ϕ∣∣) ∩max≥(∣∣ ⋁
c≅Aid
⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ∣∣)
⇒ y ∈ ∣∣[Ai, d]ψ∣∣. (7)
(LtR) Given arbitrary y ∈ W and d ∈ A that y ∈ (∣∣⟨Ai, d⟩ϕ∧A⋀c>Aid[Ai, c]¬ϕ∣∣)∩
max≥(∣∣⋁c≅Aid⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ∣∣) and M, y ⊧ Pre(d), then
1. M, y ⊧ ⟨Ai, d⟩ϕ,
2. ∀z ∈ W ∀c >Ai d that M, z ⊧ [Ai, c]¬ϕ, and
3. y ∈ max≥(∣∣⋁c≅Aid⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ∣∣).
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It follows that
1. M⊗Ai, (y, d) ⊧ ϕ,
2. ∀z ∈ W that if M, z ⊧ ¬[Ai, c]¬ϕ then c />Ai d,
3. M, y ⊧ ⋁c≅Aid⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ, and
4. ∀z ∈ W that if M, z ⊧ ⋁c≅Aid⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ then z /> y.
From cases 1, 2 and 4 it follows that
1. M⊗Ai, (y, d) ⊧ ϕ,
2. ∀z ∈ W ∀c ∈ A that if M, z ⊧ ⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ then c />Ai d, and
3. ∀z ∈ W ∀c ≅Ai d that if M, z ⊧ ⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ then z /> y.
which implies
1. M⊗Ai, (y, d) ⊧ ϕ,
2. ∀(z, c) ∈M⊗Ai that if M⊗Ai, (z, c) ⊧ ϕ then c />Ai d, and
3. ∀(z, c) ∈M⊗Ai that if M⊗Ai, (z, c) ⊧ ϕ then (c ≅Ai d⇒ z /> y).
It means that
1. M⊗Ai, (y, d) ⊧ ϕ,
2. ∀(z, c) ∈M⊗Ai that if M⊗Ai, (z, c) ⊧ ϕ then (z, c) /> (y, d).
I therefore conclude that (y, d) ∈ max≥(∣∣ϕ∣∣). Applying this result into state-
ment (6) it follows that (y, d) ∈ ∣∣ψ∣∣. It thus concludes that M, y ⊧ [Ai, d]ψ.
(RtL) Given arbitrary (x, d) ∈ M ⊗ Ai that (x, d) ∈ max≥(∣∣ϕ∣∣). It follows that
given arbitrary x ∈ W and arbitrary d ∈ A,
1. M, x ⊧ Pre(d),
2. M⊗Ai, (x, d) ⊧ ϕ, and
3. ∀(z, c) ∈M⊗Ai that if M⊗Ai, (z, c) ⊧ ϕ then (z, c) /> (x, d).
It follows that given any x ∈ W and for all d ∈ A,
1. M, x ⊧ ⟨Ai, d⟩ϕ
2. ∀(z, c) ∈M⊗Ai that if M⊗Ai, (z, c) ⊧ ϕ then c />Ai d, and
3. ∀(z, c) ∈M⊗Ai that ifM⊗Ai, (z, c) ⊧ ϕ then (c ≅Ai d implies z /> x).
From case 2 and case 3 it implies that
1. ∀z ∈ W ∀c >Ai d that M, z ⊧ [Ai, c]¬ϕ, and
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2. ∀z ∈ W ∀c ≅Ai d that if M, z ⊧ ⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ then z /> x.
In sum, given any x ∈ W and for all d ∈ A,
1. M, x ⊧ ⟨Ai, d⟩ϕ
2. ∀z ∈ W that M, z ⊧ ⋀c>Aid[Ai, c]¬ϕ, and
3. ∀z ∈ W that if M, z ⊧ ⋁c≅Aid⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ then z /> x.
It implies that given any x ∈ W and for all d ∈ A,
1. M, x ⊧ ⟨Ai, d⟩ϕ
2. ∀z ∈ W that M, z ⊧ ⋀c>Aid[Ai, c]¬ϕ, and
3. x ∈ max≥(∣∣⋁c≅Aid⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ∣∣)
It means x ∈ ∣∣⟨Ai, d⟩ϕ ∧ A⋀c>Aid[Ai, c]¬ϕ∣∣ ∩max≥(∣∣⋁c≅Aid⟨Ai, c⟩ϕ∣∣)
for arbitrary x ∈ W and d ∈ A. Applying this result to statement (7) it implies
that x ∈ ∣∣[Ai, d]ψ∣∣. Since M, x ⊧ Pre(d), I conclude that (x, d) ∈ ∣∣ψ∣∣.
□
4.2.3 Model Theory
At the end of Section 4.2.1 I showed that “different” deontic actions can have different
effects on a given set of initial legal relations. Now I make this notion of sameness of
deontic actions precise using the standard notion of bisimulation.
4.2.8. DEFINITION. A relation Z between the domains of two preference-action mod-
els M and M′ is a bisimulation whenever, for all w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′, if wZw′
then:
• For all p ∈ Prop, M, w ⊧ p iff M′, w′ ⊧ p
• (>-Forward-Condition) If w > v then there exists v′ ∈ W ′ s.t. w′ > v′ and vZv′
• (>-Backward-Condition) If w′ > v′ then there exists v ∈ W s.t. w > v and vZv′
• and similarly for ≅ and ∼i
A textbook argument shows that two bisimilarities imply modal invariance for L [13,
105]. In particular two bisimilar preference-action models support exactly the same
static rights or legal relations. These are “the same” as far as static rights are concerned.
Accordingly, I also can expect a similar bisimulation of two preference-action models
based on ≥.
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Bisimulation is straightforwardly adapted to deontic action models. I do not, how-
ever, have an explicit language to describe such actions. Recall that the dynamic
modalities only describe their effects. So instead I use a notion of behavioral equiva-
lence. I say that two deontic actions are “the same” when executing them in indistin-
guishable legal circumstances guarantees indistinguishable results.
4.2.9. DEFINITION. A relation Z between two deontic action models Ai and A′j is a
bisimulation whenever, for all a ∈ Ai and a′ ∈ A′j such that aZa′:
• Pre(a) = Pre(a′)
• (>-Forward-Condition) If b >Ai a then there exists b′ ∈ A′i s.t. b′ >Ai a′ and
bZb
′
• (≅-Forward-Condition) If b ≅Ai a then there exists b′ ∈ A′i s.t. b′ ≅Ai a′ and
bZb
′
• Similarly in the converse direction
A bisimulation Z between two deontic action models is total whenever
• for each a ∈ Ai there exists a′ ∈ A′i s.t. aZa′, and
• for each a′ ∈ A′i there exists a ∈ Ai s.t. aZa′
I are now in position to show that bisimulation for deontic-action models implies be-
havioral equivalence.
4.2.10. FACT. Given two deontic action modelsAi andA′i for agent i, and two preference-
action models M and M′. If Ai and A′i are bisimilar, and M and M′ are bisimilar,
then M⊗Ai and M′ ⊗A′i are bisimilar.
Proof:
I construct a bisimulation between M ⊗ Ai and M′ ⊗ A′i as follows. Suppose that
MZ1M′ andAiZ2A′i. I define Z1⊗Z2 as the set of all bisimilar pairs ⟨(w, a), (w′, a′)⟩
s.t. wZ1w
′ and aZ2a
′, where (w, a) ∈M ⊗Ai and (w′, a′) ∈M′ ⊗A′i. I prove that
Z1 ⊗ Z2 is a bisimulation between M⊗Ai and M′ ⊗A′i in the following.
• For MZ1M′, I know the standard result that w ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ iff w′ ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ where
ϕ ∈ L. For AiZ2A′i, I have ψ ∈ Pre(a) iff ψ ∈ Pre(a′). Combining them
together, (w, a) and (w′, a′) verify the same preconditions for actions, in the
sense that M, w ⊧ Pre(a) iff M′, w′ ⊧ Pre(a′).
• For the forward condition of >: If (w, a) > (u, b) in M ⊗ Ai and (w, a)Z1 ⊗
Z2(w′, a′). Then
4.2. Dynamic Rights 91
– either a >Ai b or (a ≅Ai b and w > u), and
– wZ1w
′ and aZ2a
′.
If a >Ai b. Since aZ2a′, this implies ∃b′ ∈ A′i s.t. bZ2b′ and a′ >Ai b′. If a ≅ b
and w > u. Since wZ1w′, then ∃u′ ∈ M′ s.t. uZ1u′ and w′ > u′. Both imply
that (w′, a′) > (u′, b′). For the backward condition of ≥, the proof is similar to
the forward condition.
• For the forward condition of ≅, the proof is similar to the case of >.
• For the forward condition of ∼i: If (w, a) ∼i (u, b) in M ⊗ Ai, then w ∼i u.
From wZ1w
′, then ∃u′ ∈M′ s.t. uZ1u′ and w′ ∼i u′. The proof of the backward
condition of ∼i is similar.
Hence, I conclude that Z1 ⊗ Z2 is a bisimulation between M⊗Ai and M′ ⊗A′i. □
The following is a direct corollary:
4.2.11. COROLLARY. Given a ∈ Ai and b ∈ A′i. If Z is a total bisimulation between
Ai and A′i and aZb, then [Ai, a]χ↔ [A′i, b]χ
Proof:
I need to prove thatM⊗Ai, (w, a) ⊧ χ⇔M⊗A′i, (w, b) ⊧ χ. By induction on the
complexity of χ. Here I only focus on the most interesting cases the atomic case, the
case of when χ = Aϕ, and the case of when χ = [<]ϕ.
• The atomic case χ = p ∈ Prop. M ⊗ Ai, (w, a) ⊧ p iff (w, a) ∈ V (p) iff
w ∈ V (p) iff (w, b) ∈ V (p) iff M⊗A′i, (w, b) ⊧ p.
• If χ = Aϕ. For the Left-to-Right direction, I assume that M⊗Ai, (w, a) ⊧ Aϕ
iff ∀w′ ∈ W∀a′ ∈ Ai.M ⊗ Ai, (w′, a′) ⊧ ϕ. If given an arbitrary b′ ∈ A′i. In
accordance with AiZA′i where Z is total, there exists a′′ ∈ Ai s.t. a′′Zb′. By
inductive hypothesis and the assumption, I have M ⊗ A′i, (w′, b′) ⊧ ϕ. Thus
I can conclude the result in this direction: M ⊗ A′i, (w, b) ⊧ Aϕ. The other
direction can be proved in a similar way.
• If χ = [<]ϕ. NTS: M⊗Ai, (w, a) ⊧ [<]ϕ⇔M⊗A′i, (w, b) ⊧ [<]ϕ.
For the Left-to-Right direction, I assume that (*) M ⊗ Ai, (w, a) ⊧ [<]ϕ. As-
sume (w′, b′) > (w, b) where w′ ∈ W and b′ ∈ A′i. This means that either
b
′ >Ai b, or (b′ ≅Ai b and w′ > w). For the subcase (1): b′ >Ai b. Now I need
to show M⊗A′i, (w′, b′) ⊧ ϕ. By b′ >Ai b, aZb and the >-backward-condition,
there exists a′ ∈ Ai s.t. a′Zb′ and a′ >Ai a. It then impliesM⊗Ai, (w′, a′) ⊧ ϕ
by a′ >Ai a and the assumption (*). According to a′Zb′ and the inductive hy-
pothesis, this implies M ⊗ A′i, (w′, b′) ⊧ ϕ. For the subcase (2): (b′ ≅Ai b
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and w′ > w). From b′ ≅Ai b, aZb and the ≅-backward-condition, there exists
a
′ ∈ Ai s.t. a ≅Ai a′ and a′Zb′. Together with w′ > w and the assumption,
I have (w′, a) > (w, a), which implies M ⊗ Ai, (w′, a′) ⊧ ϕ. According to
a
′
Zb
′ and the inductive hypothesis, it implies that M ⊗ A′i, (w′, b′) ⊧ ϕ. In
the sum of (1) and (2), I get M ⊗ A′i, (w′, b′) ⊧ ϕ. Hence I can conclude
M ⊗ A′i, (w, b) ⊧ [<]ϕ, and thus [Ai, a][<]ϕ → [A′i, b][<]ϕ. I can prove[A′i, b][<]ϕ → [Ai, a][<]ϕ by applying the forward conditions and the induc-
tive hypothesis in a similar method.
The proof for [≅] is similar to the case for [<]. □
This implies that executing two bisimilar deontic actions in the same model will
give rise to exactly the same legal relations. So the dynamic modelling that I propose
here provides a natural identity criterion for deontic actions.
4.3 Conditional Normative Positions
The formal theories of normative positions [94] examine all possible complete and
logically consistent configurations of the Hohfedian four fundamental rights. Kanger
and Kanger were the first to formulate this theory, and show that there are 26 “atomic
types of rights” [57] based on a sound and complete logic presented in Table 1.2 in
Section 1.1. Utilizing the same logic, Lindahl provides a refinement of 35 complete
“individualistic types” w.r.t. one-agent, and 127 “collectivistic types” w.r.t. two-agent
in his fine-grained “range of legal action” [63]. A general and refined computational
theory of normative positions is introduced by Sergot [93]. See [68] for a recent survey
of normative positions.
4.3.1 Normative Positions in Conditionals
One significant advantage of conditional normative positions is the gain in expressive
power they provide. As Sergot pointed out [93], the simple theory of monadic norma-
tive positions is too weak to capture the following situations:
if conditions then normative-position
“If you have paid the ticket, then you have a privilege to park here” and “if someone
attempts to murder you, then you have a privilege to defend yourself” cannot be ex-
pressed by monadic normative positions. The representation of conditional normative
positions is “far from straightforward” [93], though Alchourrón and Bulygin [1] have
provided its first systematic study.
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4.3.2 Static Normative Positions
This section studies the theory of conditional static normative positions, based on the
models introduced in Section 4.1 for a formal theory of static normative positions. My
computational result is obtained in three steps in accordance with the method proposed
in [68, 93], but adapted to my theory of conditional static normative positions.
The simple types of conditional static rights for i, j regarding ψ on the condition
ϕ are defined in the following scheme, with expressions of claim and privilege in the
language defined in Section 4.1:
±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)
This notation is Makinson’s choice-scheme [68], in which, for instance, (Doi
Doj
) here
indicates the (two) alternativesDoi andDoj . Obviously the simple types of conditional
static rights are more general and expressive than the monadic normative positions of
Kanger and Kange’s “simple types of rights” [57]. According to the four possible basic
types of non-deontic actions Do in Def. 4.1.1, I unfold the static normative positions
O(±Doi ± ψ/ϕ) into the following four types:
(o1) O(Doiψ/ϕ) indicates a claim: it is a claim against i to do ψ conditional ϕ
(o2) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ) indicates an omission-claim: it is a claim against i not to do ψ
conditional ϕ, or it is a claim against i to omit ψ conditional ϕ
(o3) O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ) indicates a prevention-claim: it is a claim against i to prevent ψ
conditional ϕ
(o4) O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ) indicates a particular case of (o2)-claim: it is a claim against i
to omit to prevent ψ conditional ϕ
Similarly, I can enumerate the four static normative positions in P (±Doi ± ψ/ϕ)
(which is ¬O(±Doi ± ψ/ϕ)) as follows:
(p1) P (Doiψ/ϕ): privilege
(p2) P (¬Doiψ/ϕ): omission-privilege
(p3) P (Doi¬ψ/ϕ): prevention-privilege
(p4) P (¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ): a particular case of (p2)-privilege
As the standard opposite relation between claim and privilege, (oi) and (pi) are dual
to each other, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. These eight simple types of conditional static rights
exhaust all possibilities of the conditional static rights.
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The atomic types of conditional static rights for i, j regarding ψ conditional on ϕ
are generated from the simple types of conditional static rights in the following schema:
⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)⟧
where the brackets denote the max-conjunctions defined by Makinson [68]: Given a
choice-scheme Σ, ⟦Σ⟧ are the set of all maximal consistent conjunctions of expressions
belonging to Σ. I call the components in ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)⟧ the atomic types
of conditional static rights.
There are three steps to figure out the total numbers of the atomic types of condi-
tional static rights:
1. What are the theorems regarding O(ψ/ϕ) and Do-operator?
2. How many components are in ⟦±O(±Doi ± ψ/ϕ)⟧?
3. How many components are in ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ϕ)⟧?
For the first step here is my answer: The relevant theorems for O and Do, which
can be used to remove the redundant conjunctions in the max-conjunctions in a given
choice-scheme, are the following:
(O.E)
ψ↔ ψ′
O(ψ/ϕ)↔ O(ψ′/ϕ)
(O.C) O(ψ/ϕ) ∧O(ψ′/ϕ)→ O(ψ ∧ ψ′/ϕ)
(O.M) O(ψ ∧ ψ′/ϕ)→ O(ψ/ϕ) ∧O(ψ′/ϕ)
(O.D) O(ψ/ϕ)→ ¬O(¬ψ/ϕ) 3
(O.N)
ψ
O(ψ/ϕ)
(E.E)
ψ↔ ψ′
Doiψ↔ Doiψ
′
(E.T) Doiϕ→ ϕ
(E.D) Doiϕ→ ¬Doi¬ϕ
By applying the above theorems, the second step is to calculate the maximally con-
sistent elements in ⟦±O(±Doi±ψ/ϕ)⟧. They are the six max-conjunctions presented
as follows:
3Ensured by that > is converse well-founded.
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(C1) O(Doiψ/ϕ)
(C2) O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)
(C3) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)
(C4) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)
(C5) O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)
(C6) ¬O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doiψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)
These six max-conjunctions are called the simple types of conditional static rights for
i. They are consistent and logically independent, and the disjunction of them is a tau-
tology. Moreover, they are more fine-grained than Kanger and Kanger’s six “simple
types of rights” for one agent. In more detail, if the conditions in these six conjunc-
tions are tautologies, then C1 becomes K3, C2 becomes K5, C4 becomes K6, and C5
becomes K4. Moreover, given the same condition, C3 implies K2, and C6 implies K1.
I now can move to the third step: the calculation of the max-conjunctions in the
schema of the two-agent case ⟦±O(±Doi ± ψ/ϕ)⟧ ⋅ ⟦±O(±Doj ± ψ/ϕ)⟧:
(B1) O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(Dojψ/ϕ)
(B2) O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B3) O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)
(B4) O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B5) O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B6) O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B7) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B8) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B9) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Dojψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)
(B10) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Dojψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B11) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B12) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Dojψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)
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(B13) O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Dojψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B14) O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Dojψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)
(B15) O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Dojψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
(B16) ¬O(Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Dojψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)
Given Σ,∆ as sets of sentences, then Σ ⋅∆ is the set of all the consistent conjunctions
that can be formed by conjoining an expression from set Σ with an expression from set
∆.
These sixteen elements in ⟦±O(±Doi±ψ/ϕ)⟧⋅⟦±O(±Doj±ψ/ϕ)⟧ are consistent
and logically independent, and the disjunction of them is a tautology. Similarly, there
are sixteen consistent and logically independent elements of ⟦±O(±Doi ± ψ/¬ϕ)⟧ ⋅⟦±O(±Doj±ψ/¬ϕ)⟧, which are also consistent and logically independent with those
sixteen elements in ⟦±O(±Doi±ψ/ϕ)⟧ ⋅ ⟦±O(±Doj ±ψ/ϕ)⟧. Hence, there are 162
consistent and logically independent elements of ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)⟧, and the
disjunction of them is a tautology. All these results are formulated in the following two
theorems.
4.3.1. THEOREM. For the two-agent case, we know that:
∣ ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ϕ)⟧ ∣
= ∣ ⟦±O(±Doi ± ψ/ϕ)⟧ ⋅ ⟦±O(±Doj ± ψ/ϕ)⟧ ∣
=16
Using the elements from (B1) to (B16), I then can calculate the total number of elements
in the schema ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ϕ)⟧, as shown in Theorem 4.3.1.
4.3.2. THEOREM.
∣ ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)⟧ ∣
= ∣ ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ϕ)⟧ ⋅ ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/¬ϕ)⟧ ∣
=162
Theorem 4.3.2 provides a calculus for ∣ ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)⟧ ∣. I therefore
have 16 × 16 = 256 elements of ⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)⟧, and they are consistent
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and logically independent. Compared to Kanger and Kanger’s 26 “atomic types of
rights” and Lindahl’s 127 “collectivistic types” w.r.t. two-agent, my “atomic types of
conditional static rights” are thus combinatorially richter.
I denote an atomic type of conditional static rights, involving i and j regarding
ψ, conditional on ϕ, as Tn(i, j, ψ/ϕ), where 1 ≤ n ≤ 256, for the n-th element in⟦±O(±(Doi
Doj
)±ψ/±ϕ)⟧. And T (i, j, ψ/ϕ) denotes the set of the 256 atomic types of
conditional static rights, involving i and j regarding ψ, conditional on ϕ. Each element
in it is independent, in the sense that they are all consistent and logically independent,
and the disjunction of all the elements is a tautology.
4.3.3 Dynamic Normative Positions
I now turn to the study of the dynamic normative positions that are generated by my
theory of legal competences. Just as I have done for static normative positions, we
answer now the question of how many distinct, atomic legal competences there are. I
have seen that for static normative positions this number increases substantially with
the number of agents. This is also the case here, but there is an additional complica-
tion. As hinted at by the valid reduction law for conditional obligation, the number of
dynamic normative positions will also grow with the size of the deontic action model.
Let me define the set of atomic legal competences for two agents i, j and a given
static normative position T (i, j, ψ/ϕ)) using again Makinson’s [68] notation:
⟦±⋁
i∈I
⋁
a∈Ai
[Ai, a] ± T (i, j, ψ/ϕ)⟧
The question I ask now is thus how large is that set for a given action model of size
at most n? In this chapter I restrict ourselves to the two-agents cases. My base result
establishes the number of combinations of claims and no-claims rights which can result
from a given deontic action.
4.3.3. THEOREM. The total maximally consistent elements in [Ai, a]⟦±O(±(DoiDoj ) ±
ψ/ϕ)⟧ are:
(T1) [Ai, a](O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(Dojψ/ϕ))
(T2) [Ai, a](O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
(T3) [Ai, a](O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ))
(T4) [Ai, a](O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
(T5) [Ai, a](O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
(T6) [Ai, a](O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
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(T7) [Ai, a](O(¬Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧
O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
(T8) [Ai, a](O(¬Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧
O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
(T9) [Ai, a](O(¬Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧
O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ))
(T10) [Ai, a](O(¬Doiψ/ϕ) ∧O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
(T11) [Ai, a](O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
(T12) [Ai, a](O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ))
(T13) [Ai, a](O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Dojψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
(T14) [Ai, a](O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧
O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ))
(T15) [Ai, a](O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doiψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
(T16) [Ai, a](¬O(Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doiψ/ϕ)∧¬O(¬Doi¬ψ/ϕ)∧
¬O(Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(Doj¬ψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Dojψ/ϕ) ∧ ¬O(¬Doj¬ψ/ϕ))
With this in hand I can get my calculation going. There are 256 maximally consis-
tent elements in
⋁
a∈Ai
[Ai, a]⟦±O(±(DoiDoj ) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)⟧
when ∣Ai∣ = 1. When ∣Ai∣ = 2, the total number of the maximally consistent elements
of that set is 2256. This number happens to grow linearly. With ∣Ai∣ = n, we get n256
possibilities. On the other hand, when ∣Ai∣ = 2, the total number of the maximally
consistent elements in
¬ ⋁
a∈Ai
[Ai, a]⟦±O(±(DoiDoj ) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)⟧
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is 2256 This number is also n256 for ∣Ai∣ = n. Furthermore, when ∣Ai∣ = 1, for each
element in the first set above there are 255 elements in the second. Accordingly, hence
the total number of elements in
⟦± ⋁
a∈Ai
[Ai, a]⟦±O(±(DoiDoj ) ± ψ/ ± ϕ)⟧⟧
is 256 × 255 = 65280, when ∣Ai∣ = 1, and the total number is n256 × (n255), when∣Ai∣ = n.
4.3.4 Bisimulation for Dynamic Normative Positions
We already know how large the size of the set of atomic legal competences is, given a
static normative position. Now I turn to the question how much an action model may
affect the atomic legal competences. I first provide an example to show the effect of
a given action model on atomic legal competences, and then I present a general result
based on the notion of bisimulation defined in Section 4.2.3.
4.3.4. EXAMPLE. Given a model M = ⟨W,<,≅, {∼i}i∈I , V ⟩ presented in Table 4.3,
such that W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}, <=≅= ∅, ∼i= {w1 ∼i w2, w1 ∼i w1, w2 ∼i w2, w3 ∼i
w3, w4 ∼i w4}, and V (p) = {w1, w3}. Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}, where Pre(a1) =
Doip, Pre(a2) = Doi¬p, Pre(a3) = doi¬p, Pre(a4) = doip.
w3p,Doip,¬Doi¬p
w1p,Doip,¬Doi¬p
w4 ¬p,Doi¬p,¬Doip
w2 ¬p,¬Doip,¬Doi¬p
Table 4.3: The Atomic Types of Legal Competences
Now I can consider how much difference action models may bring to the given
modelM. LetAi be an action model ⟨A,>Ai ,≅Ai , P re⟩ for agent i, where >Ai=≅Ai=
∅. For every a ∈ Ai,
• M /⊧ [Ai, a]O(Doip/⊤)
• M /⊧ [Ai, a]O(Doi¬p/⊤)
• M /⊧ [Ai, a]O(¬Doip/⊤) ∧ [Ai, a]O(¬Doi¬p/⊤) ∧ [Ai, a]¬O(Doi¬p/⊤)
• M /⊧ [Ai, a]O(¬Doip/⊤) ∧ [Ai, a]¬O(Doi¬p/⊤) ∧ [Ai, a]¬O(¬Doi¬p/⊤)
• M /⊧ [Ai, a]O(¬Doi¬p/⊤) ∧ [Ai, a]¬O(Doip/⊤) ∧ [Ai, a]¬O(¬Doip/⊤)
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• M ⊧ [Ai, a]¬O(Doip/⊤) ∧ [Ai, a]¬O(Doi¬p/⊤) ∧ [Ai, a]¬O(¬Doip/⊤)∧[Ai, a]¬O(¬Doi¬p/⊤)
Given a different action model A′i as follows, I have a different result. Let A′i be
another action model ⟨A,>A′i ,≅A′i , P re⟩ for agent i, so ≥A′i=>A′i ∪ ≅A′i . In this action
model, a1 ≥A
′
i a2, a1 ≥A
′
i a3, a1 ≥A
′
i a4. For every a ∈ A′i,
• M ⊧ [A′i, a]O(Doip/⊤)
• M /⊧ [A′i, a]O(Doi¬p/⊤)
• M /⊧ [A′i, a]O(¬Doip/⊤) ∧ [A′i, a]O(¬Doi¬p/⊤) ∧ [A′i, a]¬O(Doi¬p/⊤)
• M /⊧ [A′i, a]O(¬Doip/⊤) ∧ [A′i, a]¬O(Doi¬p/⊤) ∧ [A′i, a]¬O(¬Doi¬p/⊤)
• M /⊧ [A′i, a]O(¬Doi¬p/⊤) ∧ [A′i, a]¬O(Doip/⊤) ∧ [A′i, a]¬O(¬Doip/⊤)
• M /⊧ [A′i, a]¬O(Doip/⊤) ∧ [A′i, a]¬O(Doi¬p/⊤) ∧ [A′i, a]¬O(¬Doip/⊤)∧[A′i, a]¬O(¬Doi¬p/⊤)
In fact, there is a close link between action models and atomic legal competences.
In order to show this I need first to establish the following Lemma:
4.3.5. LEMMA. Given two action models Ai and A′i for agent i, and two models M
and M′. If M⊗Ai and M′ ⊗A′i are bisimilar, then maxM⊗Ai(∣∣ ± ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣ ± ψ∣∣
iff maxM′⊗A′i(∣∣ ± ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣ ± ψ∣∣.
Proof:
I consider maxM⊗Ai(∣∣ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣ψ∣∣ iff maxM′⊗A′i(∣∣ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣ψ∣∣ as an example for
all proofs of the four cases.
(⇒) Let (w′, a′) ∈ maxM′⊗A′i(∣∣ϕ∣∣) where w′ ∈ M′ and a′ ∈ A′i. It implies that(w′, a′) ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ and ¬∃(u′, b′) ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ s.t. (u′, b′) > (w′, a′) where u′ ∈M and
b
′ ∈ A′i. From the latter, I have (*): ∀(u′, b′) ∈M′⊗A′i that if (u′, b′) > (w′, a′)
then (u′, b′) /∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣.
I assume that E is a bisimulation between M ⊗ Ai and M′ ⊗ A′i, and then
∃(w, a) ∈M⊗Ai s.t. (w′, a′)E(w, a). From the invariance lemma in [105], I
have (!): M ⊗ Ai ⊧ χ iff M′ ⊗ A′i ⊧. So (w, a) ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣. Given any (u, b) ∈
M⊗Ai that (u, b) > (w, a). As (M⊗Ai)E(M′ ⊗A′i), ∃(u′, b′) ∈M′ ⊗A′i
s.t. (u′, b′) > (w′, a′), and (u, b) ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣ iff (u′, b′) ∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣. According to
(*), I have (u′, b′) /∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣. And then (u, b) /∈ ∣∣ϕ∣∣. Thus, I conclude that(w, a) ∈ maxM⊗Ai(∣∣ϕ∣∣), and so (w, a) ∈ ∣∣ψ∣∣. From (!), I can infer that(w′, a′) ∈ ∣∣ψ∣∣. Hence, maxM′⊗A′i(∣∣ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣ψ∣∣.
(⇐) Its proof is similar to the case (⇒).
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The proofs of the other three cases are very similar to the previous case. □
4.3.6. THEOREM. Given two action modelsAi andA′i for agent i, and two modelsM
and M′. Let Dk(i, j, ϕ, ψ) be the k-th atomic types of legal competence for Ai, and
D
′
l(i, j, ϕ, ψ) the l-th atomic types of legal competence forA′i. IfAi andA′i are bisim-
ilar, and M and M′ are bisimilar, then M ⊧ Dk(i, j, ϕ, ψ) iff M′ ⊧ D′k(i, j, ϕ, ψ).
Proof:
From Ai and A′i being bisimilar, and M and M′ being bisimilar, by Lemma 4.2.10, I
can infer thatM⊗Ai andM′⊗A′i are bisimilar. This may imply that maxM⊗Ai(∣∣±
ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣± ψ∣∣ iff maxM′⊗A′i(∣∣± ϕ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣± ψ∣∣ by Lemma 4.3.5. Obviously, I can
then conclude that M ⊧ Dk(i, j, ϕ, ψ) iff M′ ⊧ D′k(i, j, ϕ, ψ). □
Crucially, I also have a converse type of result. Indistinguishibility in terms of legal
competence entails bisimilarity after update.
4.3.7. THEOREM. Given two models M and M′, and two action models Ai and A′i
for agent i. Let Dk(i, j, ϕ, ψ) be the k-th atomic types of legal competence forAi, and
D
′
l(i, j, ϕ, ψ) the l-th atomic types of legal competence for A′i. If M ⊧ Dk(i, j, ϕ, ψ)
iff M′ ⊧ D′k(i, j, ϕ, ψ) , then M⊗Ai and M′ ⊗A′i are bisimilar.
Proof:
The assumption that M ⊧ Dk(i, j, ϕ, ψ) iff M′ ⊧ D′k(i, j, ϕ, ψ) is simply equiv-
alent to state: maxM⊗Ai(∣∣ ± ψ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣ ± Doi ± ϕ∣∣ iff maxM′⊗A′i(∣∣ ± ψ∣∣) ⊆∣∣ ± Doi ± ϕ∣∣. To prove that M ⊗ Ai and M′ ⊗ A′i are bisimilar. Otherwise,
suppose that (w, a)E(w′, a′), and (w, a) > (u, b) in M ⊗ Ai. And suppose that
there is no (u′, b′) ∈ M′ ⊗ A′i s.t. (w′, a′) > (u′, b′) and (u, b)E(u′, b′). That is to
say, there is a basic action type Dk(i, j, ϕ, ψ) true at M, u, and a different basic ac-
tion type Dl(i, j, ϕ, ψ) true at M′, u′, where k ≠ l. This implies that, for example,
maxM⊗Ai(∣∣ψ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣Doiϕ∣∣ and maxM′⊗A′i(∣∣ψ∣∣) ⊆ ∣∣Doi¬ϕ∣∣. Obviously, this
contradicts my assumption. □
Together with these results, I can conclude that there is a strong link between atomic
types of legal competences and lexicographic updates. This close link reflects that my
dynamic logic is a natural characterization of legal competences.
4.4 Legal Ability and Legal Permissibility
Although legal ability and legal permissibility often go together, they are conceptually
distinct notions [68, 54]. The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) offers a
concrete case where they can come apart.
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Article 179 of this code regulates the contractual delegation of the right to auction
one’s land to a third party. The article allows for the following case. Suppose that i
contracts j to auction her land. j sells to k, but k is not the highest bidder. The sale
being a deontic action, it is still considered valid. It transfers property rights from i
to k. j selling to k is, however, not legally permissible, because k is not the highest
bidder. j can consequently be asked to compensate i for the difference between the
selling price and the highest bid.
In this example j has the legal ability to sell the land to k. She is legally capable of
executing a deontic action which transfers the set of static and dynamic property rights
with regard to the land from i to k. This action, however, is impermissible. It cannot
be executed without j incurring a sanction. I now show that my logical model of legal
competences can capture this case in a simple manner.
4.4.1 Legal Ability
Let κ be the fact that k is in possession of the land’s property titles, and S be that j
compensate i for the price difference. Before the sale, i owns her land, and i contracts
j to auction her land. j, so entrusted by i, has a privilege to transfer the land’s property
titles, which I represent here simply as transferring them to κ or to someone else ¬κ.
Hence, even on the condition S, the states with Doj¬κ are the most ideal, the states
with Dojκ are the least ideal, and the others are as ideal as each other. This situation
is illustrated in Figure 4.6. There, as before, the arrows→ representing the preference
ordering ≤ between distinct states, and the dashed arc labelled j represents the relations
∼j . The reflexive loops for both relations are everywhere omitted. In this model the
following simple type of conditional static right holds for j: O(Doj¬κ). Also,¬O(κ).
Here doj is the dual of Doj .
w1¬κ,Doj¬κ, ¬S
w2¬κ, dojκ, doj¬κ,¬S
w4 κ,Dojκ, S
w3 κ, dojκ, doj¬κ, S
Figure 4.6: The preference-action modelC for the normative positions before the sale.
j’s legal ability can be modelled in the deontic action model of Figure 4.7. As be-
fore, the arrow↦ represents the preference order ≤Sj with the reflexive loops omitted.
In this particular model, the precondition of action s is Dojκ, and that of action n is
¬Dojκ.
The result of the lexicographic update C ⊗ Sj is presented in Figure 4.8. In this
model the normative position of B has changed. Now I have O(Dojκ), and O(κ) as
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n¬Dojκ s Dojκ
Figure 4.7: The deontic action model Sj for j’s sale to k.
well. The action j selling the land to k of course changes i’s normative position as
well, but I omit those here.
w1¬κ,Doj¬κ, ¬S
w2¬κ, dojκ, doj¬κ,¬S
w4 κ,Dojκ, S
w3 κ, dojκ, doj¬κ, S
Figure 4.8: The preference-action modelC for the normative positions before the sale.
This simple example shows how to model j’s legal ability to sell i’s land to k. Since
k is not the highest bidder, however, j’s action is not legally permissible. This can also
be easily expressed here.
4.4.2 Legal Permissibility
As mentioned, the language L, even extended with the dynamic modalities, cannot
directly express the notion of legal permissibility. This language is designed to describe
the effects of deontic action or, by having deontic modalities scoping over dynamic
expressions, the normative status of those effects. But this is still different from saying
that a certain deontic action is obligatory, permitted or forbidden. In my example it is
arguably the case that it ought to be that k owns the land after j has sold it to her, even
though this sale is not legally permitted.
To express legal permissibility I rather use a type of Anderson-Kanger reduction
that is also present in dynamic deontic logic [74]. Let S, as above, represent the con-
stant that a sanction will occur, viz. in my particular case that j must compensate i.
Then we define “action a is legally permitted” as follows.
P (a) ∶= [Al, a]¬S
This is the standard definition of strong permission in dynamic deontic logic introduced
by Dignum et. al. [26]. In my case Dojκ → S. j incurs a sanction upon selling the
land to k. Since C, w4 ⊧ ⟨Sj, s⟩S, I get that C, w4 ⊧ ¬P (s) and, together with my
analysis of legal ability Cw4 ⊧ ⟨Sj, s⟩⊤ ∧ ¬P (s). Selling to k is legally possible but
not permissible.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter can be seen as a test drive for a new way of representing the structure of
legal competences, and of deontic action more generally: preference-action models,
(deontic) action models and the related update mechanism. This methodology is well-
established in epistemic and doxastic logic, and many of the results presented here
closely follow that literature. My main contribution is to bring it to bear on the theory
of dynamic rights.
Indeed, I have argued that the model of Hohfeldian power and immunity devel-
oped here improves on both the classical reductive and non-reductive approaches. In
comparison with, for instance Lindahl’s [63] approach, my model explicitly captures
the norm-changing or dynamic character of legal competences. It does so both at
the semantic level, through the explicit update mechanism, and at the semantic level,
by using an explicit dynamic modality to express the effects of deontic actions. The
approach I propose here is however still reductive in the sense that formulas with dy-
namic modalities are semantically and provably reducible to formulas without. As a
result it comes with a rich set of interaction principles between static and dynamic
rights. From that point of view it improves on Jones and Sergot’s non-reductive ap-
proach to dynamic rights through “count as” conditionals [54]. Finally, I have shown
that this system can capture the distinction between legal ability and legal permissibil-
ity in a more auspicious way than reductive approaches, without paying the price of
full-blown non-reductionism.
I take this to be a promising starting point for the methodology we propose, but of
course it also raises a number of questions that could not be addressed in this chapter.
Probably the most important next step will be to enrich the model to cover not only
pure actions but also the combination of deontic and non-deontic actions, for instance
breaking someone’s window or crossing someone’s property. This would allow for
a closer comparison between my and the Jones and Sergot approach just mentioned.
Equally important in my view is to study the theory of legal competences that would
result from extending a static base that is different from Standard Deontic Logic. In
the epistemic context a wide variety of static logics of knowledge and belief have
been “dynamified” using the action model methodology. The proposal here already
slightly deviates from the classical Kangerian approach in that it includes conditional
obligations. Studying the normative positions stemming from that addition gains me a
deeper insight into conditional normative positions. Of course more radical departures
from SDL have been proposed in this chapter to capture actual legal reasoning, and the
question remains whether they would yield a plausible theory of power and immunity
once augmented with a dynamic module as I have done here.
Chapter 5
The Defeasible Characters of Permission
A Prioritized Default Theory Perspective
This chapter studies permissions in Horty’s prioritized default theory [52]. There are
two main motivations for doing this. The first is to extend prioritized default theory
with a richer typology of permissions, in order to study the relationship between per-
missions and defeasible norms. Only one type of permission has been studied in priori-
tized default theory: the one that I so far have called “weak permission,” that is the dual
of obligation [52]. Recall that this is the same type of permission as in SDL [47]. Weak
permission does not, however, exhaust all types of permission [71, 43]. We have al-
ready encountered strong permission, free choice permission and bilateral permission.
With the notable exception of [71], however, little work has been done on the relation
between a richer typology of permissions and defeasible obligations. This gap should
be filled, and Horty’s prioritized default theory, being a prominent, recent theory of
defeasible obligation, is a natural framework to do so. So by studying permissions
in default theory, I am taking another step towards reaching the main goal of this the-
sis, that is understanding how permission goes together with non-monotonic normative
reasoning.
The second motivation for studying permissions in prioritized default theory is to
continue with the thread that I started in the previous chapter: application to legal
reasoning. A number of salient pieces of legislation involve both permissions and
defeasible norms. Horty’s theory has already been applied to Common Law reason-
ing [51, 53]. I show in this chapter that, equipped with a richer typology of permissions,
it can capture and analyze two running examples, one from Chinese Tax Law, and one
from the German Driving Regulations.
5.0.1. EXAMPLE. [China Tax Incentive] In the season for businesses filing their tax
returns, any foreign company c established in China should file the corporate income
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tax (CIT) returns with the local tax authority a. If, however, c is a solar energy com-
pany, and then it can benefit from a 15% preferential tax rate from the government, if
it submits valid documentation.
5.0.2. EXAMPLE. [German Right of Way] Germany uses the “priority to the right” rule
at intersections with no further priority signs. A driver on a priority road making a left
turn is permitted to do so, unless another vehicle coming from the opposite direction
on the same road drives straight on or turns right.
The main contribution of this chapter is thus to extend prioritized default theory
with various notions of permission (Section 5.2), and to apply it to concrete cases in
Chinese and German Law (Section 5.2). One additional contribution of this chapter
is to connect the resulting theory to defeasible permissions in Horty’s theory to other
versions of default theories and to argumentation theory. The first issue concerns the
relation between my formal default theory and Dung’s stable semantics in argumenta-
tion theory [28]. This provides a theoretical foundation to my framework (Section 5.3).
The second requires me to make a comparison of the representation of my rebutting de-
feater with the so-called undercutting defeater [52] in certain legal cases, which gives
rise to different kinds of permission (Section 5.4). Here my contribution gives rise to
a new typology of permissions, different from the one in [86] and Alchourrón and
Bulygin [2].
This chapter is organized as follows. For the first task I draw from existing accounts
of explicit and tacit permissions [71, 82]. The second requires developing a multi-agent
version of Horty’s theory. The third task needs a comparison with the existing theories.
Section 5.1 introduces Horty’s prioritized default theory and its agent-relative exten-
sion, Section 5.2 presents the various permissions and their applications, Section 5.3
argues that my formal theory is developed on a firm foundation for defeasibility, Sec-
tion 5.4 demonstrates the legitimacy of my taxonomy of permissions, and Section 5.5
concludes.
5.1 Multi-Agent Prioritized Default Theory
I start by introducing the basics of Horty’s prioritized default theory, generalized such
that it allows for agent-relative duties and permissions. Prioritized default theory is a
syntactic theory about deriving defeasible consequences from background information
and default rules [52]. Although similar in some aspects, this syntactic theory is dif-
ferent than Makinson’s general syntactic theory for non-monotonic consequence [69]
and from Hansson’s semantic model for preference [42].
The language L of default theory is a set of propositions inductively defined by a
set of atomic propositions p ∈ Atom (containing⊤ as the true constant) and ∧,∨,⇒,
and¬ as the operations of conjunction, disjunction, material implication, and negation.
The turnstile⊢ indicates standard propositional logic consequence. So, unlike Chapter
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3, here this consequence relation is entirely classical. Given ϕ, ψ, χ⋯ as propositions,
andX as a set of propositions, thenX ⊢ ϕmeans that ϕ is derivable fromX according
to the rules of propositional logic. So Cn(X) = {ϕ ∣ X ⊢ ϕ} is the logical closure of
X .
A default theory ∆ is a triple ⟨W , I,D,<⟩ whereW is a set of propositions, I is a
set of agents, D is a set of default rules, and < is a strict partial order on D. A default
(or default rule) δi for agent i is a pair (ϕ, ψ) for ϕ, ψ formulas of our propositional
language. I often denote such a default as
ϕ
δi−→ ψ 1
I use the letters δi, γi,⋯ to denote defaults for agent i. Now I denote Di as a subset of
D such that Di is a set of defaults δi for agent i. Given a default ϕ
δi−→ ψ, I say ϕ is the
premise of δi, denoted as Pre(δi), and ψ is the conclusion of δi, denoted as Con(δi).
Given a set D of defaults, the set of premises of D is defined as Pre(D) = {Pre(δi) ∣
δi ∈ D}, and the set of conclusions of D is defined as Con(D) = {Con(δi) ∣ δi ∈ D}.
The order < is used to represent the fact that certain defaults “override” others. So
δi < γj indicates that the default γj for j has a higher priority than the default δi for i.
Horty adopts a reason-based reading of a given default rule ϕ
δi−→ ψ. In my agent-
relative version of his theory this gives:
ϕ is a prima facie reason for i to ψ
Let me illustrate this by modeling part of the Chinese Tax Law Example. I come
back to the German Driving Regulation later on. Suppose that s means that this is the
tax season in China, d means a company submits the valid documentation to prove that
it is a solar energy business, t means that the company files the CIT, and r that the
company gets the preferential tax rate. In this case I have two defaults: s
δc−→ t and
d
δa−→ r. The default theory ∆CIT = ⟨W , I,D,<⟩ is then defined as follows: W ={s,¬t⇔ r}, I = {a, c}, D = {s δc−→ t, d δa−→ r}, with the priority δc < δa, reflecting
that in event that both defaults are triggered then the tax reduction gets priority. See
Figure 5.1.
A scenario based on a default theory ∆ = ⟨W , I,D,<⟩ is a subset S of the set
D of defaults in ∆. There are four scenarios in ∆CIT : ∅, {δc}, {δa}, {δc, δa}. All
things considered obligations for particular agents are derived from so-called proper
scenarios, which are computed in the same way as in [52]. Proper scenarios should
contain defaults that are be triggered, non-conflicted, and non-defeated at the same
time.
5.1.1. DEFINITION. [Triggered] Given a scenario S based on ∆ = ⟨W , I,D,<⟩, a
default (ϕ, ψ) ∈ D is triggered in this scenario is defined as(ϕ, ψ) ∈ TriggeredW,D(S)⇔ ϕ ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S))
1The notations in this chapter is slightly different than the previous ones. I use ⇒ for the material
conditional, and→ for default rules.
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s
t
d
r
c a
Figure 5.1: A default theory of a solar energy business having to file the regular CIT
return to the local tax authority.
In ∆CIT only δc triggered in all four scenarios. The default δa is never triggered,
because its premise d is neither in the background information set W nor a conclusion
of a default that could be included in a scenario.
5.1.2. DEFINITION. [Conflicted] Given a scenario S based on ∆ = ⟨W , I,D,<⟩, a
default (ϕ, ψ) ∈ D is conflicted in this scenario is defined as(ϕ, ψ) ∈ ConflictedW,D(S)⇔ ¬ψ ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S))
In my example the default δa is conflicted in all scenarios that contain δc. This default
is itself conflicted in all scenarios containing δa.
5.1.3. DEFINITION. [Defeated] Given a scenario S based on ∆ = ⟨W , I,D,<⟩, a
default (ϕ, ψ) ∈ D is defeated in this scenario is defined as(ϕ, ψ) ∈ DefeatedW,D(S)⇔ ∃(ϕ′, ψ′) ∈ TriggeredW,D(S) s.t.(1) (ϕ, ψ) < (ϕ′, ψ′)(2) ¬ψ ∈ Cn(W ∪ {ψ′})
In my example there is no defeated default, since the only potential defeater is δa but
it is never triggered.
5.1.4. DEFINITION. [Proper Scenario] Given a scenario S based on the theory ∆ =⟨W , I,D,<⟩. A default (ϕ, ψ) ∈ D is proper in this scenario is defined as(ϕ, ψ) ∈ ProperW,D(S)⇔ (ϕ, ψ) ∈ TriggeredW,D(S), and(ϕ, ψ) /∈ ConflictedW,D(S), and(ϕ, ψ) /∈ DefeatedW,D(S)
I say a scenario S is a proper scenario iff S = ProperW,D(S), which involves all
those defaults satisfying all three conditions for propriety. As a summary of all three
conditions, {δc} is the unique proper scenario in the previous running example.
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5.1.1 Agent-Relative Defeasible Obligations
Prioritized default theories allow to distinguish two types of defeasible obligation, the
so-called conflict and disjunctive accounts. Intuitively, given a default theory ∆, ϕ is
obligatory in the disjunctive sense if ϕ follows from all proper scenarios of ∆. On the
other hand, ϕ is obligatory in the conflict sense if it follows from some proper scenarios
of ∆. The labels “disjunctive” and “conflict” come from their logical behavior in case
a given theory has multiple, incompatible scenarios, viz. some in which ϕ follows,
and some in which ψ follows, with ψ
δi−→ ¬ϕ. On the conflict account both ϕ will be
obligatory, and also ¬ϕ, although not their conjunction. On the disjunctive account
only ϕ ∨ ψ will be obligatory, but none of the disjuncts will.
5.1.5. DEFINITION. [Agent-Neutral Obligations - Conflict and Disjunctive Accounts]
Let ∆ be a default theory. Then:
• ∆ ⊧ Oc(ϕ), iff ϕ ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)) for some proper scenario S of ∆
• ∆ ⊧ Od(ϕ), iff ϕ ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)) for all proper scenarios S of ∆
While both types of duties are agent-neutral, in the legal applications that I have
in mind duties and permissions are agent-relative. In Chinese Tax Law, the duty to
submit the tax report bears on company c. There is no such duty for the tax authority.
Similarly, in the Right of Way example one Driver’s permission overrides the other’s.
More generally, the Hohfeldian typology that I studied in the previous chapter also
rests on the notion of correlative duties, which are agent-relative.
I capture agent-relative duties by a reducing them to a combination of agent-neutral
duties and reason-supported actions. Agent i’s ought to make it the case that ϕ will
then be interpreted as that it ought to be the case that i makes it the case that ϕ. This
is similar to the reduction of “ought to do” to “ought to be” that is proposed in [50],
and further discussed in [19]. I define the latter notion using what I call supported
action sets. Informally, making it the case that ϕ is a supported action for agent i given
a proper scenario S whenever there is a reason for i in S to making it the case that
ϕ, which comes down to saying that ψ
δi−→ ϕ is in S, for some ψ. I will denote such
supported actions with an additional piece of notation: formula Doiϕ for each agent
i, which should be read as “making it the case that ϕ is supported for agent i”. The
negation of this formula, ¬Doiϕ, should in turn be read as “making it the case that ϕ
is conflicted for agent i”.
5.1.6. DEFINITION. [Supported Action Sets - First order] Let S be a proper scenario
for a default theory ∆, andD a set of defaults. The supported action setAS,D is defined
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as
AS,D ={Do{i1,⋯,in}ϕ ∣ ∃(ψ1, ϕ1) ∈ Di1 ,⋯, (ψn, ϕn) ∈ Dins.t.
ϕ = ⋀
1≤k≤n
ϕk ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S))}
∪{¬Do{i1,⋯,in}ϕ ∣ ∃(ψ1, ϕ1) ∈ Di1 ,⋯, (ψn, ϕn) ∈ Dins.t.
¬ϕ = ¬ ⋀
1≤k≤n
ϕk ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S))}
Observe that the agent-relative first-order supported actions cover all default rules for
agents that are accepted in a given proper scenario. Namely, Do{i1,⋯,in}ϕ ∈ AS,D
means that agents i1,⋯, in together successfully support ϕ as an accepted conclu-
sion in the proper scenario S of D, while ¬Do{i1,⋯,in}ϕ ∈ AS,D indicates that agents
i1,⋯, in’s joint support to ϕ is not accepted in the proper scenario S of D. I simply
write Doiϕ as Do{i}ϕ, and ¬Doiϕ as ¬Do{i}ϕ.
In multi-agent settings it could be that one agent’s reason triggers obligations or
permissions for another. This is the case in the informal presentation of the Chinese Tax
Law example. Company c acting on its permission to submit the necessary documents
triggers a reason for the Tax Authority to give c the preferential rate. In order to capture
such cases I need to consider not only what I called first-order supported actions, but
also second order ones:
5.1.7. DEFINITION. [Supported Action Sets - Second order] Let S be a proper scenario
for a default theory ∆, and D,D′ sets of defaults. The second-order supported action
set AD′S,D is defined as
AD
′
S,D ={¬Do{i1,⋯,im}¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}ϕ ∣ ∃(ϕ1, χ1) ∈ D′j1 ,⋯, (ψn, χn) ∈ D′jn
∀(ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ Di1 ,⋯, (ψ′m, χ′m) ∈ Dim s.t.
¬ϕ = ¬ ⋀
1≤k≤m
χ
′
k ∈ Cn(W ∪ {χ1,⋯, χn})⇒ (ψ′1, χ′1),⋯, (ψ′m, χ′m) /∈ S}
∪{Do{i1,⋯,im}¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}ϕ ∣ ∃(ψ1, χ1) ∈ Dj1 ,⋯, (ψn, χn) ∈ Djn
∃(ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ D′i1 ,⋯, (ψ′m, χ′m) ∈ D′im s.t.
¬ϕ = ¬ ⋀
1≤k≤m
χ
′
k ∈ Cn(W ∪ {χ1,⋯, χn}) and (ψ′1, χ′1),⋯, (ψ′m, χ′m) ∈ S}
What I called second-order actions exhaust the relations of the non-defeated defaults
and the defeated ones. More precisely, ¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AD′S,D expresses
that a proper scenario S asserts that agents j1,⋯, jn of D would not jointly defeat
agents i1,⋯, im of D′’s potential joint support for performing ϕ. In other word,
i1,⋯, im’s joint supporting to ϕ is not defeated by the other defaults in S. Simi-
larly, Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AD′S,D addresses that j1,⋯, jn of D′ together defeat
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i1,⋯, im ofD’s joint support to ϕ as an accepted conclusion in the proper scenario. As
before, I simplify¬Do{j}¬Do{i}ϕ as¬Doj¬Doiϕ, andDo{j}¬Do{i}ϕ asDoj¬Doiϕ.
If the D′ and D in AD′S,D are the same, then I simply write ADS .
To define agent-relative obligations I simply use supported action sets to re-define
the disjunctive and the conflict accounts:
5.1.8. DEFINITION. [Agent-Relative Obligations - Conflict and Disjunctive Accounts]
Let ∆ be a default theory with the set D of defaults for conclusive reasons. Then:
• ∆ ⊧ Oc{i1,⋯,im}([¬]ϕ), iff [¬]Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D for some proper scenario S
of ∆
• ∆ ⊧ Od{i1,⋯,im}([¬]ϕ), iff [¬]Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D for all proper scenarios S of
∆
I write Oci ([¬]ϕ) as Oc{i}([¬]ϕ), and Odi ([¬]ϕ) as Od{i}([¬]ϕ). When in a given
theory ∆ the conflict and the disjunctive account agree on all ϕ, I just write ∆ ⊧
O{i1,⋯,im}ϕ.
Let me illustrate this in my example again. S = {δc} is the only proper scenario
in Example 5.0.1. So we get that Doct ∈ AS,D. Now because δa is conflicted, I
also get ¬Doar ∈ AS,D. These translate directly into obligations: ∆ ⊧ Oc(t) and
∆ ⊧ Oa(¬r).
Agent-relative obligations, even under the disjunctive reading, do not behave like
obligations in standard deontic logic. This is so because they are defined using the
consequents of the defaults that constitute stable scenarios. Since there is no logical
closure principle on defaults, I get that χ
di−→ ϕ is an element of a proper scenario S
does not entail that χ
di−→ (ϕ ∨ ψ) is also in S.
5.1.9. THEOREM. Let S be a proper scenario for the theory ∆. Then for Oi either in
its conflict or disjunctive interpretation:
• ∆ ⊧ Oi(ϕ) does not imply ∆ ⊧ Oi(ϕ ∨ ψ).
• There are default theories ∆ for which ∆ ⊧ Oi(⊤) fails.
Proof:
The first statement is demonstrated by the case that a default χ
di−→ ϕ in a proper
scenario cannot entail χ
di−→ (ϕ∨ψ) is also in the same scenario. For the second state-
ment, take the empty set of default rules as a proper scenario into account. In this case,
Oi(⊤) fails because I cannot find any rules to conclude tautology as the conjunction
of their conclusions. □
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Apart from this, the disjunctive account of agent-relative obligations satisfies the
so-called “agglomeration” principle [52, Chap. 4] for groups of agents. That is to say,
having both ψ
di−→ ϕ and ψ′
dj
−→ ϕ′ entails that ϕ ∧ ϕ′ is still in the conclusion of this
proper scenario.
5.1.10. THEOREM. Let S be a proper scenario for the theory ∆. Then forO{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}
be in the disjunctive interpretation:
1. Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D and Do{j1,⋯,jn}ϕ′ ∈ AS,D iff Do{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) ∈
AS,D.
2. ∆ ⊧ O{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) and ∆ ⊧ O{j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ′) iff ∆ ⊧ O{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ ∧ ϕ′).
Proof:
1. LtR: Suppose Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D and Do{j1,⋯,jn}ϕ′ ∈ AS,D. They entail that
∃(ψ1, χ1) ∈ Di1 ,⋯, (ψm, χm) ∈ Din s.t. ϕ = ⋀1≤k≤m χk ∈ Cn(W∪Con(S)),
and ∃(ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ Di1 ,⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ Din s.t. ϕ′ = ⋀1≤k≤n χ′k ∈ Cn(W ∪
Con(S)). Because of this, I can conclude that ∃(ψ1, χ1) ∈ Di1 ,⋯, (ψm, χm) ∈
Din , (ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ Di1 ,⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ Din s.t. ϕ∧ϕ′ = ⋀1≤k≤m χk∧⋀1≤k≤n χ′k ∈
Cn(W ∪Con(S)). This achieves the result Do{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ∧ϕ′) ∈ AS,D.
The proof for the other direction is similar.
2. The proof simply consists in unpacking the definition of agent-relative obliga-
tions.
□
As further logical properties, it should be clear that empty scenarios do not support
any first-order action. Furthermore, second-order supported actions cohere with first-
order action sets, and the latter with agent-neutral obligations:
5.1.11. THEOREM. Let S be a proper scenario for a default theory ∆. Then:
1. Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AD′S,D implies ¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D.
2. Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D implies that ∆ ⊧ O{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ).
Proof:
1. Suppose Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AD′S,D. This indicates that ∃(ψ1, χ1) ∈
Di1 , ⋯, (ψm, χm) ∈ Dim , ∃(ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ D′j1 , ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ D′jn s.t. ¬ϕ =
¬⋀1≤k≤n χ′k ∈ Cn(W ∪ {χ1,⋯, χm}) and (ψ′1, χ′1),⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ S. As(ψ′1, χ′1), ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ S, I then can conclude ¬⋀1≤k≤m χk ∈ Cn(W ∪{χ′1,⋯, χ′n}) ⊆ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)). This indicates that ¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D.
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2. This is proven according to the definition of agent-relative obligations.
□
This second property is reminiscent of, but different from, a well-known fact in default
theories, namely that “what is, ought to be”: if ∆ is a default theory and ϕ ∈ W then
∆ ⊧ Oϕ. This property holds for agent-neutral obligations here, but not for agent-
relative ones, because unless a background assumption ϕ ∈ W is also the conclusion
of a default δi in a proper scenario S it will not appear as Doiϕ in the supported action
set.
Observe that the interaction of the first-order and second-order supported actions
reflects the core of stable semantics [28]. Recall the dominant principle in stable se-
mantics: All accepted default rules are exactly the non-defeated ones. As first-order ac-
tions characterize acceptability and second-order actions capture the non-defeatedness,
I get the following observation:
5.1.12. THEOREM. Let S be a proper scenario for a default theory ∆ with W for
background. Then:
1. Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D implies that ¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ ADS,D′ for any
j1,⋯, jn of D′.
2. Assume¬ϕ /∈ Cn(W). If¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D thenDo{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈
AD′S,D for some j1,⋯, jn of D′.
Proof:
1. SupposeDo{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D. This means that∃(ψ1, χ1) ∈ Di1 ,⋯, (ψm, χm) ∈
Dim s.t. ϕ = ⋀1≤k≤m χk ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)). NTS: ∀(ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ D′j1 , ⋯,(ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ D′jn s.t. if ¬ϕ = ¬⋀1≤k≤m χ′k ∈ Cn(W ∪ {χ1,⋯, χm}) then(ψ′1, χ′1), ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) /∈ S. If not, then ∃(ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ D′j1 , ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ D′jn
s.t. ¬ϕ = ¬⋀1≤k≤n χ′k ∈ Cn(W ∪ {χ1,⋯, χm}) and (ψ′1, χ′1), ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈
S. Taking (ψ′1, χ′1), ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ S with the assumption, it then implies
ϕ,¬ϕ ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)). But this conflicts with S being a proper scenario.
I can then conclude the result.
2. Assume¬ϕ /∈ Cn(W) and¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,D. This means that∃(ψ1, χ1) ∈
Di1 , ⋯, (ψm, χm) ∈ Dim s.t. ¬ϕ = ¬⋀1≤k≤m χk ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)).
As ¬ϕ /∈ Cn(W), it indicates that ∃(ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ D′j1 , ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ D′jn s.t.
¬ϕ = ¬⋀1≤k≤n χ′k ∈ Cn(W ∪ {χ1,⋯, χm}) and (ψ′1, χ′1), ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ S.
□
The first result states that no accepted default is defeated by others, and the second that
all non-accepted are defeated, if there are no conflicting defaults in the background.
I finally observe that there is a tight connection between defeated and non-defeated:
If a negative default is defeated then its positive counterpart is not defeated.
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5.1.13. THEOREM. Let S be a proper scenario for a default theory ∆. Then:
• Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}¬ϕ ∈ AD′S,D implies¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AD′S,D.
Proof:
Suppose Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}¬ϕ ∈ AD′S,D. This means that ∃(ψ1, χ1) ∈ Di1 , ⋯,(ψm, χm) ∈ Dim , ∃(ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ D′j1 , ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ D′jn s.t. ϕ = ⋀1≤k≤n χ′k ∈
Cn(W ∪ {χ1,⋯, χm}) and (ψ′1, χ′1), ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ S. This implies that ϕ ∈
Cn(W∪Con(S)), and then⋀1≤k≤m χk ∈ Cn(W∪Con(S)). NTS:∀(ψ′1, χ′1) ∈ D′j1 ,
⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) ∈ D′jn s.t. if ¬ϕ = ¬⋀1≤k≤m χ′k ∈ Cn(W ∪ {χ1,⋯, χm}) then(ψ′1, χ′1), ⋯, (ψ′n, χ′n) /∈ S. If not, then ∃(ψ′′1, χ′′1) ∈ D′j1 , ⋯, (ψ′′n, χ′′n) ∈ D′jn s.t.
¬ϕ = ¬⋀1≤k≤n χ′′k ∈ Cn(W ∪ {χ1,⋯, χm}) and (ψ′′1, χ′′1), ⋯, (ψ′′n, χ′′n) ∈ S. This
indicates that ¬⋀1≤k≤m χk ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)). But then it conflicts with the previ-
ous statement. □
5.2 Three Types of Permissions
In this section I consider three types of permissions that can be defined in default
theories: weak, explicit and tacit permissions. This classification, and the intuitions
underlying each of these, come from [71].
In doing so, I emphasize how important is the multi-agent aspect for the representa-
tion of the standard correlative relations between claim rights and duties. I furthermore
compare the resulting permissions with weak permissions in SDL, strong permission
in von Wright’s sense, and free choice permission.
5.2.1 Weak Permissions
I start with weak permissions, the usual dual of obligations. Something is weakly per-
mitted whenever it is not the case that it is forbidden, i.e. that its negation is mandatory.
This type of permission is of course definable in Horty’s prioritized default theory, and
its logical behavior will depend on whether it is defined as the dual of the disjunctive
or the conflict account.
5.2.1. DEFINITION. [Weak Permissions] Let ∆ be a default theory with D for conclu-
sive reasons.
• ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) iff ¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ /∈ AS,D for all proper scenarios S based on
∆
• ∆ ⊧ P d{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) iff ¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ /∈ AS,D for some proper scenarios S based
on ∆
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I write P ci (ϕ) as P c{i}(ϕ), and P di (ϕ) as P d{i}(ϕ). Similar to agent-relative obligations,
I write ∆ ⊧ Pi(ϕ) when one unique proper scenario can be generated from ∆. Permis-
sion for negated formulas is defined similarly as for obligations. For the disjunctive
account, for instance, this gives: ∆ ⊧ P di (¬ϕ) iff Doiϕ /∈ AS,D for some proper
scenarios S of ∆ with D.
Let me illustrate these notions of permissions in my running example. Recall that
S = {δc} is the only proper scenario above, and that I have ∆ ⊧ Oc(t) and ∆ ⊧
Oa(¬r). From that I get that ∆ ⊧ Pc(t) and ∆ ⊧ Pc(¬r), but also ∆ ⊧ Pc(d), as
expected.
Looking a bit further I do find, however, counter-intuitive weak permissions, which
speak in favor of looking at stronger notions. I do get, for instance, that ∆ ⊧ Pa(d),
which might appear unwelcome since only the company but not the tax authority is
permitted to submit the document. I rather see it as revealing how weak is the notion
of weak permission, and showing the need for a stronger, explicit notion. Weak per-
missions do not distinguish between, on the one hand, an action not being forbidden
for an agent because there are some reasons, possibly not conclusive, for doing it and,
on the other hand, the same action not being forbidden simply because reasons are
silent when it comes to that agent doing that action. We come back to this in the next
section.
Now for the logical properties of weak permissions. As expected from the defini-
tion, P d{i1,⋯,im} and P c{i1,⋯,im} are the respective duals of Od{i1,⋯,im} and Oc{i1,⋯,im}. But
just as for agent-relative obligations, few properties of the “diamond” P in SDL are
retained here.
5.2.2. THEOREM. Let ∆ be a default theory.
• ∆ ⊧ O{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) iff ∆ ⊧ ¬P{i1,⋯,im}(¬ϕ).
• ∆ ⊧ P{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) or ∆ ⊧ P{j1,⋯,jn}(ψ) implies ∆ ⊧ P{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ ∨ ψ),
but not vice versa.
• ∆ ⊧ Od{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) implies ∆ ⊧ P d{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ).
• ∆ ⊧ Oc{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) does not imply ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ).
Proof:
Here I only prove the interesting case that ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) or ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ψ)
imply ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ ∨ ψ).
Suppose ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) or ∆ ⊧ P c{j1,⋯,jn}(ψ). It indicates that¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ /∈
AS,D for all proper scenarios S based on ∆, or ¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}ψ /∈ AS,D for all proper
scenarios S based on ∆. This implies that (¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ /∈ AS,D or ¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}ψ /∈
AS,D), for all proper scenarios S based on ∆. According to the definition of first-
order action sets, it means that ∀(χ1, ϕ1) ∈ Di1 ,⋯, (χm, ϕm) ∈ Dim , (χ′1, ψ1) ∈
Dj1 ,⋯, (χ′n, ψn) ∈ Djn s.t. ¬ϕ = ¬⋀1≤k≤m ϕk /∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)) or ¬ψ =
¬⋀1≤k≤n ψk /∈ Cn(W∪Con(S)). So then¬(ϕ∨ψ) = ¬⋀1≤k≤n ϕk∧¬⋀1≤k≤n ψk /∈
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Cn(W ∪ Con(S)). From this I can conclude ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ ∨ ψ). □
Weak permission in the conflicted account further satisfies the so-called property
of “agglomeration” in a way similar to the agent-relative obligation in the disjunctive
account.
5.2.3. THEOREM. Let ∆ be a default theory.
• ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im,im+1,⋯,im+n}(ϕ ∧ ψ) iff ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) ∧ P c{im+1,⋯,im+n}(ψ).
Proof:
LtR: Suppose ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ ∧ ψ). This means that ¬Do{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ ∧ ψ) /∈ AS,D
for all proper scenarios S based on ∆. The former is equal to that ∀(χ1, χ′1) ∈ Dii ,
⋯, (χm, χ′m) ∈ Dim , (χm+1, χ′m+1) ∈ Dim+1 , ⋯, (χm+n, χ′m+n) ∈ Dim+n , s.t. ¬(ϕ ∧
ψ) = ¬⋀1≤k≤m+n χ′k /∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)). Assume that ϕ = ⋀1≤k≤m χ′k and ψ =⋀m+1≤k≤m+n χ′k. So I have
• ∀(χ1, χ′1) ∈ Dii , ⋯, (χm, χ′m) ∈ Dim s.t. ¬ϕ = ¬⋀1≤k≤m χ′k /∈ Cn(W ∪
Con(S)), and
• ∀(χm+1, χ′m+1) ∈ Dim+1 ,⋯, (χm+n, χ′m+n) ∈ Dim+n s.t. ¬ψ = ¬⋀m+1≤k≤m+n χ′k /∈
Cn(W ∪ Con(S)).
This concludes that ∆ ⊧ P c{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) ∧ P c{im+1,⋯,im+n}(ψ).
The right-to-left direction is proven in a similar way. □
5.2.2 Explicit Permissions
Explicit permissions, as their name suggest, are permissions that are explicitly stated in
a moral or legal code. These are the strong permissions in the sense of von Wright [118,
p.31]. Here I follow [71] and stay at the intuitive level. Intuitively, the law-giver can
forbid ϕ without further legal changes if ϕ is only weakly permitted, but not if it is
explicitly permitted. This intuitive difference is also present in my running example.
The permission for the foreign company c to submit the documents is explicit, while
the same weak permission for the tax authority a is not. Such an example suggests the
need to distinguish explicit from weak permissions.
In order to capture explicit permissions I extend Horty’s account by splitting the
set D into a set of permissive norms P and a set of mandatory norms O, with < the
same partial order on D as usual.
I illustrate this idea through my running example. The explicit permission here is
the following: the solar energy business may submit the documentation if it is the tax
season. This permissive norm takes also the form of a default s
δ
′
c−→ d for the company
c. This default defeats the regular duty to pay full income tax. Formally, I get the
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default theory ∆′CIT = ⟨W , I,O ∪ P ,<⟩ defined as follows: W = {s,¬t ⇔ r},
I = {a, c}, O = {s δc−→ t, d δa−→ r}, P = {s δ′c−→ d}, with the priority δc < δa, reflecting
the priority of tax reduction. See Figure 5.2. With the addition of this permissive norm,
the unique proper scenario becomes {δ′c, δa}, as desired.
s
t
d
r
c
c
a
Figure 5.2: A default theory of a solar energy business c’s claim to the right to a tax
incentive against the local tax authority.
Now I turn to the formal definition.
5.2.4. DEFINITION. [Explicit Permissions] Given ∆ = ⟨W , I,O ∪ P ,<⟩, I say that
Pe(ϕ) is an explicit permission on this default theory, denoted as ∆ ⊧ P e{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ),
iff
Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ AS,P for all proper scenarios S based on ∆
For example, with the permissive norm s
δ
′
c−→ d at hand, I get the explicit permission
P
e
c (d), indicating that the solar energy company may submit the valid documentation.
Interestingly, the tax authority then has a correlative duty to grant the tax reduction. So
this explicit permission P ec (d) can be seen as a claim right, in Hohfeld’s sense.
Explicit permissions give more intuitive results in this case than weak permissions.
Recall that, as Figure 5.2 shows, since there is no conclusive reason for the company
that forbids granting the tax reduction, I obtained the rather counterintuitive result: it is
a weak permission for the company to reduce the tax rate. But there is no such explicit
permission here, for the simple reason that this action may only be implemented by
the tax authority. So weak permissions are too weak to model this important piece of
Chinese Law.
The Chinese Law example shows that there can be a weak permission without an
explicit one. Now I should see that the converse is also possible, by looking back at the
Right of Way example. In this example all the defaults are permissive. Suppose that l
is the driver who wants to turn left at an intersection on the priority street, r is the driver
who signals to turn right at the same intersection of this street, t means that driver l’s
turns left, s means that driver r signals to turn right, and t′ means that driver r turns
right. I have three permissive norms in this case: ⊤
δl−→ t, ⊤
δr−→ s, and s
δ
′
r−→ t’. This
situation can then be captured in the following default theory: ∆ = ⟨W , I,O ∪P ,<⟩,
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⊤
t
s
t
′
l
r
r
Figure 5.3: A default theory of the driver r’s signal for turning right being a claim right
overriding driver l’s permission to turn left.
where W = {⊤, t′⇔ ¬t}, O = ∅, and P = {⊤ δl−→ t,⊤ δr−→ s, s δ′r−→ t′} with δl < δ′r,
representing that the driver turning right has priority. See Figure 5.3. In this default
theory, the unique proper scenario is {δr, δ′r}, only including permissive norms, which
expresses that the driver r has the priority of turning right, as well as that the driver
r has an explicit permission to turn right P er (t′). However, he does not own a weak
permission P cr (t′) to do so, for the simple reason that the set O for conclusive reasons
is empty.
Similarly to weak permission, explicit permission also satisfies the “agglomera-
tion” property. Though explicit permission and weak permission both have similar
logical behavior, they are two independent categories of permission, as the previous
arguments have shown, which do bring about different normative consequences in le-
gal reasoning.
5.2.5. THEOREM. Let ∆ be a default theory.
• ∆ ⊧ P e{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) ∧ P e{i1,⋯,im}(ψ) iff ∆ ⊧ P e{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ ∧ ψ).
Proof:
As the logical structure similar to the agent-relative obligations in disjunctive interpre-
tation, the proof here is also obvious. □
5.2.3 Tacit Permissions
What I call “tacit permission” follows the basic idea of a "silent" type of permission
in [71, p.398]. The idea is that ϕ is tacitly permitted when ϕ cannot be coherently
prohibited. Translated into the present framework, this notion of incoherence bears on
the non-defeated permissive norms. Prohibiting ϕ hence leads to a contradiction when
it defeats an otherwise undefeated permissive norm.
5.2.6. DEFINITION. [Tacit Permissions] Given ∆ = ⟨W , I,D = O ∪P ,<⟩, I say that
P
t{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) is a tacit permission based on ∆, denoted as ∆ ⊧ P t{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ), iff
Do{i1,⋯,im}¬ϕ ∈ AS,O ⇒ ¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ /∈ APS,D
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Let me illustrate this idea in my two running examples. In the tax reduction case,
I get that P tc(r), which means that the permission of granting the tax reduction by
the authority is tacit. For the Right of Way example, driver r’s permission to turn
right is also tacit. This should show that tacit permission is neither weak nor explicit
permission.
Tacit permission turns out to be free choice permission, but unlike weak and explicit
permission it does not agglomerate.
5.2.7. THEOREM. Let ∆ be a default theory.
• If ∆ ⊧ P t{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ ∨ ψ) then ∆ ⊧ P t{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) ∧ P t{j1,⋯,jn}(ψ).
Proof:
Suppose that ∆ ⊧ P t{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ∨ψ). This indicates thatDo{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}¬(ϕ∨
ψ) ∈ AS,O can imply ¬Do{h1,⋯,hl}¬Do{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ ∨ ψ) /∈ APS,D. Assume
Do{i1,⋯,im}¬ϕ ∈ AS,O and Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬ψ ∈ AS,O. This means that ∃(χ1, ϕ1) ∈ Oi1 ,
⋯, (χm, ϕm) ∈ Oim s.t. ¬ϕ = ⋀1≤k≤m ϕk ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)), and ∃(χ′1, ψ1) ∈
Oj1 ,⋯, (χ′n, ψn) ∈ Ojn s.t. ¬ψ = ⋀1≤k≤n ψk ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S)). Taking them
together, this indicates that ∃(χ1, ϕ1) ∈ Oi1 , ⋯, (χm, ϕm) ∈ Oim , (χ′1, ψ1) ∈ Oj1 ,
⋯, (χ′n, ψn) ∈ Ojn s.t. ¬(ϕ∨ψ) = ⋀1≤k≤m ϕk∧⋀1≤k≤n ψk ∈ Cn(W∪Con(S)). So
I have Do{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ AS,O. According to the assumption, this implies
that ¬Do{h1,⋯,hl}¬Do{i1,⋯,im,j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ ∨ ψ) /∈ APS,D. I then have ∀(χ1, ϕ1) ∈ Pi1 ,
⋯, (χm, ϕm) ∈ Pim , (χ′1, ψ1) ∈ Pj1 , ⋯, (χ′n, ψn) ∈ Pjn , ∃(χ′′1, χ′′′1 ) ∈ Dh1 , ⋯,(χ′′l , χ′′′l ) ∈ Dhl s.t.
¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ = ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) = ¬ ⋀
1≤k≤l
χ
′′′
k ∈ Cn(W ∪ {ϕ1,⋯, ϕm, ψ1,⋯, ψn})
and (χ′′1, χ′′′1 ),⋯, (χ′′l , χ′′′l ) ∈ S. This then concludes that¬Do{h1,⋯,hl}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ /∈
APS,D and¬Do{h1,⋯,hl}¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}ψ /∈ APS,D by unpacking the definitions. According
to these, I can have the desired results. □
5.2.4 A Fourth Type: Protected Permissions
Having looked at weak, explicit and tacit permission, I now turn to notions of permis-
sions arising from legal theory. This combines in a natural way the permissive norms
introduced earlier and my multi-agent version of default theory. The crucial notion
here is that of correlative permissions and duties. This can be illustrated in my Right
of Way example. There, one’s permissive right to turn at the crossroad correlates to
other(s)’ duty not to interfere. In short, this permissive right is protected. This reverses
the standard relation between obligation and permission. As already mentioned in the
introduction, in SDL obligation implies (weak) permission. This was the consistency
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requirement. With correlative duties this is the other way around: permission implies
obligation. The so-called “protected permission” [121, 85] generates obligation.
5.2.8. DEFINITION. [Protections: Implicit Duties] Let a default theory ∆ be a tuple of⟨W , I,D = O ∪ P ,<⟩. I say that D{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ) is a protection or an implicit duty,
denoted as ∆ ⊧ D{j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ), iff
¬Do{j1,⋯,jn}¬Do{i1,⋯,im}ϕ ∈ APS,D for some i1,⋯, im of P
Protected permission can be seen as an implicit type of duty, because it aims at en-
suring the other’s explicit permissions so as to not be defeated by them. As a corollary
of Theorem 5.1.12, I get that protected permission follows from explicit permission.
5.2.9. THEOREM. Given a default theory ∆ = ⟨W , I,D = O ∪ P ,<⟩, I have
• ∆ ⊧ P e{i1,⋯,im}(ϕ)⇒ ∆ ⊧ D{j1,⋯,jn}(ϕ) for all j1,⋯, jn of D.
This type of protected permission is particularly salient in the Right of Way example.
I have seen that P er (t′) is an explicit permission for the driver r to turn right. In terms
of protected permission, I can then conclude that both drivers should not interfere with
driver r’s turning right.
5.3 Foundation in Argumentation Theory
After having developed four types of permission in my extended version of Horty’s
prioritized default theory, I now provide a theoretical foundation for it using stable
semantics [28, 29, 14] and preferred semantics [16, 17, 42, 69, 40]. This section is
organized as follows. I first introduce the basic notions of the fixed point characteriza-
tion of the stable semantics. After that, I reconstruct the stable semantics in prioritized
default theory, and then prove that it is a special case of proper scenarios. Finally, I
present the preferred semantics as one alternative formulation of specificity, and show
that, though it is computationally tractable, it cannot be a reasonable guide for real
applications to concrete legal cases, as the stable semantics is.
5.3.1 A Primer on Stable Semantics
This section develops stable extensions for stable semantics in prioritized default the-
ory, based on the framework developed by Dung [28, p.328]. A stable extension is a
conflict free extension that defeats each argument which does not belong to this ex-
tension. The original account of stable semantics is one of the many extension-based
models that originated in Dung’s classic paper on abstract argumentation theory [28].
The crucial notions here are of the attack relation, modeling conflicts between argu-
ments. This basic framework can be extended into the so-called structured argumen-
tation theory [83], which strongly underlines the difference between attack and defeat,
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in the sense that the latter involves an explicit priority governing arguments. To keep
the notations simple, I denote “arguments” by using default rules in this section.
5.3.1. DEFINITION. [Dung’s Argumentation Framework and Attacks] Dung’s argu-
mentation framework (AF) [28] is a structure ⟨A, C⟩, where C ⊆ A × A is a binary
attack relation on the arguments A. Then, for any δ, γ ∈ A,
• δ attacks γ iff (δ, γ) ∈ C
• S ⊆ A attacks γ iff ∃δ ∈ S s.t. (δ, γ) ∈ C
• S ⊆ A is conflict free iff (δ, γ) /∈ C for all δ, γ ∈ S
• δ ∈ A is acceptable w.r.t. some S ⊆ A iff ∀γ ∈ A s.t. if (γ, δ) ∈ C then
∃γ ′ ∈ S s.t. (γ ′, γ) ∈ C
Argumentation theory captures specificity, either by an implicitly derived priority
order in a given attack relation [29], or by an explicitly imposed priority order in it [83].
However, this section proposes a very simple variant of the explicit account [83] with
an explicit strict partial priority order, which only involves the key notions of “ar-
gument,” “attack,” and priority in an argumentation framework 2. In this simplified
framework the defeat relation can be defined using the given attack relation and the
priority: An argument δ is said to defeat an argument γ iff δ attacks γ and δ is “more
specific” than γ [29, 83].
5.3.2. DEFINITION. [Structured Argumentation Framework and Defeats] A structured
argumentation framework (SAF) is a tuple ⟨A, C,<⟩ where A is the set of all argu-
ments, C is an attack relation, and < is a strict partial priority order. Then
• δ defeats γ, denoted as (δ, γ) ∈ De, iff (δ, γ) ∈ C and γ < δ
• S ⊆ A defeats γ iff ∃δ ∈ S s.t. (δ, γ) ∈ De
De is the defeat relation that contains all the derived defeats. Like in default theory,
a defeat relation can be derived by the strict partial priority order in a given SAF.
But for simplification, I omit the standard distinction of undermining, rebutting and
undercutting defeats in SAF [83].
Now I turn to the formal construction of extensions, which is based on the proposal
by Dung [28, p.328], but follows the well-known formulation proposed by Prakken [83].
5.3.3. DEFINITION. [Extensions] Let ⟨A, C,<⟩ be a SAF, and S ⊆ A be conflict free.
Then
2The derived priority order proposed in the implicit account [29] cannot characterize the twin exam-
ple in [52]. No such derived strict partial priority order < “more specific” exists. Otherwise, these two
rules δ1, δ2 whose premises are tautologies and whose conclusions conflict with each other can derive
these two relations: δ1 < δ2 and δ2 < δ1.
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• S is an admissible extension iff S ⊆ {δ ∣ δ is acceptable w.r.t. S}
• S is a preferred extension iff S is a maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) admissible extension
• S is a stable extension iff S is a preferred extension that defeats all arguments in
A/S
The stable extension defined here is similar to the one in [28], and is thus in the spirit of
Dung’s proposal, even if one adds an explicit defeat relation that provides a prioritized
strength on arguments.
5.3.4. LEMMA. Let S be conflict free. Then
S is a stable extension iff S = {δ ∣ δ is not defeated by S}.
Proof:
LtR: Assume that S is a stable extension
• Let δ ∈ S. I need to show that δ is not defeated by S. Otherwise S defeats δ,
namely ∃γ ∈ S s.t. δ < γ and (γ, δ) ∈ C. Because δ ∈ S, then it implies that S
is not conflict free, which contradicts the assumption.
• Let δ is not defeated by S. I need to show that δ ∈ S. Otherwise δ ∈ A/S. As S
is a stable extension, δ is defeated by S, which contradicts the assumption again.
RtL: Assume that S = {δ ∣ δ is not defeated by S}. I want to show that S is a
stable extension in the following three steps.
1. First, to show that S is admissible. Otherwise ∃δ ∈ S s.t. δ is not acceptable
w.r.t. S. Namely ∃γ ∈ A s.t. (γ, δ) ∈ C and ∀γ ′ ∈ S s.t. (γ ′, γ) /∈ C. Since(γ, δ) ∈ C and S is conflict free, I know that γ ∈ A/S. Then γ is defeated by S,
namely ∃γ ′ ∈ S s.t. γ ′ > γ and (γ ′, γ) ∈ C. The “otherwise” does not hold, and
thus S is admissible.
2. Next I want to show that S is maximal. Otherwise ∃δ ∈ A/S s.t. δ is acceptable
w.r.t. S. However, according to the assumption and δ ∈ A/S, δ is defeated by
S, and so it cannot be acceptable. So no such δ exists.
3. In conclusion, it is obvious that ∀δ ∈ A/S that δ is defeated by S, according to
the assumption.
□
To conclude this section, I bridge prioritized default theory with stable semantics,
by generating a prioritized default theory in SAF. This sheds new light on the con-
struction of stable extensions in prioritized default theory, and on how this construction
connects with the proper scenarios.
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5.3.5. DEFINITION. A SAF-prioritized default theory is a tuple ⟨A, C,<⟩ where A =⟨W ,D⟩, < is a strict partial priority order over D, and C is defined over D as follows:(δ, γ) ∈ C⇔ ¬Con(γ) ∈ Cn(W ∪ {Con(δ)})
where δ, γ ∈ D.
In accordance with Definition 5.3.5, it is natural to represent acceptability by the
combination of triggered and non-conflicted scenarios in prioritized default theory.
5.3.6. LEMMA. Let A be a SAF- prioritized default theory where A = ⟨W ,D, C,<⟩,
and S be a non-empty set of all triggered and non-conflicted defaults w.r.t. S. Namely
S = TriggeredW,D(S) ∩ (D/ConflictedW,D(S)). Then
δ ∈ S iff ∀δ′ ∈ D.[(δ′, δ) ∈ C ⇒ ∃δ′′ ∈ S.(δ′′, δ′) ∈ C].
Proof:
LtR: Assume that δ ∈ S. Let δ′ ∈ D and (δ′, δ) ∈ C. So ¬Con(δ) ∈ Cn(W ∪{Con(δ′)}) according to Definition 5.3.5. As Cn satisfies contrapositivity, of course I
have ¬Con(δ′) ∈ Cn(W ∪ {Con(δ)}), which indicates (δ, δ′) ∈ C.
RtL: Let δ /∈ S. Assume that δ ∈ TriggeredW,D(S). Then δ ∈ ConflictedW,D(S).
Since S is non-empty, so ∃δ′ ∈ S s.t. ¬Con(δ) ∈ Cn(W ∪ {Con(δ′)}), and for any
δ
′′ ∈ S, of course, (δ′′, δ′) /∈ C, as both are contained in S. □
In other words, a default is triggered and non-conflicted iff it is acceptable w.r.t. a given
scenario.
5.3.7. COROLLARY. Let ⟨W ,D, C,<⟩ be a SAF-prioritized default theory, and sce-
nario S is triggered and non-conflicted. Then
S is a stable extension iff S = {δ ∣ δ is not defeated by S}.
Proof:
According to Lemma 5.3.6, this scenario S is an admission extension. And then it is
conflict free. By using Lemma 5.3.4, this corollary is obvious. □
Together with Corollary 5.3.7, I can simply conclude that stable extensions are
already one particular case of proper scenarios. The detailed connection is presented
in the next section.
5.3.2 Safe Scenarios: A Representation of Stable Extensions, Pro-
viding Reasonable Explanations for Legal Permissibility
This section proposes a representation of stable extensions in prioritized default the-
ory, what I called “safe scenarios,” which undoubtedly gives rise to reasonable legal
permissibilities in principle of “overall undefeated reasons.” In doing so, two notions
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in stable extensions should be characterized, acceptability and non-defeatedness. As
Definition 5.3.5 and Lemma 5.3.6 show, an “acceptable” default can be naturally rep-
resented as a combination of the triggered and non-conflicted default in prioritized
default theory.
5.3.8. DEFINITION. [Acceptability] Given a scenario S based on ∆ = ⟨W ,D,<⟩. A
default δ is acceptable w.r.t. S iff δ is a triggered and non-conflicted default w.r.t.
S. A scenario is acceptable iff all defaults in it are acceptable w.r.t. itself, namely
S ⊆ TriggeredW,D(S) ∩ (D/ConflictedW,D(S)).
In accordance to Lemma 5.3.6, an acceptable scenario is an admissible extension, and
vice versa.
I then can define a scenario as maximally acceptable as it contains all the acceptable
default w.r.t. itself.
5.3.9. DEFINITION. [Maximal Acceptability] Given a scenario S based on the theory
∆ = ⟨W ,D,<⟩. This scenario S is a maximally acceptable scenario based on the
theory ∆ iff it contains all acceptable defaults w.r.t. S, namely
S = TriggeredW,D(S) ∩ (D/ConflictedW,D(S))
I denote the set of all maximally acceptable scenarios based on ∆ as MAW,D.
Each maximally acceptable scenario naturally presents the maximality of accept-
ability in the following sense.
5.3.10. LEMMA. If S ∈ MAW,D then S ∪ {(ϕ, ψ)} ⊆ ConflictedW,D(S) where(ϕ, ψ) ∈ TriggeredW,D(S) and (ϕ, ψ) /∈ S.
So a maximally acceptable scenario is a preferred extension.
My construction of maximal acceptability can deal with the classical benchmark
case for stable semantics: The vicious cycle example [52, Section 1.3.2]. In this exam-
ple it returns an empty stable extension, which, as argued by Dung [28], is reasonable.
I first apply the maximal acceptability in the following vicious cycles example.
5.3.11. EXAMPLE. [No Maximally Acceptable Scenarios: Vicious Cycles] Given a
default theory ∆ = ⟨W ,D,<⟩ where W = {⊤}, D = {⊤ δ1−→ a, a δ2−→ ¬a} with
δ1 < δ2. See the following diagram:
⊤ a
1
2
In this diagram, {δ1} is the unique element inMAW,D. For the other scenarios: neither
∅ nor {δ2} is triggered, and {δ1, δ2} is conflicted.
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To return an empty extension in this vicious cycles case, I need to build a stable
extension in prioritized default theory, which crucially uses the notion of non-defeated
defaults.
5.3.12. DEFINITION. [Safe Scenarios] Given a default theory ∆ = ⟨W ,D,<⟩, and
a scenario S ∈ MAW,D as one of the maximally acceptable scenarios. I say S ∈
MAW,D is a safe scenario based on ∆, denoted as S ∈ SafeW,D, iff
S = D/DefeatedW,D(S)
The construction of safe scenarios is equal to that of stable extension in SAF, by taking
Definition 5.3.9, Lemma 5.3.10, Lemma 5.3.6, and Corallary 5.3.7 together. I therefore
conclude that safe scenarios are stable extensions in the sense of [28, 83].
Let me see how safe scenarios can be applied to the benchmark case of the vicious
cycles example, which is a benchmark of plausibility.
5.3.13. EXAMPLE. In Example 5.3.11, even {δ1} is the unique maximally consistent
scenario based on ∆, there is no safe scenario based on this default theory. δ2 ∈
TriggeredW,D({δ1}) s.t. δ2 > δ1 and ¬a ∈ Cn({⊤} ∪ {¬a}). And so δ1 ∈
DefeatedW,D({δ1}). It implies that D/DefeatedW,D({δ1}) = ∅ ≠ {δ1}. Hence,
there is no safe scenario in this case.
This conclusion is intuitively plausible. In this case safe scenarios exclude all the non-
reasonable ones.
Moreover, maximal acceptability is a necessary condition for safe scenarios, as the
following lemma shows.
5.3.14. LEMMA. If there is no scenario S in MAW,D, then there is no scenario S in
SafeW,D.
There is a close link between safe scenarios and proper scenarios: a safe scenario
is a proper scenario.
5.3.15. THEOREM. If S ∈ SafeW,D then S = ProperW,D(S).
Proof:
Given a safe scenario S based on the default theory ∆ = ⟨W ,D,<⟩. LtR: Let (ϕ, ψ) ∈
S ∈ SafeW,D, so I have (ϕ, ψ) ∈ TriggeredW,D(S)∩ (D/ConflictedW,D(S)), and(ϕ, ψ) ∈ D/DefeatedW,D(S). This results in S ⊆ ProperW,D(S). RtL: Assume that(ϕ, ψ) /∈ S. As S is a safe scenario, by Definition 5.3.12, (ϕ, ψ) ∈ DefeatedW,D(S),
and thus (ϕ, ψ) /∈ ProperW,D(S). So I have S ⊇ ProperW,D(S). I thus conclude
that S = ProperW,D(S). □
One significant feature of safe scenarios distinguished from proper scenarios is
that: a maximally acceptable scenario including the highest priority is not necessarily
safe.
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5.3.16. EXAMPLE. Given a default theory ∆ = ⟨W ,D,<⟩ where W = {⊤}, D ={⊤ δ1−→ a,⊤ δ2−→ b, b δ3−→ ¬a, a δ4−→ c} with δ1 < δ2 < δ3 < δ4. See the following
diagram:
⊤
a b
c
1 2
3
4
In this theory, {δ1, δ2, δ4} and {δ2, δ3} are the mere maximally acceptable scenarios.
But {δ2, δ3} is the unique safe scenario based on ∆, because no default rules in it are
defeated. As δ1 ∈ DefeatedW,D({δ1, δ2, δ4}), I know that {δ1, δ2, δ4} is not safe.
However {δ1, δ2, δ4} is a proper scenario. This result of a safe scenario reflects that,
even if the maximally acceptable scenario contains the default in the highest priority,
this condition cannot ensure this scenario is safe, because it may contain a default that
is defeated. Compare with the following situation:
⊤
a b
1 2
3
4
This diagram is a default theory ∆′ = ⟨W ′,D′,<′⟩ where W ′ = {⊤}, D′ = {⊤ δ1−→
a,⊤
δ2−→ b, b
δ3−→ ¬a, a
δ4−→ ¬b} with δ1 <′ δ2 <′ δ3 <′ δ4. In this case, {δ1, δ4} and{δ2, δ3} are the two maximally acceptable scenarios based on ∆′. Moreover, {δ1, δ4} is
the unique safe scenario and the unique proper scenario based on ∆′.
Example 5.3.16 in fact proves the following theorem, which asserts that a proper
scenario may not be a safe scenario.
5.3.17. THEOREM. Given ∆ = ⟨W ,D,<⟩. It may have S = ProperW,D(S) but
S /∈ SafeW,D.
Putting together Definition 5.3.12, Theorem 5.3.15 and Theorem 5.3.17, I see that
the proper scenario is a general characterization of stable extension.
Furthermore, I argue that a proper scenario is a better representation of reasons.
5.3.18. EXAMPLE. This counter example is similar to those in [52, section 8.3.3].
Given a default theory ∆ = ⟨W ,D,<⟩ where W = {⊤}, D = {⊤ δ1−→ a,⊤ δ2−→
b,⊤
δ3−→ ¬b, a
δ4−→ b} with δ1 < δ2 < δ3 < δ4. See the following diagram:
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⊤
a
b
1
4
23
In this diagram, S = {δ1, δ2, δ4} is the unique maximally acceptable scenario based
on ∆. But it is not a safe scenario. Because DefeatedW,D(S) = {δ2, δ3}, and then
S ⊃ D/DefeatedW,D(S) = {δ1, δ4}. However, the unique proper scenario is S ′ ={δ1, δ4}.
The proper scenario S ′ in the above has a reasonable representation of reasons.
δ2 is defeated in the above default theory by the triggered δ3, and so it should not be
contained as a reason.
In this section I reconstructed the standard stable extensions by safe scenarios in
prioritized default theory, which is proved to be a special case of proper scenarios.
The upside of safe scenario is that, as a standard model in stable semantics, it has a
constructive fixed point. In other word, a safe scenario can be generated in an inductive
process without “guessing.” However, as the example shown in Example 5.3.18, it may
be not able to exclude the unreasonable default in some concrete cases.
5.4 Explicit Permission vs. Exclusionary Permission
In this section I propose a formalization of Raz’s exclusionary reason [86] in my ex-
tended version of Horty’s prioritized default theory with exclusion. The upshot of this
is that exclusionary permission is a particular instance of permission in my framework.
5.4.1 Default Theories with Exclusionary Reasons
To capture exclusionary reasons, I formulate exclusion as second-order reasons in pri-
oritized default theory [52, p.121-130] 3, by developing “proper expansions on the
background information” in the “fixed” prioritized default theory introduced particu-
larly in Section 5.2. I choose the fixed prioritized default theory instead of the variable
prioritized default theory as [52, p.121-130] does, because the former can explicitly ex-
press both permissive reasons and exclusionary reasons at the same time. I will build
up my exclusionary prioritized default theory step by step.
Now I develop the exclusionary “fixed” prioritized default theory with the core
concept exclusions. In doing so, the language of the theory has to contain sentences
with the predicate Out, which is applied to the unique name dδ for each given default
3See [52] for detailed discussion of “exculsionary reasons” in terms of undercutting defeats.
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δ in ∆. The sentence Out(dδ) indicates that δ is undercut, canceled or excluded from
the consideration. I denote Out(∆) as the set of all names of defaults which are un-
dercut. Right now, given a prioritized default theory, the sentences in the background
information and the set of default rules can both include exclusionary sentences. I
call these type of theory exclusionary prioritized default theories. A sentence whose
subsentence is under the scope of an Out-predicate is called an exclusionary sentence,
and a sentence without is called a pure sentence. In this case, a default rule whose
conclusion is scoped by the Out-predicate is called an exclusionary reason.
5.4.1. DEFINITION. [Exclusions] Let ∆ = ⟨W , I,D,<⟩ be an exclusionary priority
default theory. Then the set ExcludedS of default rules that are undercut in scenario S
based on ∆ is defined as follows:
δ ∈ ExcludedS iff W ∪ Con(S) ⊢ Out(dδ)
The exclusions ExcludedS in a given scenario S are those undercut default rules
that are not applicable or triggered in this scenario any longer.
5.4.2. DEFINITION. [Triggered Defaults without Exclusions: Revised Definition] Given
an exclusionary priority default theory ∆ = ⟨W , I,D,<⟩ and a scenario S based on
∆. Then(ϕ, ψ) = δ ∈ TriggeredW,D(S)⇔ δ /∈ ExcludedS & ϕ ∈ Cn(W ∪ Con(S))
Here the proper scenarios based on ∆ are defined as in Definition 5.1.4 but with this
revised Definition 5.4.2 of triggered defaults.
I now present a revised version of the CIT example where I can apply my exclu-
sionary default theory. In this revised example, the default theory contains the same
background information, but I replace the permissive norm d
δa−→ r with an exclusion-
ary reason d
δa−→ Out(dδc), which indicates that submitting the document undercuts the
regular tax rate. This exclusionary reason does not, however, deliver the correct result.
In this modified example it is still permitted to reduce the tax rate.
s
t
d
c a
Figure 5.4: A revised default theory of CIT, in which the claim of the solar business is
an exclusionary reason to undercut the regular tax rate.
5.4. Explicit Permission vs. Exclusionary Permission 129
5.4.3. EXAMPLE. [Revised CIT with Exclusionary Reasons] Given a theory ∆CITE =⟨W , I,D,<⟩ as follows: W = {s, d}, I = {a, c}, D = {s δc−→ t, d δa−→ Out(dδc)}, in
which the defaults contain the claim of the solar company as an exclusionary reason
for tax reduction. See Figure 5.4. This default theory ∆ has a unique proper scenario{δa}, and thus, it can only imply the weak permission of filing regular tax, and of
submitting the valid documentation. In other words, this exclusionary default theory
cannot conclude the most important permission in this concrete case: it is permitted to
reduce the regular tax rate.
In this section I reconstructed prioritized default theory, the so-called exclusionary
prioritized default theory, by extending the object language with exclusions. By doing
so, triggered default rules have to be re-defined accordingly. Comparing the results I
just obtained with those in Section 5.2, it seems that in this particular legal case I obtain
more reasonable conclusions with explicit permissive norms than with exclusionary
permissions.
5.4.2 Alternative: e-Exclusionary Default Theories
In this reconstruction of exclusionary default theory, the basic idea is that the set of all
exclusionary sentences only appears as a set of default rules, in order to make a sharp
distinction of the respective effects of permissive norms and exclusionary reasons. To
achieve this, I first collect all exclusionary sentences by the so-called exclusionary set E
of default rules as follows. If an exclusionary sentence is a proposition Out(d) consis-
tent with the background information, then it is taken to have a corresponding default
rule ⊤ → Out(d) without priority. In this case, this proposition and its corresponding
rule have the same effect on a given default theory. As all tautologies are derived from
the background in the classical consequence relation, the corresponding rule is always
triggered. Together with the fact that this rule should always be the least element in
the proper scenario, it becomes included in E . Unlike in the previous construction, all
exclusionary sentences here can have their own given priority. All elements in E are
called exclusionary defaults.
5.4.4. DEFINITION. [Alternative: e-Exclusionary Default Theories] Given a tuple ∆e =⟨W , I,D∪E ,<⟩. I say ∆e is an e-exclusionary default theory iffW is a set of pure sen-
tences, I is a set of agents, D is a set of default rules without exclusionary sentences,
E is an exclusionary set of exclusionary defaults, and < is a strict partial priority order
over the union of D and E .
The proper scenarios in this section are defined as in Section 5.4.1 with the revised
Definition 5.4.2 of triggered defaults. I then have the following lemma which bridges
the exclusionary default theory in Section 5.4.1 and the e-exclusionary default theory
in this section. I first define a corresponding notion. I say ∆e = ⟨W ′, I,D′ ∪ E ,<⟩
is a corresponding e-exclusionary default theory to ∆ = ⟨W , I,D,<⟩, iff ∆e is an
130 Chapter 5. The Defeasible Characters of Permission
e-exclusionary default theory s.t. W ′ ⊆ W is the set of all pure sentences in W ,
and D′ ⊆ D is the set of all pure sentences in D, and E is the set of all corresponding
exclusionary sentences inW∪D. According to this construction,W∪D =W ′∪D′∪E ,
and < ranges over a subset of D′ ∪ E related to D.
5.4.5. LEMMA. Let ∆ = ⟨W , I,D,<⟩ be an exclusionary default theory in Section 5.4.1
and ∆e = ⟨W ′, I,D′∪ E ,<⟩ be a corresponding e-exclusionary default theory to ∆ in
this section. Then S is a proper scenario based on ∆ iff S is a proper scenario based
on ∆e. That is
S = ProperW,D(S)⇔ S = ProperW ′,D′∪E(S)
.
Proof:
According to W ∪ D = W ′ ∪ D′ ∪ E as their corresponding notions, and the same
priority over rules, this result is obvious. □
Taking the last two observations together, they assert a relationship between per-
missive norms and exclusionary sentences. Comparing the e-exclusionary construction
with the default theory with permissive norms, exclusionary sentences and permissive
norms are two distinct types of default rule in a given default theory. However, I should
keep in mind that, permissive norms may get the highest, while still being undercut by
exclusionary sentences with lower priority. Therefore, a most prioritized explicit per-
mission can be canceled by a less important exclusionary reason.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter developed a formal theory for a rich typology of permissions by extending
Horty’s default theory. I showed that this theory can be applied to important examples
in Chinese and in German Law.
Aside from this, my formal theory has highlighted the multi-agent aspect in legal
reasoning by the so-called action sets. This turns to be an advantage for characterizing
Hohfeldian correlative relations of claims and duties. I argued for this by displaying
two case studies in explicit permission. However, a further argument for supporting this
characterization should be given, in order to build up a firm philosophical foundation
to link my normative concepts with Hohfeldian legal rights. I leave this to my future
research.
This chapter also contributes to the formal studies of the theoretical foundation
of my default theory, by connecting default theory with the other formal theories for
defeasibility or specificity, and by justifying the idea of permissive norms as a response
to [2, 86]. The investigation of these two issues provides me with a positive support for
my formulation of default theory, by showing that my default theory can bring about
intuitive normative consequences in the concrete cases for two items of Chinese and
German Laws.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis has studied an abundant variety of notions of permissions and their logical
structures in non-monotonic reasoning. Because actions are the subjects of permis-
sions [117], the whole investigation can be divided into three broad action-theoretic
ideas: conditionals, dynamics and defeasibility. Each of these showcase different prop-
erties of permissions, as well as a particular relationship with obligation.
6.1 Review of the Chapters
Chapter 2 argued that free choice permission is a plausible notion for normative reason-
ing about rational recommendations in games. In doing so, it presented a comparison
between several existing non-normal modal logics, which share the idea of obligation
as the weakest free choice permission. This comparison demonstrated the theoretical
significance of this particular relationship between permission and obligation. They
are, respectively, the sufficient and necessary conditions for rationality in games.
Chapter 3 examined the logical behaviors of free choice permission in natural lan-
guage by using a family of substructural logics. In order to gain some deductive power,
I augmented my substructural logic of action with the “rational monotony” assump-
tion, and argued that this provides a plausible model of Free Choice Permission. The
resulting logic is thus weaker than classical logic, but not too weak. The key concep-
tual contribution of this chapter was the interpretation of the conditional connective on
action types in terms of "licensed instances".
Chapter 4 led me to a study of the dynamic behavior of permission in a legal con-
text. In this chapter, the dynamic logic of permission is generalized from the well-
established dynamic logics of lexicographic updates, and it is completely axiomatized.
In contrast to the existing framework of power and immunity, this dynamic logic pro-
vides a complex reduction to static normative positions, while still viewing these rights
as actions that change legal relations. This chapter also provided a computation of
the dynamic normative positions, as a standard in the development of formal theo-
ries of Hohfeldian legal rights. Aside from this, the dynamic logic in this chapter can
131
132 Chapter 6. Conclusion
clearly distinguish the notions of “legal ability” and “legal permissibility,” as illustrated
through the analysis of a concrete example in German contract law.
Chapter 5 studied the defeasible character of actions and permissions in an exten-
sion of prioritized default theory, in order to capture two items of Chinese and Ger-
man Law. The prioritized default theory developed here was based on two extensions:
multi-agent and permissive norms. This can then define various independent types of
permission. This agent-relative default theory with permissive norms can plausibly
capture the case “Chinese Tax Incentives” and the “Rights of Way.” Comparing the
default theories with undercut defeaters, and other extension-based semantics, the pri-
oritized default theory introduced in this chapter can helps us understand better these
concrete legal situations.
6.2 Open Questions
The many facets of permissions that we encountered in this thesis open up a lot of
questions for future research.
6.2.1 The Stability of Permission and Obligation
The first important open question in my view concerns the stability of norms. I un-
derstand “stability” here by analogy with the notion of entrenchment in belief revi-
sion [34, 35]. In this thesis, the permission in Chapter 2 can be viewed as the “all-
or-nothing” permission. But what about those in the other chapters in non-monotonic
frameworks? We know from dynamic doxastic logic [35] that belief and entrench-
ment are different. This distinction can arguably also be made for normative concepts.
Here a promising research avenue would be to look at the notion of “trust” [66, 62]
as sustainer of stability for deontic notions like permissions and obligations. If such
an analogy would exist in deontic logic, what would be their definitions, and what are
their logical behaviors and their relationship with the existing concepts in this thesis?
6.2.2 Aggregations on Permission and Obligation
From a multi-agent perspective, there is an interesting question about how to define
permission and obligation for groups of agents, by analogy with distributed knowl-
edge in epistemic logic [30]. Although this topic is not a no-man’s land, most existing
theories in multi-agent deontic logic address, for instance, the notions of group obli-
gation based on collective obligation [91, 39] or joint action [50, 97]. In contrast, it
would be interesting to look at the aggregation of permissions and obligations, such
that each individual’s permission and obligation contributed to an aggregate norm. In
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, a perspective of multi-agent interaction was addressed, but
the permissions and obligations were still for individuals. These chapters have offered
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well-established frameworks for multi-agents; the next step is how to apply these for-
mal frameworks to the topic of aggregating permissions and obligations.
Unlike the traditional viewpoint, this thesis has argued that non-standard permis-
sions, e.g. free choice permission and explicit permission, are the key elements in some
realistic cases, which cannot be captured by the standard notion of weak permission.
I believe that all these non-standard views of permissions bear fruit beyond deontic
logics, and they are the invaluable guidelines to develop normative systems, promising
in the areas of ethics, economics, and policy making. And this is what has been argued
in this thesis.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit erforschte verschiedene formale Theorien der taxonomischen Kategorie
der Erlaubnis in nichtmonotonem Schließen, untersuchte die jeweiligen logischen Prinzi-
pien und wandte diese verschiedenen Begriffe von Erlaubnis auf konkrete Fälle in
natürlicher Sprache und Gesetzgebung an. Im Gegensatz zur singularen Form der Er-
laubnis in SDL zeigte diese formale Untersuchung, wie wichtig plurale Sichtweisen
auf Erlaubnis bei der Errichtung von normativen Systemen in der Praxis sind.
Kapitel 2 ist eine vergleichende Untersuchung von vier Logiken in zwei Darstellun-
gen rationaler Verpflichtung als die schwächste Erlaubnis in Spielen; eine basiert auf
Propositionen und die andere auf Handlungstypen. Sie lieferte einige Übersetzungsre-
sultate bezüglich der deduktiven Stärke und zeigte die Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede
zwischen ihnen auf.
Kapitel 3 ist eine neue Lösung des berüchtigten Rätsels des free choice permis-
sion paradox. Es untersuchte dabei eine Gruppe substruktureller Prinzipien, um free
choice permission in natürlicher Sprache zu fassen, erweitert um ein nichtmonotones
Prinzip aus handlungstheoretischer Sicht. Demgemäß entwickelte es eine Familie sub-
struktureller Logiken mit hinreichender deduktiver Stärke. Diese Logiken werden voll-
ständig axiomatisiert, dabei erfüllen einige den Gentzenschen Hauptsatz.
Kapitel 4 ist eine Pilotstudie zur Anwendung der etablierten Logik mit lexiko-
graphischen Updates auf Hohfeldsche dynamische Rechte. Anders als ihre Vorgänger
stellt sie einen dritten Weg dar, um Macht und Immunität zu formulieren. Auf der einen
Seite unterscheidet die dynamische Logik den dynamischen Charakter von Rechten
von den statischen. Auf der anderen Seite verfügt sie als reduktive Darstellung über
eine größere Menge von logischen Interaktionen zwischen statischen und dynamischen
Rechten. Tatsächlich kann die hier entwickelte dynamische Logik in einem konkreten
Fall aus dem deutschen Zivilrecht angewandt werden, um den Begriff des rechtlichen
Könnens von dem des rechtlichen Dürfens zu unterscheiden.
Kapitel 5 ist eine formale Untersuchung von vier Arten von Erlaubnis auf der
Grundlage von Hortys prioritized default theory, die verwendet werden kann um zwei
bedeutende Teile deutschen und chinesischen Rechts zu analysieren. Dabei erwei-
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terte sie Hortys Theorie um erlaubende Normen sowie agency. Darüber hinaus wurde
bewiesen, dass diese formale Theorie im Vergleich zu Dungs Argumentationstheorie
und der exclusionary default theory eine allgemeinere Formulierung von defeasibility
darstellt.
Abstract
This thesis has studied various formal theories of the taxonomic category of permission
in non-monotonic reasoning, examined their particular logical principles, and applied
these various notions of permission to concrete cases from natural language and from
legislation. In contrast to the singular form of permission in SDL, this formal study has
pointed out how important plural views of permission are in building up a normative
system in practice.
Chapter 2 is a comparative study to argue that free choice permission is a plau-
sible notion about rational recommendations in games. In doing so, it presented a
comparison between several existing non-normal modal logics, which share the idea
of rational obligation as weakest permission. It provided several translation results
regarding their deductive power, and pointed out the theoretical significance of this
particular relationship between permission and obligation. They are, respectively, the
sufficient and necessary conditions for rationality in games.
Chapter 3 is a new solution to the notorious puzzle of the “free choice permission
paradox.” In doing so, it studied a group of substructural principles for capturing free
choice permission in natural language, augmented with a non-monotonic principle.
Accordingly, it developed a family of substructural logics with sufficient deductive
power. These logics are completely axiomatized, and some satisfy cut-elimination.
The key conceptual contribution of this chapter was the interpretation of the conditional
connective on action types in terms of “licensed instances.”
Chapter 4 is a pilot study of applying the well-established logic with lexicographic
updates on Hohfeldian dynamic rights. Different than its ancestors, it is a third way
to formulate power and immunity. On the one hand, the dynamic logic distinguished
the dynamic character of rights from the static ones. On the other hand, as a reductive
account, it has a richer set of logical interactions between static and dynamic rights.
Indeed, the dynamic logic developed here can be well applied to distinguish the no-
tion of legal ability (rechtliches Können) from that of legal permissibility (rechtliches
Dürfen), in a concrete case from the German civil code.
Chapter 5 is formal research that studies the defeasible character of actions and
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permissions in an extension of prioritized default theory, in order to capture two items
in Chinese and German Law. The prioritized default theory developed here was based
on two extensions: multi-agent and permissive norms. This can then define various
independent types of permission. This agent-relative default theory with permissive
norms can plausibly capture the case “Chinese Tax Incentives” and the “Rights of
Way.” Comparing the exclusionary default theory, and other extension-based seman-
tics, the prioritized default theory introduced in this chapter can help us understand
better these concrete legal situations.
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